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The Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary was first 
published in 1975.  The new association between 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and the University of Strathclyde’s 
Business School provides the Fraser of Allander Institute 
with the support to continue the Commentary, and we 
gratefully acknowledge this support.  The Fraser of Allander 
Institute is a research unit within the Department of 
Economics at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow.  The 
Institute carries out research on the Scottish economy, 
including the analysis of short-term movements in economic 
activity.  Its researchers have an international reputation in 
modelling regional economies and in regional development.  
One-off research projects can be commissioned by private 
and public sector clients.  If you would like further 
information on the Institute’s research or services, please 
contact the Institute Administrator on 0141 548 3958 or 
email the Institute at fraser@strath.ac.uk. 
 
The Fraser of Allander Institute was established in 1975 as 
a result of a donation from the Hugh Fraser Foundation.  We 
gratefully acknowledge the contribution of the Buchanan 
and Ewing Bequest towards the publication costs of the 
Commentary.   
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Outlook 
and  
appraisal 
Overview 
 
 
 
In the June Commentary we stressed that 
the Scottish economy was threatened with 
stagnation as the rate of recovery slows. This 
threat is even more real today than it was 
then. Growth has continued to weaken in the 
global economy and is weaker in the UK and 
Scottish economies too. The UK economy 
has effectively stagnated over the last year, 
growing by only 0.5%. In Scotland growth 
was flat between April and June and 
business surveys suggest continuing 
weakness in the third quarter. The UK has 
recovered more strongly than Scotland, by 
nearly 3% compared to around 1% to 2% in 
Scotland, even though the recovery is weak 
overall. There is little comfort in the latest 
GDP data for both Scotland and the UK. This 
is underlined by the latest US real GDP 
figures which reveal an annualised growth 
rate of 2.5% for the third quarter of this year. 
Growth in the US is still weak by the 
standards of previous recoveries and 
insufficient to make much of a dent in the 
high levels of unemployment. Yet, it is 
notable that with the latest quarter's results, 
GDP in the US economy moved back above 
its pre-recession peak output, whereas the 
UK and Scotland are still - in the second 
quarter - 5% and 4%, respectively, below 
their pre-recession GDP. It will not go 
unnoticed that, unlike the UK, the US has 
only recently adopted an austerity 
programme, which has yet to kick in. We 
therefore welcome the Bank of England's 
decision to undertake a further expansion of 
the money stock through quantitative easing 
and note that there is still scope for some 
fiscal easing without damaging our fiscal 
credibility in the long-term. 
 
Added to this are the consequences of the 
problems in the Eurozone which are affecting 
business confidence and if there is a 
disorderly Greek default will have damaging 
consequences for Scottish exports, 
investment and household spending as bank 
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lending contracts further. The problems 
become much greater if there is a prospect 
of an Italian default, which, if it occurred, 
would probably throw the world economy into 
a recession as big, if not bigger than the 
Great Recession that started in 2008. On a 
gloomy note we consider that there is not a 
high probability that the Eurozone problems 
will be quickly resolved. Even if some 
headway is made in creating a sustainable 
financing mechanism for those member 
countries that are finding it difficult to fund 
their sovereign bonds at reasonable rates, 
such as the ECB becoming a full lender of 
last resort like any other central bank, there 
is still the issue of adjustment to deal with if 
the problems are not to recur. Peripheral 
member countries need to improve (lower) 
their prices and costs relative to Germany on 
a sustained basis. Being members of a 
currency union precludes own currency 
devaluation so the periphery must adjust by 
a relative internal deflation of wages and 
prices of significant proportions. We are not 
sanguine that this can be achieved without a 
higher level of inflation in the EZ core - 
Germany especially - being tolerated and 
that looks unlikely. The future of the present 
Eurozone looks bleak. 
 
Against this background we are forecasting 
GDP growth of 0.4% this year, and 0.9% in 
2012 compared to our June forecast of 0.8% 
and 1.5%, respectively. Our research on 
previous forecast errors – see the paper by 
Grant Allan – suggests the lower and upper 
bounds for growth in 2011 are expected to 
be 0.1% and 0.7% and for 2012, 0.4% and 
1.4%. Forecasts for the UK have also been 
reduced by independent forecasters, 
reflecting the weakening in the UK and global 
economies. So, overall, we are projecting 
weaker growth than previously and 
continuing weaker recovery than the UK.  
 
In the labour market we note the strong 
contribution of part-time employment to the 
recent recovery in jobs. On our central 
forecast, net jobs grow by 0.2% in 2011, 
0.4% in 2012 and 0.7% in 2013. By end 2013 
total employee jobs are forecast to be 
2,324,000 around 80,000 fewer than at the 
end of 2008 but up by 60,000 from the end of 
2009, and up by 30,000 from the end of 
2010. By sector, the largest absolute growth 
in job numbers is forecast for the production 
sectors in 2011(2,400 against 2,250), but in 
services in 2012 (4,950 against 3,400 in 
production) and 2013 (9,350 against 6,100). 
Few jobs are created in construction or in 
agriculture over the forecast horizon. 
Unemployment, on the preferred ILO 
measure is forecast to rise to 8.3%, or 
219,800 by the end of this year, rising further 
to 234,800 or 8.9% by the end of 2012. After 
that, the numbers unemployed will fall only 
slightly to 231,550 by the end 2013 but the 
rate stays the same at 8.9%. 
 
Recent GDP performance 
The latest quarterly growth data from the Scottish 
government for the second quarter 2011 reveal that GDP 
grew by 0.1%, the same as in the UK. Hence, growth was 
largely flat between April and June in both Scotland and the 
UK and weaker than in the first quarter where growth is now 
estimated to have been 0.2% - see Figure1.  
 
Over the year to the second quarter GDP growth was 
weaker in Scotland with net output growing by 1.1% 
compared to 1.5% in the UK. 
 
There was a boost to Scottish growth from a strong 
performance of Electricity, Gas Supply, with growth of just 
over 15% compared to a fall of -1.7% in the sector in the 
UK. But the sector only contributes about 2% to overall 
GVA. Both the major Services sector (73% of the economy) 
and Construction (8% of the economy) were weaker in 
Scotland compared to their UK counterparts in the quarter 
see Figures 2 and 3. 
 
Services grew by 0.1% in Scotland but by 0.2% in the UK, 
while Construction contracted by -2.3% in Scotland but grew 
by 1.1% in the UK. Over the year, Service sector growth 
was weaker in Scotland at 0.1% compared to growth of 1% 
in UK Services. In contrast, Construction performance was 
stronger in Scotland with growth of 11.8% compared to 
7.3% in the UK. 
  
In the latest quarter, manufacturing grew by 0.2% in both 
Scotland and the UK, a bit better than the economy overall 
but still relatively weak growth - see Figure 4. Over the year, 
manufacturing output has grown by around 2% in Scotland 
but with growth of nearly 5%, the sector has grown more 
strongly in the UK.  
 
When the latest data are looked at over the period since the 
start of the recession the challenge facing the Scottish 
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Figure 1: Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth, 1998q2 to 2011q2 
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Figure 2: Scottish and UK Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2011q2 
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Figure 3: Scottish and UK Financial Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2010q4 
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economy is clear. Scottish GDP is still more than 4% below 
where it was just before the recession started - see Figure 
5. The UK economy is nearly 5% below from where it 
started. However, the depth of the recession was greater 
and sharper in the UK, with GDP falling by just over 7%, 
whereas in Scotland the drop was a little under 6%. But the 
UK has come back more strongly than Scotland, by nearly 
3% compared to around 1% to 2% in Scotland, even though 
the recovery is weak overall. There is little comfort in the 
latest GDP data for both Scotland and the UK. This is 
underlined by the latest US real GDP figures which reveal 
an annualised growth rate of 2.5% for the third quarter of 
this year. Growth in the US is still weak by the standards of 
previous recoveries and insufficient to make much of a dent 
in the high levels of unemployment. Yet, it is notable that 
with the latest quarter's results, GDP in the US economy 
moved back above its pre-recession peak output, whereas 
the UK and Scotland are still - in the second quarter - 5% 
and 4%, respectively, below their pre-recession GDP. It will 
not go unnoticed that, unlike the UK, the US has only 
recently adopted an austerity programme, which has yet to 
kick in. 
 
While in the second quarter Scottish GDP was 4% below its 
pre-recession peak, GDP is further below where it would 
have been if the recession had not occurred and the 
economy continued to grow at trend. Figure 6 provides the 
results of applying trend growth of 0.5% per quarter to the 
pre-recession peak. This suggests that Scottish GDP was 
10.4% below where it would have been with no recession. 
However, we cannot be sure that the recession may not 
have destroyed capacity, so, for example, there may be 
financial service activities that will never return. Assuming 
that lost capacity is 2% of GDP - i.e. one third of the 
percentage drop in GDP due to the recession -  we then 
apply the 0.5% quarterly trend rate, which leads to an 
'output gap' of 8.5% by 2011Q2. A worst case scenario 
where the trend rate of growth is lower at 0.4% per quarter 
as well as a once and for all permanent loss of output leads 
to an output gap estimate of 7.3% by 2011q2.  
 
What this analysis suggests is that the economy is much 
worse off than suggested by the current growth rate and by 
the extent to which GDP is below the pre-recession peak. 
Moreover, if the trend projection is anywhere near accurate 
it also suggests that the amount of spare capacity is large 
and there is much room for growth and therefore a demand 
stimulus without inflationary fears. 
 
We can get a deeper understanding of the strength of the 
recovery in Scotland, absolutely and compared to the UK, 
by looking at the real GDP performance of the principal 
sectors since the beginning of the recession. 
 
Figure 7 charts the recession and recovery in the Service 
sector in Scotland and the UK. Services account for 73% of 
total Scottish value added or GDP. The figure shows that 
UK services had a steeper recession than Scottish services 
with GVA falling by -5.35%, while GVA in Scottish services 
fell by -4.89% during the recession. However, recovery from 
recession has been much stronger in UK services. By the 
second quarter of this year, UK services were -2.88% below 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
  
Figure 4: Scottish and UK Manufacturing GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2011q2 
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the pre-recession peak, whereas Scottish services were -
4.42% below. What this suggests, and what the figure 
shows, is that there has been hardly any recovery in 
Scottish services at all. After the drop in services GVA in the 
recession it has stagnated thereafter for nearly two years 
and can be described as "bumping along the bottom". 
  
The explanation for this stagnation is because services 
depend much more on local domestic demand than sectors 
such as manufacturing. It is now well known that household 
consumption in the UK was badly affected during and after 
the recession. This was the consequence of the legacy of 
high levels of household borrowing for mortgages and 
personal credit that was a contributory factor in the credit 
crunch and subsequent collapse of demand. Moreover, as is 
revealed in the discussion of the household spending data 
in the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy section in this 
Commentary below, income growth in Scotland is slightly 
weaker than in the UK as a whole which along with 
consequences of the debt overhang is likely to account for 
the overall weakness in Scottish household spending and 
hence service sector growth. 
 
The financial services and business services sectors taken 
together account for 26% of overall Scottish GDP and 29% 
in the UK. Figure 8 charts the recession and recovery in this 
combined sector in Scotland and the UK. What is evident 
from the chart is that the recession in this sector was much 
greater in Scotland than in the UK, and this might in part 
reflect the greater incidence in Scotland of the banking 
problems that precipitated the credit crunch and recession. 
It is also clear from the chart that there has been hardly any 
recovery from recession in the sector. UK business and 
financial services have contracted further and GVA in the 
sector stands more than 7% below the pre-recession peak. 
In Scotland, while there has been some recovery in the 
sector during the last two years it is marginal with GVA now 
standing less than 11% below the pre-recession peak. 
 
The UK government hopes that rapid growth of exports and 
investment will underpin the recovery from the Great 
Recession. Exports and investment must grow appreciably 
to offset weakness in household spending, labouring under 
a debt overhang and squeezed disposable income, and 
weakness in government spending, due to fiscal 
consolidation. Exports are mainly of manufactured goods. 
So, while manufacturing directly contributes only about 12% 
to GDP in Scotland and 10% in the UK as a whole it is 
expected to play a crucial role in the recovery. Stronger 
manufacturing export growth will contribute to GDP growth 
directly but also indirectly through an increased demand for 
service sector inputs and from the spending of higher 
earned incomes. We noted above the comparatively weak 
recent growth in manufacturing in both Scotland and the UK 
and the weaker growth in Scotland over the year. Figure 9 
charts the recession and recovery in the manufacturing 
sector in Scotland and the UK. The very large falls in 
manufacturing output in both Scotland and the UK are
PAGE 8 VOLUME 35  NUMBER 2 
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Figure 5: GVA and Jobs in Recession and Recovery: Scotland and UK 
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Figure 6: Scottish 'Output Gap' under different assumptions  
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Figure 7: The Service Sector: Recession and Recovery in Scotland and UK 
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Figure 8: Business & Financial Services: Recession and Recovery in Scotland and UK  
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Figure 9: Manufacturing: Recession and Recovery in Scotland and UK 
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clearly evident. Moreover, the drop in output was much 
greater in the UK, at over -13%, than in Scotland, at a little 
above -10%. However, it is also evident that UK 
manufacturing has recovered more rapidly than Scottish 
manufacturing. By the second quarter of this year UK 
manufacturing GVA was just under 6% below its pre-
recession peak, while UK manufacturing was just under 7% 
below its pre-recession peak. So, by the second quarter UK 
manufacturing had recovered nearly 50% (48.5%) of the 
GVA lost in the recession, while Scottish manufacturing had 
recovered just over 40% (42.3%). The recovery is weak in 
both UK and Scottish manufacturing but the challenge 
confronting Scottish manufacturing is clearly evident, given 
the weakness of Scottish household demand and the lack of 
recovery in the Scottish service sector. 
 
Finally, Figure 10 charts the recession and recovery in the 
construction sector in Scotland and the UK.  The drop in 
output in the recession was sizable and at just above -18% 
broadly the same in Scotland and the UK. The figure reveals 
that construction recovered more quickly from recession in 
Scotland than in the UK, and we noted above that 
construction performance has been stronger in Scotland 
over the past year. This will offer comfort to the Scottish 
government that its decision to front-load capital investment 
last year may have had a positive outcome on construction 
output. However, we are not convinced that the timing of the 
upsurge fits with the outlay of additional government capital 
investment. An alternative, albeit anecdotal, view is that the 
boost to Scottish construction in 2010 came from projects in 
the pipeline that were held back or the start-date postponed 
because of the recession. Whatever, the explanation for the 
upsurge, the downturn again in the sector over the last three 
quarters must be a cause for concern. 
 
The labour market 
The latest labour market data for Scotland show falling 
employment in the latest quarter (-24,000) and rising 
employment over the year (+20,000) - see Overview of the 
Labour Market  section below. Unemployment rose by 7,000 
in the quarter but has fallen by 17,000 over the year. The 
Scottish unemployment rate now stands higher at 7.9% but 
remains below the UK unemployment rate of 8.1%. In 
addition, the rate of employment of the population aged 
between 16 and 64 fell to 71.2% but is still above the UK 
employment rate of 70.4%. 
 
These data have, quite reasonably, been interpreted as 
indicating that the Scottish labour market continues to be 
robust both absolutely and relative to the UK, despite the 
latest evidence of weakening. However, we must be careful 
about the conclusions that we draw from these data. 
 
First, total UK employment is currently about 1.5% below 
its pre-recession peak while total Scottish employment is 
more than 3% below its pre-recession peak - see Figure 11. 
 
Secondly, strong growth in jobs in Scotland of 70,000 
between the first quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of this 
year masks the fact that Scotland endured a large shake-ou
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Figure 10: Construction: Recession and Recovery in Scotland and UK 
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Figure 11: Employment in UK and Scotland relative to Apr-June 2007 Scottish peak and Apr-June 2008 UK 
peak  
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of nearly 50,000 jobs between the 2009q4 and 2010q1. This 
was probably an over-reaction by Scottish employers so 
there might have been an element of catch up last year as 
employers sought to establish a proper balance between 
jobs and output. Alternatively, there is a parallel with the 
rapid surge in GVA in construction which rose in the first 
three quarters of 2010 with the rise in jobs coming plausibly 
one quarter later in the second, third and fourth quarters. 
So, if the job surge was due to the rapid increase in 
construction activity, this leaves open the question whether 
it was the Scottish government's decision to front-load 
capital investment that caused it.  As we noted above it is 
not clear to us that the timing fits and there are other 
candidate explanations for the upsurge in construction 
activity. What cannot be denied, however, is the evidence 
that the Scottish labour market shed -4.77% of its jobs in the 
recession while the UK  shed only -2.41% and job levels are 
still more than 3% below the pre-recession peak in Scotland 
but only 1.5% below in the UK. 
 
Thirdly, one must also look at the movement within the 
overall jobs total, particularly what is happening to jobs in 
the both the private and public sectors. The public sector 
jobs figures released in September show that public sector 
employment in Scotland fell by 25,200 in the year to the 
second quarter of 2011, while there were 57,700 more jobs 
in the private sector over the period. The performance of the 
private sector job creation is clearly going to be of crucial 
importance to the future jobs prospects of the Scottish 
labour market as fiscal consolidation bites.  
 
Finally, we need to bring in a fourth factor when considering 
the state of the Scottish labour market. This is that one 
should not judge the state of the labour market by job 
creation alone but by the creation of jobs in relation to 
available labour reserves. Working population has been 
rising in Scotland by a little more than 100,000 since the 
start of the recession. When that is taken into account we 
see - Figure 12 - that the total employment-working 
population ratio is still more than -5.5% below its pre-
recession peak while the ratio fell by -6.35% from peak to 
the trough of the recession. 
 
These figures do not indicate a tight labour market but one 
that is still suffering from  a severe lack of demand, nearly 
four years after the start of the recession . Moreover, job 
creation in Scotland appears to be more biased towards 
part-time working than in the UK, so relatively less labour 
services may be being demanded than is apparent from the 
simple job numbers. The numbers of full time workers in 
Scotland has declined by 120,000 since the pre-recession 
peak, whilst part time employment, in contrast, fell by only 
7,000 during the recession then recovered quickly to be 
40,000 higher between April 2010 - March 2011 than the 
pre-recession peak. When expressed in terms of full time 
equivalents the recent stronger Scottish employment growth 
is much more muted. 
 
Another labour market issue that should not be forgotten is 
the degree of inequality between participants and areas that 
appear to have worsened in the recession and the limited 
recovery. The 18-24 year old age group has been badly hit 
with its employment rate dropping from 68.1% between April 
2007 and March 2008, to 61.7% between April 2010 and 
March 2011. During the past year the deterioration in job 
losses amongst young people - 18-24 - has continued. In 
addition, the employment rate for men has fallen by more 
than that for women except in the 50 - 64 age group.  North 
Ayrshire and Glasgow continue to suffer high unemployment 
rates of 12.1% and 11.2%, respectively, compared to the 
national average of 7.9%, almost twice the rates that existed 
before the recession. Inactivity rates were also high in the 
two areas, as well as Eilean Siar, at 29.8%, 29.4% and 
31.4%, respectively, compared to the national average of 
22.9% 
 
Overall, it appears that  the growth of private sector output 
remains weak and insufficient to offset the effects of fiscal 
consolidation to produce falling or stable unemployment. 
The growth of part-time employment  appears to be masking 
a decline in full-time employment. Levels of inequality in the 
labour market are worsening particularly to the 
disadvantage of young workers and areas such as North 
Ayrshire, Glasgow and Eilean Siar. The latest data are 
consistent with our expectation that we should expect 
unemployment in Scotland to begin to rise again. 
 
Persistent macro-economic policy myths 
There are several myths that have gained currency with key 
policymakers, and opinion formers across the world that are 
seriously limiting appropriate policy responses to the 
aftermath of the Great Recession and the Eurozone crisis. 
 
General  
 
Myth 1:  Reducing government budget deficits and debt 
 levels - "fiscal consolidation" - will enhance growth 
 - "expansionary austerity"  
 
This is the obverse of the view that high levels of 
government borrowing and rising debt will lead to higher 
interest rates, yields on long-term (10 year) bonds, thereby 
slowing growth and risking higher inflation. While there may 
be some truth in this view if the economy is close to full-
employment it is definitely not the case when there is a large 
degree of spare capacity and unemployment is high. In this 
situation any consequences for the interest rate and its 
effect on demand will be more than outweighed by the 
countervailing change in aggregate demand due to the net 
change in government spending. So, cutting government 
spending may lower interest rates to some degree as well 
as input costs, including wages, for the private sector. Some 
boost to demand may come from that. But it will be more 
than outweighed by the loss of output and jobs caused by 
the cut back in government spending.  
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Figure 12: Employment in Scotland to Working Population relative to Apr-Jun 2007 peak 
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Recent research by IMF staff looked at the impact of fiscal 
consolidation using data over the past 30 years, covering 
173 episodes in 17 advanced countries. Their conclusion is 
stark, " ..fiscal consolidations typically have the short-run 
effect of reducing incomes and raising unemployment. A 
fiscal consolidation of 1 per cent of GDP reduces inflation-
adjusted incomes by about 0.6% and raises the 
unemployment rate by almost 0.5 percentage points .. within 
two years, with some recovery thereafter. Spending by 
households and firms also declines, with little evidence of a 
handover from public to private sector demand. In 
economists' jargon fiscal consolidations are contractionary, 
not expansionary."1 Added to this, the authors find that long-
term unemployment increases and inequality rises with the 
burden mainly falling on wage earners rather than on 
recipients of profits and rents.2 
 
When it is remembered that the fiscal consolidation 
occurring in Britain is planned to take 6% out of GDP by 
2015-16 then on the above estimates real GDP is likely to 
be nearly 4% lower and unemployment 3% points higher as 
a result. Moreover, while in more normal times there might 
be some favourable effect on interest rates and private 
sector activity due to fiscal consolidation that is much less 
likely today following the Great Recession because interest 
rates are almost zero. This is a situation where there is an 
excess of desired savings and individuals/institutions have 
more than enough liquidity - a situation economists describe 
as a 'liquidity trap'. The effect is that interest rates will tend  
not to rise following a fiscal stimulus, nor fall following fiscal 
consolidation. Krugman (2011)3 shows that  10 year US 
Treasury bond yields actually fell over the period since 
2008, when there was a $4 trillion rise in US federal debt 
held by the public. 
 
Myth 2:  Printing money - "quantitative easing" - will 
 necessarily lead to inflation, even hyper-
 inflation   
 
The view that expanding the monetary base - via the 
purchase by the central bank of long-term bonds - will 
promote inflation depends on a complicated transmission 
mechanism that sees a lowering of interest rates, rising 
asset prices, increased spending, rising nominal GDP with 
rising prices, promotion of inflationary expectations and an 
inflationary spiral. However, interest rates are effectively 
zero - the 'zero bound' - so that banks, financial institutions 
and corporates may be quite happy to swap one store of 
value, a bond, for another store of value, money, with no 
further consequences. It is only if the trade gives the banks 
etc. desired liquidity that there is likely to be a carry-though 
to spending and a rise in nominal GDP. Furthermore, if 
there is much spare capacity in the economy and high 
unemployment, as at present, the likelihood is a rise in 
output and not prices. So on this basis under present 
conditions expansion of the monetary base is unlikely to 
promote inflation and given almost zero interest rates and a 
'liquidity trap' may not have much impact on demand - 
nominal GDP - at all. The current evidence that growth in 
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the monetary base has not led to growth in the broader 
definition of money (M4) which includes bank deposits, the 
continuing weakness of bank lending, low levels of 'core' 
inflation - wage growth is no more than 2% - as opposed to 
'headline' inflation and weak inflation expectations would 
appear to offer support for these points.4 
 
Eurozone 
 
Myth 3:  Large government budget deficits and  
 high levels of sovereign debt are the result of 
 government profligacy. 
 
The Eurozone (EZ) crisis is the most significant for the world 
economy since the events of late 2008 following the 
collapse of Lehmans. Yet, much media discussion and the 
pronouncements of the ECB, and key member governments 
such as Germany5 and France seek to source the crisis to 
the irresponsible 'local' behaviour of the governments of 
peripheral countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Italy. The implication is that if such governments 
begin to behave responsibly then after some adjustment the 
problems of the EZ will be resolved. Nothing could be 
further from the truth. The problems of the EZ are largely 
'systemic' although the behaviour of some governments and 
private sector agents in individual countries such as Greece 
has not helped. Kash Mansor6 demonstrates that the 
explanation is more 'systemic' than 'local'. The creation of 
the EZ made it more attractive for investors in the rest of 
Europe to buy assets in the peripheral countries, where 
there were, on the face of it, significant investment 
opportunities. Governments in the periphery were able to 
borrow at near German rates because the financial markets 
believed, and were implicitly led to believe by the ECB and 
Germany and France, that peripheral country sovereign 
bonds had the backing of the EZ authorities. This led to 
significant flows of capital from the centre to the periphery 
and a crisis was precipitated when these flows suddenly 
stopped. 
 
The evidence for this is in the data presented by Mansor 
and in his words " The factor that crisis countries have in 
common is that, without exception, they ran the largest 
current account deficits in the EZ during the period 2000-
2007. The relationship between budget deficits and crisis is 
much weaker; some of the crisis countries had significant 
average surpluses (e.g. Spain and Ireland) during the years 
leading up to the crisis, while some of the EZ countries with 
large fiscal deficits (e.g. France and Germany) did not 
experience crisis. This is one piece of evidence that a surge 
in capital flows, not budget deficits, may have been what 
laid the groundwork for the crisis." Moreover, " ... the capital 
flow bonanzas in evidence ... were directly the result of the 
adoption of the euro by the peripheral EZ countries, which 
made it easier for capital in the core EZ countries to find 
investment opportunities in the periphery."7 
 
Several of the periphery countries such as Greece, Portugal 
and Spain have real efficiency and competitiveness 
problems, which makes it difficult for them in a monetary 
union, led by Germany, that has high levels of productivity 
growth. One saving grace might have been if these 
investment flows had facilitated an economic adjustment in 
the periphery sufficient to raise their productivity and 
competitiveness towards German levels. The evidence 
shows that the capital flows were associated with 
investment spending  rising in the periphery countries (with 
the exception of Portugal), and for consumption to fall. So, 
no evidence of local irresponsibility there. However, the 
capital flows in addition tended to fuel rising domestic prices 
in the periphery, hence a rising real exchange rate and 
deteriorating competitiveness, which improved little relative 
to Germany. 
 
Myth 4:  "fiscal and structural reforms" in the periphery 
 will solve the current problems of the 
 Eurozone . 
 
This seems to be the view of the ECB and the core EZ 
states, Germany and France. There are two issues that 
need to be addressed: financing and adjustment of the 
peripheral states with high and unsustainable debt levels. 
The model of financing adopted by the EZ is to use the 
EFSF with leveraged funding up to 1,000bn Euros, bank 
recapitalisation and where necessary, as in the Greek case, 
debt relief: a 50% write-down of Greek debt is on offer. The 
financing package relies to a large extent on private sector 
support: voluntary debt write-downs and voluntary bank 
recapitalisation, as well as hoped for financial support for 
the EFSF from China. In addition, the peripheral economies 
are expected to make significant structural adjustments: 
budget deficit reductions and steps taken to improve the 
competitiveness of their economies through, effectively, 
internal devaluation of wages, prices and cost reductions 
relative to the EZ core. 
 
There is little likelihood that these measures will solve the 
problems of the EZ. On financing, while the scale of support 
on offer might be sufficient to support Greece it is unlikely to 
be sufficient to support Italy because the scale of its 
indebtedness and its refunding requirements is so much 
greater. The only real solution to the financing problem is for 
the ECB to take on the true role of a central bank, which is 
not simply aiming for price stability but also acting as lender 
of last resort. If ECB acted as a lender of last resort it would 
start to buy individual sovereign bonds where there was a 
market shortfall. This is what the Bank of England would do 
in the UK or the Fed in the US. However, to fulfil this 
function would require the ECB to print Euros and hence 
increase the money stock. Given German sensitivities over 
inflation this is unlikely to happen and so the EZ crisis will 
continue until eventual breakup and reconstitution in some 
new form with perhaps a core Germany, France, Holland, 
Belgium, Luxembourg monetary union. 
 
Added to this is the question of adjustment. The overriding 
goal of the ECB and the core countries of the EZ is that the 
burden of adjustment must be borne by the current account 
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deficit countries in the periphery. But to secure adjustment 
in the absence of individual national currencies requires 
internal devaluation: price and wage reductions relative to 
the core. This is almost impossible to secure. Countries 
such as Ireland and Latvia which might be described as the 
poster boys of internal devaluation have hardly achieved 
any real internal reduction in wages and prices. We can say 
with some certainty that Germany and the ECB need to 
accept that current account surplus countries within the EZ 
are part of the problem. They must adjust too. They can 
adjust by allowing an expansion of domestic demand 
sufficient to promote a rise in domestic inflation to 3% to 4%. 
If that happens then it will be easier for the periphery to 
adjust through a much less stringent internal devaluation. If 
that does not occur there is little hope for the survival of the 
EZ as presently constituted. 
 
UK 
 
Myth 5:  Fiscal austerity is necessary to secure 
 business and financial market confidence.  
 
A special case of Myth 1.  Here we have the belief, 
frequently articulated by the UK government,  that fiscal 
consolidation will not only free up private sector resources 
for growth but is necessary to encourage financial markets 
to accept lower interest rates - yields - on government 
bonds and hence borrowing. Lower bond rates make the 
debt easier to fund, make it more sustainable, and require 
less diversion of public spending to fund it. The coalition 
government's view is that current low yields on UK 10 year 
bonds represent a vote of confidence in the UK 
government's fiscal austerity policy. Hence, austerity was 
necessary even when the UK economy was relatively 
depressed. The alternative view is that stabilisation and 
reduction of debt levels through reduced structural budget 
deficits is necessary within a medium term fiscal framework. 
On this view, a fiscal stimulus may be required in the short-
term to boost aggregate demand and protect tax revenues, 
with deficit reduction and reduced debt levels occurring in 
the medium term when the economy has more normal 
levels of aggregate demand. 
 
What the evidence seems to show is that low UK 
government 10 year bond yields are more a reflection of 
expectations by the financial markets of low growth, and 
hence a flight from 'risk assets' such as equities into less 
risky assets such as UK, US and German sovereign debt. 
Neither the US nor Germany has put in place austerity 
measures on the scale of the UK government. 
 
Myth 6: Britain's current weak current growth 
performance is a consequence of the 
Eurozone crisis 
There is a sense from some of the comments of UK 
government ministers to recent UK growth figures that the 
crisis in the Eurozone is being blamed for the current 
weakness of UK growth. While it is certainly the case that 
the crisis is affecting confidence and may be leading to a 
reluctance to invest by some companies in the UK, the 
reason for a loss of confidence is that the crisis portends the 
risk of sovereign default, contagion to other sovereigns, 
bank runs, bank failures, and a drop in aggregate demand 
and GDP. If and when any of those events occur then the 
harmful impact on the global economy, including the UK, will 
be dramatic. But in the meantime the explanation for weaker 
UK growth largely rests at home: the continuing 
consequence of the debt overhang for household spending, 
low expectations of growth by firms leading to weak 
investment, insufficient pickup in net exports and the impact 
of the sizable fiscal consolidation. It is revealing that the US 
while experiencing a weak recovery from the Great 
Recession nevertheless returned to its pre-recession peak 
level of GDP in the third quarter of this year. The UK, in 
contrast, is still 4% below its pre-recession peak although 
the UK's unemployment rate is slightly lower at 8.1% 
compared to 9.1% in the US. 
 
Forecasts 
 
Background 
The weakness of the global economy continued into the 
third quarter although there were some brighter spots. First, 
the US economy grew by 0.6%, or an annual rate of 2.5%. 
This is still weak growth for a recovery phase but it was 
better than expected and, as noted above, it took US real 
GDP back to its pre-recession peak. But the US economy is 
still not creating enough jobs to reduce its unemployment 
rate which is still at the high level of 9.1%. Secondly, the UK 
reported real GDP growth of 0.5% in the third quarter which 
was above the anticipated 0.3%. However, the special 
factors that temporarily reduced growth: the Royal wedding; 
two bank holidays; and the effects on supply of the 
Japanese Tsunami, have now unwound, so that the ONS 
recommends that the two quarters should be taken together. 
On that basis growth averaged 0.3% in the two quarters, 
with real GDP largely stagnant over the past year rising by 
only 0.5% over the year to the third quarter. 
 
While the recent poor performance of UK GDP is due to 
weak domestic demand, the problems of the Eurozone (EZ) 
are likely to diminish future growth prospects even further. 
The 25 basis point cut in the ECB funds rate is very 
welcome but this reverses what was clearly an ECB  policy 
error in raising the rate by the same amount in July. For 
most advanced economies on most key indicators, such as 
GDP, jobs and wage incomes, the recovery is worse than 
the average from previous recessions - see the FRED  - 
Federal Reserve of St Louis - database.8 This supports the 
Reinhart Rogoff (2010) research findings that economies 
subject to a recession precipitated by financial and banking 
crises in particular experience a very weak recovery.9 
 
The latest forecasts from the London-based NIESR - The 
National Institute for Economic and Social Research 
suggest continuing weakness in UK GDP growth for the 
next eighteen months at least, with growth of 0.9% this year 
and 0.8% in 2012. They noted in their October GDP 
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estimate release that this recovery will be the weakest of 
any since the end of the First World War and that includes 
the 1930s Depression. Against that background, we 
welcome the decision by the Monetary Policy 
Committee(MPC) of the Bank of England in October to 
begin a further programme of "Quantitative Easing" by 
increasing the purchase of, largely, government bonds with 
long-term maturities (more than 3 years) by £75 billion to 
£275 billion. But with the difficulties confronting monetary 
policy when interest rates are close to zero in getting carry 
through to nominal GDP, we still believe there is scope for 
more fiscal easing. This view is held by NIESR too, who in 
publishing their latest forecasts argue "  .. it remains our 
view that in the short-term fiscal policy is too tight and a 
modest loosening would improve prospects for output and 
employment with little or no negative effect on fiscal 
credibility."10 
 
 
Table 1: Forecast Scottish GVA Growth, 2011-2013  
 
GVA Growth (% per annum) 2011 2012 2013 
Central forecast 0.4 0.9 1.6 
June forecast 
 
UK median independent last 3 months (October) 
 
Mean Absolute Error % points 
0.8 
 
1.0 
 
+/- 0.296 
 
1.5 
 
1.5 
 
+/- 0.492 
1.9 
 
na 
 
na 
 
 
 
 Scotland cannot help being touched by weak household 
spending in the rest of the UK as well as the deteriorating 
conditions in the EZ. For example, more than half of 
Scotland's exports outside the UK are to EU economies 
mostly within the EZ.  
GVA Forecasts 
For our latest GVA forecasts we adopt a new presentational 
procedure. Since 2008 we have presented a high and low 
forecast as well as the central forecast. This was done in 
recognition of the high degree of uncertainty confronting the 
economy at the time and since. However, following recent 
work in the Institute reviewing the accuracy of FAI forecasts 
- see Grant Allan's paper later in this Commentary - we are 
now able to use the estimated forecast errors to establish 
the likely range that the true first estimate of the growth of 
Scottish GVA will lie between. 
 
Domestically, wage income growth has been weaker in 
Scotland than the UK, but UK income growth slowed in 
2011 possibly moving the two more into line - see 
discussion of SNAP data in Scottish Economy Forecasts 
section below. Household spending fell by more in the UK 
during the recession, 6.5% compared to a fall of 4.5% in 
Scotland - a fall of 5% in the UK over the same period. 
Perhaps as a result, the UK savings rate stayed above the 
Scottish savings rate until the end of last year when the 
Scottish rate moved above the UK rate. We do not have 
data for much of 2011, nor do we know whether the Scottish 
data may be revised in the light of revisions to the UK data 
published on October 25th, so we don't know for certain 
whether there was an absolute and/or relative weakening in 
Scottish household expenditure. What is beyond doubt is 
that household spending in both Scotland and UK remains 
very weak, along with investment and exports.  
 
Table 1 presents our forecasts for Scottish GVA - GDP at 
basic prices - for 2011 to 2013. The forecasts are presented 
in more detail in the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy 
section of this Commentary below. 
 
Table 1 shows that we have revised downwards our 
forecast for all years. The lower forecasts reflect a 
weakening in household spending and export growth 
particularly compared with the position in June. The OBR 
forecasts for the UK are now out of date since they were 
produced in March and almost certainly will be revised 
downwards this month. Our forecasts are therefore 
compared with the median of latest independent  forecasts 
for the UK in 2011, 2012 that are published by the UK 
Treasury. We are now forecasting growth of 0.4% in 2011, 
and 0.9% in 2012 compared to our June forecast of 0.8% 
and 1.5%, respectively. Given our previous forecast errors 
the lower and upper bounds for growth in 2011 are expected 
to be 0.1% and 0.7% and for 2012, 0.4% and 1.4%. 
Forecasts for the UK have also been reduced by 
independent forecasters, reflecting the weakening in the UK 
and global economies. So, overall, we are projecting weaker 
growth than previously and continuing weaker recovery than 
the UK. 
 
Some light on the performance of the Scottish economy in 
the third quarter can be shed from survey data - see Review 
of Business Surveys section below. The third quarter 
surveys of output, jobs and retail spending broadly suggest 
a slowdown in activity  with the expectation of a further 
slowdown and perhaps a complete halt to the recovery in 
the winter months. The Scottish Engineering Review is 
something of an exception, retaining a positive outlook but 
even here firms responding to the survey reported rising 
uncertainty. Overall, we consider that the demand for 
Scottish goods and services both currently and in the near 
term has weakened since we published the last 
Commentary in June. 
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Table 2: Forecast Scottish Net Jobs Growth in Three Scenarios, 2011-2013 
 
 2011 2012  2013 
Upper 11,150     18,850 41,100 
June forecast 36,317 41,882  60,675 
Central  4,900       8,750      16,200 
June forecast  20,600 18,548  39,849 
Lower -1,550          -1,350     -9,250 
June forecast 9,621 2,661  21,431 
 
 
   
Table 3: ILO unemployment rate and claimant count rate measures of unemployment under each of the 
three forecast scenarios 
 
 2011 2012  2013 
ILO unemployment 
    Rate (ILO un/TEA 16+)  8.3% 8.9%  8.9% 
Numbers  219,800 234,200  231,550 
Claimant count       
    Rate (CC/CC+total job)  5.4% 6.0%  5.9% 
Numbers  149,500 166,300  164,400 
 
 
We expect that production and manufacturing output will 
continue to be the main sectoral drivers of growth, with 
Production forecast to grow by 1.2% this year compared to 
service sector and construction growth of 0.2% which are 
largely flat-lining. In 2012, production continues to be the 
main sectoral driver of growth with growth of 2.2%. Stronger 
growth is projected for services and construction of 0.6% 
apiece but the two sectors remain comparatively weak. It is 
not until 2013 that we see much pick-up in growth. GDP is 
forecast to rise by 1.6%, still about 0.4% points below 
historic trend, while production growth rises to 3.7%, service 
sector growth moves up to 1.1% and the growth of 
construction GVA reaches 1%. 
 
Employment forecasts 
Table 2 presents our forecasts for net employee jobs for the 
3 years 2011 to 2013 in terms of a central and upper and 
lower forecasts. 
 
Table 2 indicates that our year-end employee jobs forecast 
are much reduced from the forecasts presented in the June 
Commentary. The lower forecasts reflect data revisions, 
revised productivity estimates and the impact of a 
weakening economy. On the central forecast, net jobs grow 
by 0.2% in 2011, 0.4% in 2012 and 0.7% in 2013. By end 
2013 total employee jobs are forecast to be 2,324,000 
around 80,000 fewer than at the end of 2008 but up by 
60,000 from the end of 2009, and up by 30,000 from the end 
of 2010. By sector, the largest absolute growth in job 
numbers is forecast for the production sectors, in 
2011(2,400 against 2,250) but in services in 2012 (4,950 
against 3,400 in production) and 2013 (9,350 against 
6,100). Few jobs are created in construction or in agriculture 
over the forecast horizon. 
Unemployment forecasts 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in Table 
3 below. 
 
The ILO rate is our preferred measure since it identifies 
those workers who are out of a job and are looking for work, 
whereas the claimant count simply records the unemployed 
who are in receipt of unemployment benefit. Unemployment 
is projected to rise further compared to our June forecast as 
GVA growth and job creation weakens. The recovery of 
Scottish GDP is expected to continue to be weaker and at a 
rate below that which is required - from the estimated Okun 
relationship - to stabilise unemployment. Hence 
unemployment is projected to rise even with positive output 
growth. Unemployment in Scotland this year is forecast to 
rise to 8.3%, or 219,800 by the end of this year, rising 
further to 234,200 or 8.9% by the end of 2012. After that, the 
numbers unemployed will fall only slightly to 231,550 by the 
end 2013 but the rate stays the same at 8.9%. However, as 
previous quarters have demonstrated there is considerable 
uncertainty around the unemployment forecast due to the 
extent to which output change maps into job change, 
changes in working population and independent variations  
in activity rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
4 November 2011 
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Introduction 
In summary, we revise down our forecast for Scottish GVA 
growth in 2011 from 0.8% to 0.4%. This is due to rapidly 
falling household consumption indices, suggesting (for the 
UK, and by implication Scotland) a rapid falling off in 
consumer confidence since the summer months and a 
worsening global (particularly Euro zone) economic 
environment which has seen unprecedented declines in 
business activity and confidence during the second half of 
2011. Continued high inflation, driven by commodity and 
energy price increases and temporary factors from recent 
changes to the VAT regime, will squeeze household 
incomes. Incomes themselves are seeing slower growth as 
inflation expectations remain anchored in the medium term, 
meaning real reductions in household income. Indeed the 
Bank of England warn against downside risks to meeting 
their 2% inflation target over the medium term as persisting 
weak domestic and external demand. Indicators suggest 
that 2012 will be a more difficult trading year, and our 
forecast has been revised down from 1.5% to 0.9%. 
 
Monetary policy 
The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee met on 
the 5th and 6th of October and took the view that UK 
inflation is likely to fall below its 2% target in the medium 
term as domestic and external conditions worsen, making a 
“compelling” case for a further round of asset purchases. 
The Bank’s own work on the impact of “Quantitative Easing” 
(QE) had argued that this has had real effects, principally – 
but not solely – through the “portfolio balance” channel. This 
is the consequence of the Bank buying assets from non-
bank financial institutions with newly created reserves which 
those institutions then reinvested in “riskier assets like 
corporate bonds and equities”. This raises asset prices, 
lowering yields and borrowing costs, acting to stimulate 
spending (Joyce et al, 2011). Asset price increases also 
increase the net worth of asset holders, increasing their 
spending. 
 
At its October meeting the Bank unanimously agreed to 
maintain interest rates at 0.5% and to expand the QE 
programme from £200 billion to £275 billion through the 
purchasing of gilts with maturities of more than 3 years. 
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Figure A: Compensation of employees, Scotland and UK, 1998 to 2010 
 
 
Note: UK and Scottish household compensation of employees series’ from Quarterly National Accounts (for the UK, published on 25th October 
2011) and SNAP (for the Scottish figures, published on 15th September 2011) respectively.  
 
 
 
Figure B: Household real expenditure (peak=100), UK and Scotland 
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Note: UK and Scottish household spending series from Quarterly National Accounts (for the UK, published on 25th October 2011) and SNAP 
(for the Scottish figures, published on 15th September 2011) respectively. Scottish figures given in current values converted to into real values 
using product deflators for components by UK consumption good series’ and applied to Scottish consumption components. 
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Fiscal policy 
Since our forecast in June, the Scottish Government 
brought forward its Draft Budget for 2012-13, alongside 
spending plans to 2014-15. The headline policy 
announcements were the switching of £200 million from 
resource to capital spending, allowing capital projects 
(principally transport) across Scotland to be retained despite 
large reductions to the Scottish Government’s capital 
budget. Spending on health, being protected against 
inflation, means that larger reductions in resource spending 
are required in other areas of the Scottish budget. In 
response to the budget, CPPR noted the larger than 
expected reductions in the resource budget for local 
government from central government, but that non-domestic 
rates will increase to offset this reduction. CPPR notes that 
local government’s resource budgets will therefore become 
“increasingly dependent on Non Domestic Rates as 
opposed to grants, which makes it potentially more volatile”. 
The level of realised efficiency savings will be crucial 
therefore in preventing real reductions in the quality or 
quantity of public services provided. We remind readers that 
the Scottish Government’s own figures show that the 
resource and capital budgets in 2014-15 are estimated to be 
9.2% and 36.7% lower (in real terms) than 2010-11 
respectively. 
 
Recent economic developments 
We begin by comparing figures for Scotland from the 
Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) with comparable 
series from UK Economic Accounts. The UK figures used 
here were released on the 25th of October, and were 
substantially revised compared to earlier UK figures. In 
particular, wage income and consumption expenditure was 
revised down while the household savings ratio was revised 
up (as will be detailed later). This has resulted in the pattern 
in household consumption for the UK coming much closer to 
that which Scotland has seen (on the experimental 
measures). If the Scottish figures are revised in light of the 
major UK revisions, then the differing pattern of household 
consumption between Scotland and the UK could reopen. 
This aside, we describe the pattern of income growth, 
demand and household savings, over the following sections.  
 
Household income 
Without specific National Statistics figures on weekly 
earnings for Scotland we cannot say how incomes growth 
differs between Scotland and the UK as a whole. 
Experimental statistics prepared under the SNAP are 
available however on Compensation of Employees – i.e. 
that portion of gross value added accruing to providers of 
labour (e.g. household income). This is the first time we 
have used these data in the commentary. Both data are 
available at current prices, so are not adjusted for inflation. 
Taking 2008 as the index year we can see from Figure A 
that the level of incomes fell slightly in 2009 and in 2010 is 
only slightly higher than the figure for 2008. The level of 
incomes in the UK had risen over this period to 3.5% above 
the 2008 level. This suggests – and we should note again 
that these Scottish data are experimental and so do not 
have the status of official National Statistics – that wage 
income growth in Scotland since the recession may have 
been weaker than for the UK as a whole. 
 
Household consumption expenditure 
Household consumption expenditure both in Scotland and 
the UK as a whole has fallen sharply during the recession. 
Total household spending in real terms remains significantly 
lower than its peak, and has fallen again in most recent 
quarter for which Scottish data are available (Q1 2011). This 
recent fall mirrors a decline in UK household expenditure. 
Household spending in Scotland is currently 4.5% below its 
pre-recession peak in real terms, unchanged from the level 
seen in Q42009. Household spending for the UK as a whole 
has fallen by 5.0% over the same period. These are shown 
in Figure B. 
 
Household savings ratio 
Part of the relative worsening of the household expenditure 
can be explained by examining the relative movements in 
the household savings ratio. This is the difference between 
total household resources (i.e. wage and other incomes 
minus taxes and transfers paid) and total household 
consumption expenditure. As was noted at time of 
publication at the end of October, the UK savings ratio was 
revised significantly upwards. This measure suggests that 
the savings ratio increased to 9.4% in a single quarter – an 
increase of 1.9 points on its previous estimate – at the start 
of 2009. Further, while previous data signalled an increasing 
savings ratio for households in Scotland and a fall in the UK 
ratio, the most recent UK data for Q2 shows an upwards 
jump. These data are shown in Figure C. 
 
As the Bank of England notes in its August Inflation Report, 
households may raise their savings in anticipation of lower 
earnings growth, or increased uncertainty about 
employment prospects. The Bank also notes that any gains 
to households from the reductions in interest rates might 
have been offset by an increased riskiness of lending, and 
so households unable to borrow at reduced rates. It remains 
likely however that household savings rates will remain 
above their averages over the last decade for the coming 
quarters as households’ real earnings growth remains weak. 
This implies that growth in the service sectors will remain 
weak. We shall see the consequences of this for forecasts 
of these sectors in the Forecast section. 
 
Output 
The latest figures on Gross Value Added in the Scottish 
economy are discussed in the Overview and appraisal 
section of this Fraser Economic Commentary. In brief, data 
continues to suggest that the recovery in both Scotland and 
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Figure C: Household savings ratio, UK and Scotland 
 
 
 
the UK is weak, but that growth is stronger in the UK as a 
whole than in Scotland. Growth in the second quarter of 
2011 in Scotland was 0.1%, the same as growth in the UK. 
The Scottish economy has grown 1.1% over the year, while 
the UK economy has grown by 1.5%. Growth in the UK 
economy over the year is stronger for both production and 
services sectors as a whole, with value added in the 
Scottish service sector still at an aggregate level 
comparable to that seen during the second quarter of 2009. 
Manufacturing growth remains stronger in the UK than in 
Scotland on an annual basis (4.6% vs. 1.9%). Scottish 
construction activity appears to be faring stronger than the 
UK, however much of the differences in the annual growth 
figures appears to be due to spikes in construction activity 
during Q3 and Q4 of 2010, not repeated in the UK. For the 
Scottish construction sector, there have been three quarters 
of negative growth since, while the sector grew in the UK in 
the recent quarter (although recent preliminary estimates of 
UK GDP for Q3 2011 suggests that this sector has seen 
growth of -0.6% in Q3). 
 
The release of preliminary GDP data for the UK in Q3 
reports that growth in the UK economy over the last two 
quarters has been 0.6%. Looking over the year as a whole 
annual GDP has grown by 0.5%, far below the official 
forecasts for growth.  
 
Investment  
Data on public and private expenditure on investment that 
are consistent with UK series’ are not available for Scotland. 
Experimental data under SNAP suggests that the fall in total 
investment expenditure in Scotland was less severe than for 
the UK as a whole, which would be consistent with overall 
activity in Scotland declining by less than activity in the UK 
as a whole, and a typically higher outturn on GVA for the 
construction sector in Scotland. This impression however 
cannot be fully understood without further examination of 
the links (including timing of activity) between investment 
spending and changes in the contribution of the construction 
sector. The relative lower decline in the sector in Scotland if 
corroborated in future figures, is of course an important 
issue. Current trends in Scottish construction activity appear 
to be weak, with three periods of declining GVA to Q2 2011, 
while the sector expanded in Q2.  
 
The preliminary estimate for construction activity in the UK 
in Q3 showed a decline of -0.6% - indicative of, and 
consistent with, continued worries about the investment 
environment. As is noted elsewhere in this issue of the 
Commentary, the investment outlook remains weak across 
much of the Scottish surveys. An exception appears to be 
oil and gas, which expects increased capital spending on 
exploration and production. Smaller companies in the sector 
report issues around the availability of access to capital.  
 
Scottish trade 
Scotland’s exports to the rest of the world during the second 
quarter of 2011 were detailed in the Index of Manufactured 
Exports, produced on the 5th of October. This revealed a 
broadly flat growth in the real value of exports to non-UK 
destinations. Growth in the second quarter of 1.1% meant 
that on a rolling annual basis real exports had increased by 
2.0%. 
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Within manufacturing sectors, the pattern of growth was 
mixed. Of continuing concern must be the growth missing in 
the “Engineering and allied industries” sectors, which was 
worth almost 46% of Scottish manufacturing exports in 
2007. In the second quarter of 2011 the value of total 
exports by this sector was almost 20% below this peak. 
Within this sector, we note that it is the “Electrical and 
instrument engineering” sector where GVA has fallen 
sufficiently to offset stronger performances in the “Transport 
equipment” and “Mechanical engineering” sector. “Food, 
drink and tobacco” continued its strong showing on exports 
as did “Chemicals, coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuels”, recovering the outputs and exports to levels 
of early in 2009. 
 
At the UK level, exports at the start of the year moved 
positively, in line with the evidence for Scotland as a whole. 
The Bank of England’s Inflation Report from August 
suggests that, while the lower level of Sterling should have 
helped exporters at the start of the year, demand from 
abroad is either being understated by surveys, or there has 
been an “adverse shift” in global demand away from the 
service exports produced by the UK. The only survey on 
Scotland’s service (and goods) exports is the Global 
Connections Survey, which is scheduled for release in 
January 2012 and will relate to the calendar year 2010. The 
timeliness of this survey means that we continue to rely on 
Manufacturing exports figures as indicators of the direction 
of Scotland’s exports.  
 
Exports to the rest of the UK 
Growth in the rest of the UK remains critical for the exports 
of Scottish firms. UK growth has remained broadly flat over 
the last three quarters, with preliminary data for Q3 2011 
estimating a slight rebound in growth of 0.5%. Digging 
deeper under this however, one sees that a wide range of  
“special events” were estimated to have reduced growth in 
the second quarter by around 0.5%. Figures for the UK 
economy, the ONS suggested should be viewed grouping 
together quarters 2 and 3, giving growth of 0.6% over the 
last two quarters and 0.5% over the last year. 
Continued weak economic figures and survey evidence for 
the UK, combined with a worsening labour market 
performance, suggests that growth in the second half of 
2011 is likely to be flat. Indeed, some commentators have 
not ruled out a quarter of negative growth in Q4 2011. 
Against this background of worsening domestic demand in 
the UK, significant revisions to savings ratios and weak 
signs of the investment environment improving, it appears 
that external factors are not currently providing the sources 
of growth hoped for during the period of deliberate 
rebalancing. Indeed, the UK Economic Accounts reported 
that positive contributions to UK growth in Q2 came from 
General Government and Investment, while trade and 
household spending acted as a drag to growth. Household 
expenditure growth in Q2 for the UK fell by 0.8%, making 
the fourth consecutive quarterly decline in household 
expenditure. The persistence of General Government 
consumption expenditure growth underlines the importance 
of the announced reductions in public spending at all levels 
of government across the UK to be implemented fully 
through the current spending review period (and elaborated 
on during further previous Forecasts). It appears that at the 
UK level real reductions in government spending have yet to 
feed through into the economic system. The consequences 
of fiscal consolidation would be expected to reduce 
domestic demand sources further. We await the publication 
of the Office for Budgetary Responsibility’s forecasts for the 
UK economy, to be published during November 2011. This 
is widely expected to revise down its growth forecast for 
2011 from 1.7%, given that would require a significant 
positive growth in Q4 and most significant indicators are 
pointing towards a flat or falling quarter for growth. Between 
June 2011 and October 2011 the median new forecast for 
growth in the UK in 2011 and 2012 were both revised down 
by 0.5% to now stand at 1.0% and 1.5% respectively. 
 
Exports to the rest of the world 
As discussed above, Scottish manufacturing exports saw 
continued growth, albeit not increasing from an annual rate 
of growth of 2.0%. The global outlook has worsened 
significantly since we reported in June 2011. The IMF’s 
report on the world economy from September 2011 lowered 
forecasts for growth in every economy between its June and 
September publications, with the exception of Japan in 2011 
– increasing its growth by 0.2% - and keeping its forecast for 
Spanish growth constant at 0.8%. World growth in real 
terms is forecast at 4.0% in 2011 and 2012, down 0.3% and 
0.5% respectively in three months. (The IMF forecast for the 
UK was cut by 0.4% and 0.7% to 1.1% during 2011 and 
1.6% during 2012). 
 
The OECD pointed to the “Euro area debt crises and fiscal 
policy in the United States” as being likely to dominate 
economic developments over the coming two years. 
“Excessive” fiscal policy in the US and a disorderly 
sovereign debt situation in the Euro zone with contagion, 
could lead to their gloomy scenario. Weak growth persists 
for 2011 and 2012 in their main scenario with 
unemployment rates remaining high in developed countries. 
The largest reduction in growth forecast for a major 
economy was the downgrade of the US forecast for 2011 
from 2.5% to 1.5%. This is lower than the OECD’s latest 
forecast of 1.7% for the US during 2011, but is higher than 
some forecasts for the US made earlier in this year. 
Perhaps most critically for world economic developments 
over the longer term, growth forecasts for China and India in 
2012 were reduced by 0.5% and 0.3% respectively.  
The Eurozone situation remains deeply uncertain and 
appears to move from crises to resolution and back over the 
space of a few days. The announcement on the 26th of 
October of a series of reforms and funds agreed for Greece, 
including “haircuts” for holders of Greek government debt 
and additional loans to the country. This appears, at the 
time of writing, to have been undermined, perhaps fatally so, 
by the announcement that these options will be put to a 
referendum in Greece, perhaps into 2012. Continued 
uncertainty about the political will to implement reform 
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Table 1: GDP growth forecasts for 2011 and 2012 for top five export markets for Scottish products in 2009, 
plus UK and euro area (including change from June 2011 forecasts by IMF where appropriate) 
 
  2011 2012 
 Share of Scottish 
exports to rest of 
the world, 2009 
IMF (September 
2011) 
Change from 
June 2011 
forecast 
IMF (September 
2011) 
Change from 
June 2011 
forecast 
      
USA 15.5% 1.5% -1.0% 1.8% -0.9% 
Netherlands 9.6% 1.6% +0.1%* 1.3% -0.2%* 
France 7.5% 1.7% -0.4% 1.4% -0.5% 
Germany 6.1% 2.7% -0.5% 1.3% -0.7% 
Belgium 4.0% 2.3% +0.6%* 1.5% -0.4%* 
Others      
Asia 9.8% 8.2% -0.2% 8.0 -0.4 
      
Euro area - 1.6% -0.4% 1.1% -0.6% 
United Kingdom  1.1% -0.4% 1.6% -0.7% 
 
 
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2011, Global Connection Survey. “Asia” in the table above uses the growth figure for 
“Developing Asia” from the IMF World Economic Outlook. * Netherland and Belgium growth forecasts were last produced by the IMF in the April 
World economic Outlook (not June’s World economic Outlook Update). The changes given refer to the change since April 2011’s forecast. 
 
 
programmes may undermine investor confidence in the 
ability of Eurozone economies to take steps necessary in 
the event of debt crises in larger economies. With some 
commentators laying out proposals for Greece to withdraw 
from the Eurozone, the future of the Euro in its current 
shape requires that growth returns to all economies across 
the economic area. The economic dividend to growth 
prospects for the UK and Scotland will critically affect the 
timing of these economies return towards long-term trends. 
SNAP data suggests that over half of non-UK exports from 
Scotland are to the EU economies, largely those within the 
Euro zone.  Growth forecasts for key markets for Scottish 
goods are shown in Table 1.  
 
Forecasts of the Scottish economy 
The outlook for Scottish domestic demand has worsened 
since June’s forecast. Household wage growth remains 
weak – and is likely to be weaker than for the UK as a whole 
going forward. Retail price inflation running at over 5 per 
cent, is anticipated to continue to squeeze real household 
spending, largely due to higher energy, transport and food 
prices. Evidence suggested that the Scottish and UK 
savings ratios were diverging with larger reductions in 
demand and higher savings ratios in Scotland, although this 
pattern is less strong since upward revisions to the UK 
savings rate. Whether Scottish households over the 
medium-term reduce their consumption at higher equilibrium 
rate of savings remains uncertain. Consumption spending in 
Scotland remains at levels seen during the worst of the 
recession (2009Q2). With an increased savings ratio and 
lower income growth our forecast for household 
consumption remains depressed for several quarters.  The 
combinations contribute to us revising down our forecast for 
household growth through 2011, 2012 and 2013 from our 
forecasts in June 2011 in our central scenario.  
 
Against this background, General Government spending – 
which remained broadly flat in real terms during 2010 while 
there were reductions in the UK as a whole – appears to 
have fallen further in Scotland in the first quarter of 2011 
than in the UK. Only when we have a breakdown of the 
components of central and local government spending in 
real terms for Scotland will we be able to examine the scale 
of these differences. The outlook for growth in spending by 
governments of all levels in Scotland remains weak. We 
anticipate the largest reduction in local government 
spending within our forecast horizon to occur through 2011-
12, with smaller reductions in real terms budgets in 
subsequent years.  
 
The prospects for a return to higher growth remain weak 
while growth in demand centres for Scottish products 
remain sluggish. Continued uncertainty over the Eurozone 
economies, notably Greece – where a “rescue package” of 
financial support, “haircuts” for lenders and continued deep 
austerity appear to be the route by which the Eurozone is 
seeking to restore confidence in the single currency project. 
Developments in other Eurozone countries, particularly Italy, 
point to a winter of continued heightened market 
uncertainty, likely to be resolved only when European 
economies begin to show returns to growth. The latest data 
suggests that it is only Germany which is seeing positive 
growth at the end of 2011, which is concerning for the 
growth of the euro area as a whole. The self-fulfilling nature 
of market fears about specific countries’ fiscal stability 
means that we cannot rule out continued uncertainty and 
increasing volatility. 
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Figure 1: GVA growth for Scotland in central case, 2005 to 2010 and forecasts for 2011 to 2013, annual real 
(%) 
 
 
 
 
The implications for the Scottish economy of continued 
uncertainty in the Eurozone – Scotland’s major (non-UK) 
trading partner – is likely to produce slow overall trade 
growth through the coming years. The US, another key 
market for Scottish goods, continues to face economic and 
budgetary challenges. The US 2011 deficit is likely to be the 
third highest in 65 years, with the two previous years the 1st 
and 2nd highest figures.  The US Congressional Budget 
Office now expects real growth of 2.5% this year and 2.0% 
in 2013. With the US economy not returning to near to trend 
growth until 2014, the outlook for the developed economies 
– and by extension, Scottish exports – indicates a continued 
depression. In this background, the recent export figures 
suggest that by the end of 2010 the share of manufactured 
exports accounted for by the “food, drink and tobacco” 
sector had risen from 26% of exports in 2007 to almost 
30%, while “engineering and allied industries” had lost 
equivalent share. There is some positive news however in 
that total manufacturing exports grew for the second quarter 
of 2010 for the second consecutive quarter. Exports to the 
rest of the world are currently growing at around 2% on an 
annual rate, which is significantly below the rates seen 
through the early and middle part of the decade. Given a 
worsening external growth background we have slightly 
revised down the forecasts for Scottish export growth from 
the rest of the world from our June forecasts. 
 
The impact of the reduced public capital spending in the 
current year will be having a direct effect upon the 
construction and affiliated sector of the Scottish economy. 
Public capital spending in Scotland is likely to see 
reductions in the next two years – up to the end of our 
forecast horizon – albeit at a slower rate than in this current 
year. Private capital spending on the other hand is showing 
some, albeit limited, signs of growth.  
 
The latest data indicates that GVA in the construction sector 
fell sharply in recent quarters - down 2.9% and 2.3% in 
2011Q1 and 2011Q2 respectively.  With a reduction of 1.5% 
in 2010Q4, the level of activity in the construction sector in 
Scotland was at same level as during the start of 2010. The 
arithmetic of GVA calculations mean that the upward spike 
in construction sector activity seen in 2010Q3 will be in the 
denominator of the rolling four quarter growth calculations 
from the next quarter. Even with positive growth in the 
construction sector in the coming quarters, the loss of this 
quarter from January’s figure onwards will produce 
significant reductions in the rolling annual growth rate in this 
sector (down from its current figure of 11.8%). 
 
Results 
As with our commentary in June 2011 we forecast over a 
horizon of three calendar years – i.e. 2011, 2012 and 2013. 
We are forecasting year-on-year growth. We will know how 
accurate these (and previous) forecasts for 2011 are when 
growth in the final quarter of 2011 is released during April 
2012. Elsewhere in the commentary we provide an 
assessment of the accuracy of the FAI’s forecasts for the 
Scottish economy made between 2000 and 2011. 
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The aggregate forecasts for Gross Value Added in Scotland 
for 2011, 2012 and 2013 are shown in Figure 1, alongside 
(for comparison only) the forecasts for the UK over the 
same period by the Office for Budget Responsibility 
(reported in March 2011). HM Treasury collects forecasts 
from City and non-City forecasting organisations on a 
monthly basis. These give a frequently updated picture of 
the trend in forecasts for the UK economy than the OBR 
forecasts. In Figure 1 we include the median of new (i.e. 
made in the last three months) forecasts (as published in 
the October release of HM Treasury’s collected forecasts for 
the UK). As an indication of the scale of possible revisions 
to the OBR’s earlier forecasts, the median growth rate 
forecast for 2011 and 2012 in October 2011 is 0.5 points 
lower than the median forecast in June 2011. 
 
Table 2: Growth in the Scottish economy in central case, 2011 to 2013, % change from previous year 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
    
Gross Value Added 0.4% 0.9% 1.6% 
Production 1.2% 2.2% 3.7% 
Services 0.2% 0.6% 1.1% 
Construction 0.2% 0.6% 1.0% 
 
 
Our central forecast for growth in 2011 is now 0.4%, down 
from 0.8% forecast in June and down from 1.0% forecast in 
March 2011. Our reduction in the 2011 growth forecast 
within this year is therefore broadly in line with that seen in 
forecasts for the UK as a whole.  
 
We present our forecasts for growth over the forecast period 
for broad industry groupings. Table 2 gives the real growth 
in sectoral GVA and aggregate GVA for the central 
scenario. With continuing weak domestic demand due to 
reduced income growth, increased savings and higher 
inflation in the near-term squeezing household incomes,  the 
domestic-facing sectors of the Scottish economy will face 
continuing troubles. The service sector as a whole – 
representing all private and public service activities is 
forecast to growth 0.6% in 2012 and 1.1% in 2013, well 
below trend growth for the sector. Of course within this 
sector there will be differing growth, with some public sector 
activities forecast to see falling GVA, while growth in the 
crucial retail and wholesale sector – comprising around 10% 
of Scottish output – moves broadly in line with the services 
sector as a whole. GVA growth within services is forecast to 
be stronger than the average for the services sectors in 
“hotels and catering”, however this is well below trend 
growth. 
 
Production sectors as a whole are forecast to see the major 
growth in the Scottish economy over the forecast period. In 
2012 we forecast production increasing by 2.2%, and an 
increase of 3.7% in 2013. Comprising around 17% of GVA 
in Scotland, this growth is supported by external demands 
from exports (to the rest of the UK and overseas) and 
investment. The positive boost from external consumption 
forecast is weaker than previously assumed, given the 
global weakening seen over the last six months as many 
leading economies have struggled to recover from 
recession. With the Eurozone banking system, sovereign 
debt and currency-uncertainty, low growth for the Eurozone 
will contribute to weaker than anticipated demand for 
Scottish products. As mentioned above, on the latest data 
the majority of Scottish exports were destined for European 
markets.  
 
Elsewhere in this issue of the Fraser Economic 
Commentary, this author reviews the accuracy of FAI 
forecasts. The paper evaluates how accurate forecasts 
made at different points throughout the year were in 
correctly predicting the annual growth rate both for the year 
that the forecast was made in, and the following year. This 
process will be updated regularly, providing reflective 
evidence on the accuracy of the modelling framework used 
to produce these forecasts. In this first instance we use the 
estimated forecast errors to capture the likely range that the 
first estimate of Scottish GVA growth will lie between. This is 
the value of Scottish growth which will be released in April 
2012 and give the first official estimate of growth during 
2011.  
 
Here, we use the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) between 
forecasts made during the last three months of each year 
(termed “winter” in the paper) to give the average difference 
between the central forecast published and the first estimate 
of growth. These are taken directly from Table 3 in that 
paper. The true value of the first estimate is, on average, 
0.296 percentage points different from the forecast made in 
the winter of the year being forecast. Therefore, the “upper” 
and “lower” estimates for growth in 2011 are our central 
forecast (0.4%) plus (for the upper) and minus (for the 
lower) the MAE for winter forecasts . 
 
The MAE for forecasts for the following year made in the 
winter period is 0.492 percentage points. Both of these MAE 
figures are used to construct the upper and lower estimates 
of growth in 2011 and 2012 respectively.  
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Figure 2: GVA growth in Scotland in central and upper and lower cases, annual real (%)  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Forecasts of GVA growth in “Production” under three scenarios, 2011 to 2013 
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Figure 4: Forecasts of GVA growth in “Construction” under three scenarios, 2011 to 2013 
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Figure 5: Forecasts of GVA growth in “Services” under three scenarios, 2011 to 2013 
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Table 3: Forecasts of Scottish employee jobs (000s) and net change in employee jobs in Central scenario, 
2011 to 2013 
 
2011 2012 2013 
Total employee jobs (000s), Dec 2,299 2,308         2,324 
Net annual change (jobs) 4,900 8,750        16,200 
% change from previous year 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 
   
Agriculture (jobs, 000s) 32 33             33 
Annual (absolute) change 150 300           550 
Production (jobs, 000s) 226 229           235 
Annual (absolute) change 2,400 3,400        6,100 
Services (jobs, 000s) 1,905 1,910        1,919 
Annual (absolute) change 2,250 4,950        9,350 
Construction (jobs, 000s) 136 136           136 
Annual (absolute) change 100 50 200 
 
Note:  Absolute changes are rounded to the nearest 50 jobs. 
 
 
Table 4: Net employee jobs growth in Scotland in central, upper and lower forecasts, 2011 to 2013 
 
2011 2012 2013 
Upper 11,150 18,850        41,100 
Central 4,900 8,750        16,200 
Lower -1,550 -1,350  -9,250 
 
Note:  Absolute changes are rounded to the nearest 50 jobs. 
 
 
Table 5: Forecasts of Scottish unemployment in Central scenario, 2011 to 2013 
 
2011 2012 2013 
ILO unemployment 219,800 234,200 231,550 
Rate1 8.3% 8.9% 8.9% 
Claimant count     149,500     166,300      164,400 
Rate2 5.4% 6.0% 5.9% 
 
Note: Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50. 
Notes: 1 = rate calculated as total ILO unemployed divided by total of economically active 16+ population. 2 = rate calculated as claimant count 
divided by the sum of claimant count and total jobs. The latest labour market figures are detailed in the Labour market section of this 
Commentary. 
 
We are forecasting 2013 as well, but forecasts more than 
two years in advance were not assessed in the paper 
elsewhere in this issue. This was outside the typical forecast 
horizon during the last decade. Until we have enough 
evidence on the accuracy of forecasting at this time horizon 
we will not be able to use measured historical forecast 
errors to inform possible ranges of uncertainty. In the 
meantime – for this commentary – we assume that the 
accuracy of forecasts made now for 2013 have the same 
errors as the longest forecast horizon. The range around our 
central case is given in Figure 2. Readers will note that the 
range is smaller for shorter forecast horizons, which is as 
we would expect.  
 
Figure 3 gives the GVA changes in the “Production” sectors, 
while Figures 4 and Figure 5 give the forecasted changes in 
“Construction” and “Services” sector respectively for the 
central case. Note that these are given for SIC2007 
categories, and so are consistent with the figures published 
1A and 2A of the GVA release for Scotland.  
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Figure 6: Scottish ILO and claimant count unemployment rate, history and forecast 
 
 
 
Employment 
As of December 2010 the number of employee jobs in 
Scotland stood at 2,294,400, with the current level of 
employee jobs (at the end of 2011Q2) giving a level of 
employee jobs of 2,292,200 (down 2,200 from the end of 
2010).  Forecasts for employee jobs are shown in Table 3. 
 
In our central scenario we forecast that the number of 
(employee) jobs in Scotland at the end of 2011 will be 
2,299,000. This is down from our estimate of the level of 
jobs made in June 2011, but is consistent with seven 
thousand additional jobs being between the end of Q2 and 
the end of Q4 2011. The largest number of jobs added 
during 2011 are forecast to come in the Production sectors, 
adding almost 2500 jobs from the end of 2010. The service 
sector is expected to expand employment by 2250 jobs, 
while there are only small employment gains in the 
construction sector over the forecast horizon. An evaluation 
of the accuracy of previous financial services sector 
employee jobs forecasts is given in Box 1. 
 
The number of employee jobs in Scotland by the end of 
2013 is forecasted to be thirty thousand higher than at the 
end of 2010, and almost sixty thousand higher than at the 
end of 2009. Employee jobs numbers are however forecast 
to be almost eighty thousand lower than at the end of 2008. 
Changes in net employee jobs under the forecasted range 
of growth scenarios are given in Table 4. With growth 
consistent with the upper points, net jobs of 70,000 are 
forecasted to be added to the Scottish economy. With 
growth at the lower end. Note that we expect the outcome to 
be closer to the central forecast than either of these two 
alternative points. 
 
Unemployment 
We present our 2011 to 2013 forecasts for unemployment in 
the central scenario, as measured by the ILO definition as 
well as those receiving unemployment benefits, in Table 5. 
The preferred measure of unemployment is the ILO 
definition as given by the Labour Force Survey. This is 
preferred as it is an indication of the level of labour available 
for work in the labour market, and so a better measure of 
the level of spare capacity in the Scottish economy. 
Our forecasted levels of ILO unemployment and claimant 
count for the end of 2011 have increased by 3,000 and 
6,500 respectively since the forecast in June 2011. This 
reflects faster than expected growth in the unemployment 
rate which in the quarter to August 2011 increased by 0.3 
percentage points to 7.9%. The claimant count level has 
increased by 6 thousand since the start of 2011 and now 
stands at 145,200 (5.4%). An increase of 4,300 in the 
number of claimants of Jobseekers Allowance, as we are 
now forecasting between September and the end of 2011 
would be slightly faster increase than over the previous 
three months (3,200 between June and September 2011). 
 
Our forecasts for both ILO and claimant count measures of 
unemployment have been revised upwards since June’s 
commentary, again reflecting the worsening domestic and 
international economic climate, and weakening employment 
and unemployment statistics for Scotland over this period.  
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We show the history and forecasted values for the ILO 
unemployment rate and claimant count rate from 1992 to 
2013 in Figure 6. 
 
 
Grant Allan 
November 2011 
 
________________ 
References: 
Joyce, M., Tong, M and Woods, R. (2011), The United 
Kingdom’s quantitative easing policy: design, operation and 
implementation, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Q3 
2011, p. 200-212. 
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Box 1: Forecasts of employment in the financial services sector 
 
In February 2010 the FAI forecasted the level of employment in the financial services sector in Scotland. Produced over 
eighteen months ago, this forecast that the level of employment in the financial services sector would decline through 2009 and 
2010 by a total of 16,500 jobs from the level at the end of 2008 (with most of these lost in 2010). It should be noted that the 
number of employee jobs in financial services at the end of 2009 was not known until after our forecast was published. Our 
forecasted jobs loss was picked up by some commentators as higher than would expected at that time.  
 
The latest data reveal that our initial forecasts were generally correct in both direction and magnitude, if not exactly accurate on 
quantitative or timing. The (seasonally adjusted) employee jobs series for financial services reports that at the end of 2010 there 
were 10,100 fewer jobs in this sector. The time period of changes is particularly interesting though. Rather than a slower 
reduction in 2009 with a larger loss of jobs in 2010, the decline in jobs was 17,000 in 2009, and 2010 saw a recovery of almost 
6,900 jobs. Our forecast of the number of employee jobs was 6,400 more than were lost between the end of 2008 and the end 
of 2010. 
 
Taking things forward, our February 2010 forecast had predicted a gain of 700 jobs in 2011, bringing total employee jobs in the 
sector by the end of 2011 down from 2008 levels by 15,800. At the time of writing, official statistics give the number of job losses 
during the first two quarters of 2011 as 4,200 jobs. Without further job growth in the sector through to the end of 2011 our 
forecasts for the employee jobs in financial services by the end of 2011 will have overestimated the number of jobs lost by 
1,500. Comparing to the size of employment in the sector at the end of 2008, this is an error of 1.4%. We will return to check 
and report on the accuracy of the forecasts for employee jobs in the financial services when Q4 figures for 2011 are available 
during 2012. 
 
 
Figure B1: Changes in employee jobs in the financial services sector, end 2008 to end 2011 
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Review of Scottish 
Business Surveys  
 
 
 
 
Overall 
Increasingly surveys of Scottish business, in common with 
UK and European surveys, have highlighted the continuing 
and deepening concerns as to the sovereign debt crisis in 
the Euro zone. These, together with growing fears of 
recession coupled with more signs of a slow down both in 
the UK and internationally, forecasts of lower rates of growth 
in 2012, consumer insecurity, pressures on household 
spending, rising energy costs and continued difficulties in 
obtaining finance have all contributed to a dampening of 
business confidence and activity.   
 
However, the Scottish Engineering Review (Q3) retained a 
positive outlook, as did the Oil and Gas UK Quarterly Index 
(Q2), albeit more modestly and with more reservations it 
noted the announcement of a substantial investment and  
‘the Government’s apparent willingness to engage with 
companies to lessen the negative impacts may have 
reassured companies and resulted in a slightly more 
positive outlook’.  
 
Notwithstanding the deepening economic concerns the most 
recent occupancy rates as reported by Visit Scotland 
Scottish hotel occupancy surveys (July and August 2011)  
suggest average bed and occupancy rates were slightly 
better than in the same months in 2010 and 2009, and 
business remained quite confident. In contrast whilst 
Scottish Chambers hotel respondents reported declining 
business confidence, demand was still rising and occupancy 
rates better than in the previous year. 
 
A sense of a slowdown in activity, noted earlier in other 
business surveys, was more evident in the latest CBI 
Industrial Trends (Q3), Bank of Scotland  Scottish Job 
market (September) and PMI report (for September 2011) 
which reported a further moderation in Scottish private 
sector growth due to a fall in new business. It reported a fall 
in employment levels for the second consecutive month in 
the private sector, due mainly to job shedding in the service 
sector offsetting rising employment in manufacturing.  As 
the Scottish Engineering Quarterly Review (q3) noted ‘ 
whilst our level of optimism remains high, our sector realises 
that in the longer term we are not immune to the effects of 
uncertainty associated not only with the Euro zone but also 
with the USA’. 
 
Cost inflation continues to feature as an increasing business 
pressure, being noted by the PMI, Scottish Chambers, and 
Scottish Retail Consortium surveys. 
 
Oil and gas services 
Internationally prospects are positive with expectations of 
increased capital spending on both exploration and 
production with continued expansion of deep water reserves 
and unconventional sources.  Whilst the outlook for 
operators and for oilfield services is much brighter than 
other sectors in the current international economic 
difficulties, macro economic uncertainties continue to pose 
major uncertainties as to demand and the level of activity in 
both the short term and medium term. 
 
In the UKCS and elsewhere volatility in stock exchange 
values  have been seen by some analysts as adversely 
affecting smaller exploration and production companies’ 
access to capital, and this may well encourage some 
consolidation of smaller E & P companies in the short to 
medium term. 
 
In the UK positive news as to major investments, and signs 
of some resilience in investment levels, contributed to a 
positive view of the UKCS, and one which the Government 
took advantage of in support of its view that the recent tax 
increase, announced in the 2011 Budget, would only have a 
marginal effect on investment trends and activity in the 
industry. However, in a climate of limited resources it is 
likely that the unannounced ‘raid’ on the industry together 
with the increase in taxation levels will, in general terms, 
lower the attractiveness in investment in the UKCS 
compared to other regions, a review endorsed in the recent 
report of the House of Commons Energy and Climate 
Change Select Committee’s report noted ‘It is not sensible 
to make opportunistic raids on UKCS producers. The 
Government must build a more constructive relationship if it 
is to restore industry confidence and maximise the benefits 
gained from the UKCS.’ 
 
Production 
Respondents from the LloydsTSB Business Monitor (June-
August 2011) reported that the overall net balance of 
turnover for firms in the production sector was 0%. This was 
worse than the +3% from the previous survey but better 
than the -14% reported by firms in the same quarter last 
year.  The Business Monitor noted that expectations differ 
widely between sectors with production firms more 
pessimistic, although the degree of pessimism declined from 
the previous quarter.  
 
Manufacturing 
The Index of Manufactured exports for the second quarter of 
2011 indicated that exports grew by 1.1% over the quarter 
and on an annual basis grew by 2%. Textiles, engineering 
and chemicals registered the largest rise over the quarter.  
Business surveys differed in their interpretation of trends, 
but there was more agreement in recent surveys of a 
slowing down in activity. The Purchasing Managers Index 
(PMI) conducted by The Bank of Scotland concluded that 
the overall growth of manufacturing output in September 
was better than for the service sector, although the trends 
new orders were weaker.  More recent UK data 
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(Markit/CIPS October) reported a substantial reduction in 
new order inflows with declining output, new orders and 
employment, this may herald weaker trends in Scottish 
surveys for the fourth quarter. Cost pressures for 
manufacturers remained similar to August levels with firms 
reporting sharper increases than their counterparts in the 
service sector.  Employment prospects in manufacturing 
continued to look favourable during September.   
 
The Scottish Engineering Review in its upbeat survey in 
September noted that ‘for the first three quarters of 2011, 
the manufacturing engineering sector has shown 
remarkable resilience in the face of global economic 
disruption’. By and large firms in the survey remained 
optimistic and maintained their strong growth levels with 
respect to orders and output, although non metal products 
returned negative trends.  Export trends, whilst positive, 
were again weaker and down from the peak reported in Q1 
2011, and the rising trend in order intake remains on the 
positive trend for the sixth quarter, albeit at slightly lower 
levels. Staffing levels remain positive for the sixth quarter. 
But recognised that the sector is not immune in the longer 
term from the uncertainty in the Eurozone economies. 
 
Similarly the CBI Industrial Trends Survey for Q3 2011 was 
that ‘following seven consecutive quarters of growth, export 
orders are expected to contract in the coming three months 
and at their fastest pace for four and a half years. It comes 
as firms report that concerns over political and economic 
conditions overseas have risen, and which are now at their 
fifth highest quarterly level in 10 years’.  The Survey 
concluded that manufacturing orders, employment and 
employment were all down whereas costs had increased 
during the third quarter. 
 
The SCBS reported that manufacturing firms were, on 
balance, more pessimistic compared to three months ago.    
The rising trend in total new orders ended in quarter three 
although the upward trend in total new sales continued. The 
outturn in total orders was worse than had been expected 
however export orders continued to improve. Average 
capacity utilisation rose marginally to 77.7%, a little higher 
than a year ago. The rising trend in orders is expected to 
resume during the fourth quarter. Cost pressures eased 
marginally with half of respondents expecting prices to 
stabilize. Once again the net trend in turnover is expected to 
remain positive over the coming twelve months. Profitability, 
on balance, is expected to decline although the decline is 
set to ease with a net balance of 5% (compared to 10% in 
Q2) expecting a decline over the coming year. 
 
Plans to invest in plant/machinery improved during quarter 
three for a net balance of SCBS manufacturing firms.   New 
investment mainly directed towards replacement or to 
improve efficiency whereas R&D/expansion investment 
intentions remained low.  Employment trends continued to 
rise modestly. Fewer than 15% of firms increased pay 
during the three months to October and the average 
increase was 3.3%. Recruitment activity increased further 
with 40% attempting to recruit compared to 23% in Q2. 
 
Construction 
The latest Scottish Construction Monitor conducted by the 
Scottish Building Federation members (SBF) for Q2 2011 
reported an improving picture of overall confidence, but with 
at best a fragile recovery within the Scottish construction 
industry, with their latest confidence rating having risen by 
16 percentage points from -22% to -6%. The survey noted 
however that, 70% of those completing the survey described 
themselves as less confident or as neither more nor less 
confident about the prospects for their business over the 
next 12 months compared to the past year. The Scottish 
Building Federation remain concerned over the prospects 
for sustainable long-term recovery in the industry. 
 
Scottish Chambers’ construction respondents noted that the 
strong downward trend in business confidence resumed in 
Q3 with business optimism as low as in Q3 2010; 
suggesting that the easing in the downward trend during Q2 
was temporary. The outturn, in terms of new contracts, was 
significantly worse than had been anticipated by 
respondents in the previous survey. Trends in contracts 
from all areas declined with the most significant reduction 
being for public sector contracts.  A net balance of firms 
from the previous survey had expected a rise in work in 
progress however the outturn was a net balance of -21%. 
60% of firms reported working below optimum levels. 
Average capacity used, at 76.4% was two percentage points 
lower than Q2 although was marginally higher compared to 
a year ago.  Turnover, tender margins and profitability over 
the next twelve months are expected to decline for more 
than half of respondents.  The long-term downward trend in 
employment resumed in Q3, suggesting that the rise in Q2 
was seasonal. Once again no recruitment difficulties were 
evident. Average pay increases declined from 3.9% in Q2 to 
2.1%.   
 
The service sector 
The Lloyds TSB Scottish Business Monitor   (June-August 
2011) described the recovery in the service sector as ‘muted 
and mild’ with no overall improvement in turnover during the 
three months to the end of August.  The survey reported 
that service sector respondents continue to expect a 
negative net balance for expectations in turnover in the six 
months to the end of February 2012.   
 
Retail distribution 
Recent UK retail figures from the ONS (August and 
September) provide a useful insight as to the issues 
confronting the sector. In the food sector sales values 
increased by 5.0% in August 2011 and continued to rise at 
similar rates in September, sales volumes decreased by 
0.8% and prices rose by an estimated 5.7%. Interestingly in 
November 2006 approximately £1 in every £33 spent in 
retail (excluding automotive fuel) was spent on line, in 
August 2011 £1 in £10 spent in retail is spent on line.  The 
implications for firms without an on line sales facility are 
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clear. Moreover, non food sales decreased and sales fell for 
the smallest retail firms. The September Retail Sales 
Monitor saw a slight improvement over the August figures 
with a slight rise in non-food sales (mainly small home 
wares and electrical goods). However, there is much to 
suggest, as the Scottish Retail Consortium noted, that any 
growth in retail is being driven by inflation rather than an 
increase in sales. Widespread discounting is evident and set 
to continue for the remainder of the year. 
 
The Scottish Retail Sales Monitor (August data) reported 
sales falling at the second fastest annual rate since 1999. 
Retail sales value fell by 0.7% compared to the same month 
a year ago and the value of non food sales was down 3.6% 
compared to August 2010.  With food sales rising 1.4% year 
on year in a context of inflation of 4.5% in August suggests 
a decline in the volume of sales. 
 
Scottish Chambers’ retail respondents reported no 
improvement in conditions in the retail sector in recent 
quarters with weak/declining consumer confidence, flat 
sales trends, increasing competition, rising costs and 
declining margins were widely reported by SCBS 
respondents. The low levels of business confidence 
remained with more than half of firms reporting a decline.  
The trend in sales weakened further with 68% reporting and 
72% expecting some decline in the total value of sales.  
Only 10% reported increased sales during Q3 2011, and 
once again continuing concerns over consumer confidence 
are moderating sales expectations for the coming quarter 
with only 10% of retailers expecting an overall increase.  
Cost pressures remain intense with over 80% reporting 
increased suppliers costs, 58% reporting increased 
transport costs. Pressure from utility costs increased from 
50% to 73% of firms (reflecting recently announced price 
increases). Inflationary pressures remain widespread. 
Pressures on margins also remain widespread with two 
thirds expecting declining profitability and turnover over the 
next year. Labour market activity continues to remain at low 
levels with three quarters of retailers reporting no change to 
overall employment levels. Recruitment activity eased for 
the ninth consecutive quarter.  
 
Tourism 
Business confidence remained positive for respondents to 
the Visit Scotland Monthly Occupancy Survey (August 
2011), but declined significantly in Q3 for Scottish 
Chambers’ hotel respondents. Scottish Chambers’ 
respondents reported increased occupancy levels 
(averaging 75.4% for Q3) and Visit Scotland’s survey 
reported hotel occupancy up slightly compared to the 
previous two years, but a further decline in self catering 
occupancy. Increasing occupancy levels in the major city 
centres and in the islands adds support to those who see 
current visitor numbers bolstered by ‘staycations‘ and 
shorter breaks. 
 
During the three months to the end of September, trends in 
bar/restaurant trade and demand for conference/function 
facilities remained relatively weak.  A third reported reducing 
average room rates and the widespread pattern of ‘special 
offers’ seems set to continue with almost half expecting to 
reduce room rates in Q4. Underpinning these weak trends is 
the lack of tourist demand, reported by 84% of Scottish 
Chambers’ hotel respondents whilst almost a quarter noted 
competition and poor transport infrastructure.  Recruitment 
activity remained widespread, but mainly seasonal staffs.  
 
Logistics and wholesale 
Data from the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey showed 
that business confidence amongst Scottish wholesale 
respondents deteriorated further in Q3 with no firms 
reporting an improvement in optimism. Business confidence 
was considerably lower compared to one year ago.  Sales 
trends remained very weak during Q3 with the outturn worse 
than had been predicted by firms in Q2. Almost half of firms 
reported declining sales and more than half expect a further 
decrease.  Cost pressures eased slightly during the three 
months to the end of September for SCBS responding firms 
although remained historically high. Three quarters of 
respondents cited transport costs and 62% cited increased 
suppliers costs and. Over 60% expect to increase prices 
over the next three months, but cash flow trends remain 
weak Concerns over turnover eased slightly however 
profitability remains low. Once again most firms reported no 
change to investment plans; nevertheless the net decline 
continued.  Wholesale respondents continued to shed staff 
during Q3 although the rate of decline eased. Slightly fewer 
than a third sought to recruit staff; largely for replacement.  
The average pay increase in Q3 was 3.5% compared to 
3.3% in Q2.  
 
Outlook 
Recent business surveys suggest a slowing down in the 
recovery and more concerns that the recovery may, to all 
intents and purposes, halt over the winter months.  
Continued consumer uncertainty and reduced living 
standards are evident in the trends in retail and tourism. 
Concerns as to likely events in both the Eurozone and 
American economies continue to adversely influence both 
activity and sentiment in Scotland and in the rest of the 
United Kingdom.   
 
The Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey for Q3 concluded 
‘As we noted in report for Q1 2011 ‘Rising price pressures 
and weak demand seem set to continue in the service 
sector, for many Scottish businesses the combination of 
limited improvements in turnover, rising costs, pressures on 
margins and declining trends in profitability will pose real 
problems in 2011 we see little evidence in the results for the 
third quarter to change this view, if anything, our concerns 
are greater’. Such sentiments are more widely evident 
although not universal in recent business surveys. 
 
Cliff Lockyer/Eleanor Malloy 
November 2011 
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Current trends in Scottish Business are regularly reported 
by a number of business surveys. This report draws on: 
 
1. The Confederation of British Industries Scottish 
Industrial Trends Survey for the third quarter 2011; 
 
2. Lloyds TSB Business Monitor for the quarter June 
2011 – August 2011and expectations to February  
2012; 
 
3. Scottish Engineering’s Quarterly Reviews for the 
third quarter of 2011;  
 
4. The Bank of Scotland Markit Economics Regional 
Monthly Purchasing Managers’ Indices for July, 
August and September 2011; 
 
5. The Scottish Retail Consortium’s KPMG Monthly 
Scottish Retail Sales Monitors August/September 
2011; 
 
6. The Scottish Chambers of Commerce Quarterly 
Business Survey report for the second and third 
quarters of 2011;  
 
7. Oil & Gas UK quarterly Index Q1 and Q2 2011; 
 
8. Oil & Gas UK Economic Report 2011; 
 
9. ONS Retail sales August and September 2011; 
 
10. Visit Scotland Occupancy Survey for July and 
August 2011; 
 
11. The Scottish Construction Monitor October 2011 
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Overview of the  
labour market 
 
 
 
Inevitably current interest in the Scottish labour market 
continues to focus on the trends in both employment and 
unemployment figures, a theme developed in other sections 
of this edition.  Public interest continues to focus on public 
sector employment trends and for a further issue we return 
to these themes and to a review of a recent ACAS 
discussion paper reviewing the emerging changes in public 
sector employment relations.  
 
A new era of public sector employment 
In a recent ACAS discussion paper (2011) Professor Bach 
argues, that just as there have been major change in the 
public sector over the  past two decades the current 
Government’s policies to modernise public services and to 
reduce the deficit are ’likely to have wide ranging and in 
some cases, profound implications for employment 
relations’.  Bach argues that these changes imply a ‘major 
shift in terms and conditions of employment and a further 
erosion of national bargaining’.  Moreover the issues of 
maintaining morale and employee commitment will become 
more problematic and will ‘have a bearing on behaviour and 
motivation long after the redundancy process has been 
completed’. The credibility of independent pay review bodies 
is likely to be under some strain given policies of pay 
restraint, and Bach notes some ‘waning in official 
enthusiasm for independent pay review’.  The further 
dismantling of national pay arrangements may well lead to 
new problems especially those relating to the provision of 
training and mobility of staff. Pay restraint in the public 
sector needs to consider the longer term issues of likely 
shortages of staff and the consequential pay and grade drift 
together with the introduction of supplements which have 
been a feature in periods following previous periods of 
public sector pay restraint. Later this year widespread public 
sector industrial action seems likely over the current 
proposals to change public sector pensions, and threats of 
action seem likely in a number of areas as the effects of 
reductions in public sector expenditure become more 
evident.  
 
Recent trends and statistics  
Comparable figures on the labour market between Scotland 
and the United Kingdom in the quarter June – August 2011 
are summarised in Table 1. Labour Force Survey (LFS) data 
show that in the quarter to August the level of employment 
in Scotland fell by 24 thousand, to 2,474 thousand. Over the 
year to August 2011, employment in Scotland rose by 20 
thousand. For the same period, UK employment fell by 47 
thousand. The Scottish employment rate (16 – 64) – those 
in employment as a percentage of the working age 
population – was 71.2 per cent, up 0.3 per cent compared to 
one year earlier.  For the same period the UK employment 
rate was 70.4 per cent, down 0.3 per cent compared to one 
year earlier. Unemployment, in the quarter to August, rose 
by 7 thousand to 212 thousand, a fall of 17 thousand over 
the year.   
 
In considering employment, activity and unemployment 
rates it is important to remember the bases and 
relationships of these figures.  LFS data (estimated) is 
provided for: (1) all aged 16 and over and (2) for all aged 
59/64. The first measure (all aged 16 and over) leads to 
higher numbers in employment, in the total economically 
active and economically inactive – but reduces the 
economic activity rates and unemployment rates, but at the 
same time increases the economically inactive rate. 
Conversely the second measure (all aged 16 to 59/64) leads 
to lower numbers economically active, in employment and 
economically inactive – but leads to a higher economically 
active, employment and unemployment rates but lower 
economically inactive rates. Figures derived from the Labour 
Force Survey differ slightly from those derived from the 
Annual Population Survey. 
 
The relationships between employment, unemployment, 
totally economically active and inactive are important in 
appreciating changing levels of employment and 
unemployment, and changes in the employment rates 
should be seen in conjunction with changes in the activity 
rates.  If people leave employment and become 
unemployed (but are still economically active) the 
unemployment rate increases, but the economically active 
rate remains unchanged. However, if people leave 
employment and do not seek employment, as seems to be a 
continuing pattern, they are categorised as economically 
inactive, as such the unemployment rate remains 
unchanged whilst the activity and inactivity rates change. 
Equally the changing pattern between full and part time 
employment is of interest.  As the State of the Economy 
Annex to the July 2011 State of the Economy, produced by 
the office of the Chief Economic Adviser,  notes  between 
Jan – March 2008 and Jan – March 2011, part time 
employment in Scotland grew by 6.5% compared to a fall of 
5.8% in full-time employment over the same period.  Our 
understanding of the trends in total employment will differ if 
we examine total employment, or consider the trends in full 
time equivalents, we return to this issue later in this section. 
These relationships are clearly shown in tables 1 and 5. 
Over the year to August 2011, the numbers employed rose 
by 20 thousand, whilst unemployment fell by 17 thousand – 
and the numbers of those aged 16-59/64 who are 
economically inactive fell by 8 thousand and the numbers 
economically active rose by 14 thousand. 
 
Table 1 shows that for Scotland the preferred ILO measure 
of unemployment rose to 212 thousand, between June - 
August 2011, and fell by 17 thousand over the year. The 
ILO unemployment rate rose in the three months to August 
2011 and now stands at 7.9 per cent. This represents a 0.3 
per cent rise over the last quarter.
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Table 1:  Headline indicators of Scottish and UK labour market, June - August 2011 
 
June - August 2011  Scotland 
Change 
on 
quarter 
Change on 
year 
United 
Kingdom 
Change on 
quarter 
Change on 
year 
Employment* 
 
Level (000s) 2,474 -24 20 29,101 -178 -47 
Rate (%) 71.2 -0.5 0.8 70.4 -0.3 -0.3 
Unemployment** Level (000s)          212  7 -17 2,566 114 113 
Rate (%) 7.9 0.3 -0.7 8.1 0.4 0.3 
Activity* Level (000s)       2,686  -17 3 31,668 -63 66 
Rate (%) 77.4 -0.3 0.3 76.7 0.0 -0.1 
 
Inactivity*** 
 
Level (000s)        770  10 -8 9,354 26 75 
Rate (%) 22.6 0.3 -0.7       23.3 0.0 0.1 
 
 
Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, October 2011  
  * Levels are for those aged 16+, while rates are for those of working age (16-59/64) 
 ** Levels and rates are for those aged 16+, rates are proportion of economically active. 
*** Levels and rates for those of working age (16-59/64) 
 
 
The economically active workforce includes those 
individuals actively seeking employment and those currently 
in employment (i.e. self-employed, government employed, 
unpaid family workers and those on training programmes). 
Table 1 shows that the rate of the economically active fell 17 
thousand between June - August 2011. There were 2,686 
thousand economically active people in Scotland during 
June - August 2011. This comprised 2,474 thousand in 
employment and 212 thousand ILO unemployed. The level 
for those of working age but economically inactive rose by 
10 thousand in the latest quarter, but over the year the total 
fell by 10 thousand to 770 thousand people; this indicates a 
fall of 0.8 per cent in the number of people of working age 
economically inactive over the last year.  
 
Data on employment by age, derived from the Annual 
Population Survey, is available up to March 2011. In the 
year to March 2011 employment rates fell for those aged 18 
– 24 and those aged over 35, with the employment rate for 
those aged 16 – 64 falling by 0.1 percentage points and with 
the largest percentage point falls being recorded for those 
aged 18 - 24 (down 1.6%) and 50 - 64 (down 0.6%). 
Employment rates for men again fell more than those for 
women, except for those aged 50 – 64. Table 2 illustrates 
the changing employment rates by age group for the four 
years April - March 2008 – 2011 and illustrates consistent 
declines across all age groups, except 16 – 17 year olds.  
 
In the year to August 2011 (the latest available data) 
inactivity amongst 16 – 64 fell by 8 thousand, a 0.8% 
decrease over the year and the inactivity rate (16 – 64) 
stood at 22.6%. Inactivity for men aged 16 – 64 rose by 10 
thousand (3.3%) over the last quarter but fell by 9 thousand 
(3.9% over the year. Inactivity for women was unchanged 
over the past quarter but rose by 1 thousand (0.3%) over 
the year.   
 
In the year to August 2011 inactivity fell by 2 thousand to 
779 thousand. The main increases reported for the reasons 
for inactivity over the year were: retired up 9 thousand and 
long term sick up 11 thousand. The numbers looking after 
family and home rose by 1 thousand and those temporarily 
sick fell by 3 thousand.(See Table 11, First Release Data). 
 
Table 2:  Employment rates thousands (%) people by age for the four years April – March 2008 - 2011 
 
 
 All 16+ 16 - 64 16 - 17 18 - 24 25 - 34 35 - 49 50 - 64 65+ 
Apr 2007 - Mar 2008 60.6 74.0 38.0 68.1 81.6 83.9 64.9 5.6 
Apr 2008 - Mar 2009 60.1 73.3 39.2 66.8 81.1 82.8 65.0 6.1 
Apr 2009 - Mar 2010 58.4 71.2 32.2 62.6 78.1 81.1 64.9 6.5 
Apr 2010 - Mar 2011 58.1 71.0 33.2 61.7 78.9 81.6 63.3 6.7 
 
Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, October 2011 
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Table 3:  Employment, unemployment and inactivity rates by local authority area 2007, 2008 and Apr 2010 – 
March 2011 (%) 
 
Geography  
(Residence Based) 
Employment rates Unemployment rates 16+* Economic inactivity rates 
2007 2008 
Apr 2010/ 
Mar 2011 2007 2008 
Apr 2010/ 
Mar 2011 2007 2008 
Apr 2010/ 
Mar 2011 
Scotland 76.0 75.6 71.0 4.7 4.9 7.8 20.1 20.3 22.9 
Local Authority Area          
Aberdeen City 79.1 79.4 76.5 3.7 3.6 5.3 17.3 17.6 18.2 
Aberdeenshire 82.6 82.2 80.9 2.5 2.6 3.7 15.6 15.5 16.0 
Angus 79.1 80.0 73.2 4.5 4.6 7.0 16.2 15.6 20.5 
Argyll & Bute 80.0 77.6 72.5 4.0 4.3 6.3 16.3 18.4 22.7 
Clackmannanshire 69.4 70.9 74.2 5.5 5.4 8.3 25.3 25.4 21.6 
Dumfries * Galloway 77.4 76.2 70.1 4.2 4.5 6.6 19.1 19.5 24.4 
Dundee City 72.1 71.5 70.5 6.6 6.3 8.8 22.4 23.9 23.1 
East Ayrshire 73.1 74.6 70.2 6.3 6.1 9.3 21.5 20.4 23.5 
East Dunbartonshire 78.9 77.6 72.6 3.1 3.9 6.2 19.0 18.7 21.5 
East Lothian 79.2 77.9 72.2 3.5 3.5 7.0 18.0 19.4 21.9 
East Renfrewshire 77.2 76.5 72.5 3.4 3.6 5.5 19.1 20.5 22.5 
Edinburgh, City of 77.4 76.6 71.5 4.3 4.5 6.5 19.5 19.8 23.5 
Eilean Siar  79.4 78.7 65.3 4.2 4.6 7.0 17.7 16.3 31.4 
Falkirk 78.1 78.9 72.6 4.6 4.4 8.0 18.5 18.3 21.4 
Fife 75.9 76.5 70.8 5.6 5.8 9.2 18.8 17.7 21.3 
Glasgow City 66.9 66.6 62.3 6.8 6.9 11.2 28.2 28.8 29.4 
Highland 82.0 81.7 77.8 3.2 3.5 5.1 16.0 16.3 18.9 
Inverclyde 68.4 72.5 70.4 7.1 6.4 8.7 24.8 23.0 23.4 
Midlothian 80.7 79.9 72.7 4.2 4.2 7.9 15.1 16.2 20.3 
Moray 80.4 81.8 78.3 3.5 3.8 5.0 17.2 15.0 18.9 
North Ayrshire 71.5 71.8 61.4 6.4 7.4 12.1 23.5 22.0 29.8 
North Lanarkshire 73.2 71.0 70.4 5.4 5.9 9.9 22.6 23.8 21.9 
Orkney Islands 86.4 83.9 77.5 2.7 2.9 3.9 11.2 14.2 19.3 
Perth and Kinross 78.1 78.7 75.0 3.5 3.7 5.3 18.8 17.9 20.5 
Renfrewshire 75.0 76.0 67.2 5.1 5.5 9.6 20.9 18.9 24.9 
Scottish Borders 81.4 80.6 72.2 3.1 3.6 6.0 16.2 15.8 23.1 
Shetland Islands 88.1 88.0 83.8 2.6 2.8 3.6 10.4 10.8 14.6 
South Ayrshire 77.2 75.4 67.9 5.0 5.4 9.0 18.9 20.5 24.3 
South Lanarkshire 78.9 76.7 71.6 4.2 4.4 7.8 18.5 20.6 23.7 
Stirling 76.8 75.2 69.5 3.9 4.5 7.0 19.2 20.2 24.3 
West Dunbartonshire 73.9 71.2 68.0 6.3 6.9 10.8 20.8 23.3 23.6 
West Lothian 77.8 79.1 73.0 4.8 4.6 7.7 17.7 17.4 21.6 
 
 
Source:   2007 and 2008 data from Annual Population Survey (Jan to Dec)  
                Oct 2009/September 2010 data from Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland  and UK, October 2011 (Source Annual  
 Population  survey, Job Centre Plus administrative system and Annual Business Inquiry) 
Notes:  See sources for definitions and original sources  
 
Statistics from the Annual Population Survey provide some 
indications of the impact of the recession at local area 
levels, by occupation and by sector (the APS combines 
results from the Labour Force Survey and the Scottish 
Labour Force Survey. Thus these figures differ slightly from 
those produced from the Labour Force Survey and the 
Annual Business Inquiry and from those published in  
Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, 
October 2011). Table 3 indicates the continuing significant 
differences in employment, unemployment and inactivity 
rates before the onset of the recession, however, between 
2008 and 2009 the gap between the areas with the highest 
and lowest employment rates widened by 5.8 percentage 
points. In the year April 2010 – March 2011 employment 
rates varied from over 80% in Aberdeenshire and Shetland 
to under 70% in seven local authority areas. Likewise 
unemployment rates were again lowest in Aberdeenshire, 
Orkney and Shetland and highest, over 12%, in North 
Ayrshire and over 11% in Glasgow, and inactivity rates were 
highest in Eilean Star, North Ayrshire and Glasgow City. 
 
The most recent figures for the number of workforce jobs by 
industrial activity are detailed in Table 4. Total workforce job 
figures are a measure of jobs rather than people. Total 
PAGE 40 VOLUME 35  NUMBER 2 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
Table 4:  Total workforce jobs* by industry, Scotland, June 2005–2011 (thousands) 
 
Industry June 2005 
June 
2006 
June 
2007 
June 
2008 
June 
2009 
June 
2010 
June 
2011 
A : Agriculture, forestry and fishing 51 54 60 60 59 62 55 
B : Mining and quarrying 25 28 30 30 29 27 29 
C : Manufacturing 233 226 228 212 201 181 177 
D : Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 10 10 13 16 19 19 20 
E : Water supply; sewerage, waste management etc 16 18 17 16 14 14 15 
F : Construction 181 194 203 199 185 188 172 
G : Wholesale & retail trade; repair of motor vehicles etc 382 384 380 396 398 363 389 
H : Transportation and storage 125 118 123 123 111 140 112 
I : Accommodation and food service activities 189 190 188 191 186 197 193 
J : Information and communication 72 73 79 69 68 75 65 
K : Financial and insurance activities 114 107 91 98 100 95 95 
L : Real estate activities 25 29 30 32 32 23 29 
M : Professional, scientific and technical activities 145 154 161 176 174 157 173 
N : Administrative and support service activities 174 180 192 200 185 176 172 
O : Public administration & defence; social security 180 177 181 177 146 145 138 
P : Education 199 200 192 208 208 197 211 
Q : Human health and social work activities 384 399 383 398 401 375 431 
R : Arts, entertainment and recreation 75 81 75 84 71 72 70 
S : Other service activities 63 65 63 58 59 67 60 
Column Total 2,644 2,685 2,690 2,740 2,651 2,571 2608 
 
Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland, October 2011  
 *    Workforce jobs are a measure of jobs rather than people 
Note: There have been considerable revisions to the June 2009 and June 2010 from previous figures and as of September 2011 ONS are 
highlighting figures with a coefficient of variation greater than 25% 
 
Table 5:  Trends in total, full, part-time, temporary and part-time who could not find a full-time job 
 
 
All in employment 
Scotland Total1 Employees1 
Self 
employed1 
Full-time 
workers2 
Part-time 
workers2 
Workers 
with 
second 
jobs 
Temporary 
employees 
Could not 
find full-
time job 
         
Jan 2007 - Dec 2007 2,525 2,244 263 1,892 631 93 128 60 
Apr 2007 - Mar 2008 2,533 2,248 267 1,900 630 96 126 60 
Jul 2007 - Jun 2008 2,544 2,254 271 1,912 629 98 125 61 
Oct 2007 - Sep 2008 2,550 2,262 269 1,916 631 98 119 61 
Jan 2008 - Dec 2008 2,529 2,243 268 1,900 626 99 116 64 
Apr 2008 - Mar 2009 2,527 2,245 267 1,899 624 101 117 65 
Jul 2008 - Jun 2009 2,515 2,235 264 1,880 632 103 123 73 
Oct 2008 - Sep 2009 2,503 2,220 265 1,856 644 102 127 81 
Jan 2009 - Dec 2009 2,492 2,211 265 1,844 645 102 133 84 
Apr 2009 - Mar 2010 2,470 2,185 267 1,815 652 101 132 90 
Jul 2009 - Jun 2010 2,462 2,179 265 1,802 656 99 126 96 
Oct 2009 - Sep 2010 2,466 2,183 264 1,798 663 98 127 99 
Jan 2010 - Dec 2010 2,469 2,181 268 1,793 671 97 124 106 
Apr 2010 - Mar 2011 2,471 2,182 270 1,796 670 97 125 110 
 
Source:  Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland, October 2011 
Note: 1 Includes people who did not state whether they worked part time or full time 
 
2The split between full time and part time employment is based on respondents’ self classification 
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seasonally adjusted employee jobs for the quarter ending 
June 2011 (the latest available figures) stood at 2,608 
thousand, although it is necessary to note significant 
revisions to the 2009 and 2010 figures since the last report. 
Table 4 provides some indication of both the impact of the 
recession and the recovery on sectors, although the trends 
need to be considered with some caution.  
 
Table 5 outlines the changing patterns of full time and part 
time employment, and highlights the growth in the numbers 
of part-time workers in Scotland, the latest data (April 2010 
– March 2011), indicates that since the peak in employment 
(October 2007 – September 2008) total employment 
(employees, self employed, unpaid family workers and 
those on government supported training and employment 
programmes) has fallen by 79 thousand.  The numbers of 
full time workers in Scotland since the peak in employment 
has declined by 120 thousand whilst part time employment 
numbers recovered very quickly and are now 40 thousand 
higher. The number of self employed is now above that 
reported in October 2007 – September 2008, suggesting 
some substitution of self employment for employment. The 
number of those working part time because they could not 
find a full time job has almost doubled, suggesting that 
increasing numbers of workers were taking part time 
employment in the absence of full time work (the same 
argument applies to temporary work). Interestingly, a 
comparison of tables 3 in the first release for Scotland and 
for the UK figures suggests that, in relative terms, the 
decline in full time employment has been greater in Scotland 
than in the UK, but in contrast the growth in part time 
employment, in relative terms, has been greater suggesting 
that the relative ‘better’ performance in employment in 
Scotland in recent quarters has been fuelled by a growth in 
part time employment, as a comparison of FTEs would 
suggest. The relative growth in the numbers of self 
employed has been greater in the UK than in Scotland. 
 
Table 6, drawing on the Annual Population Survey, attempts 
to explore how the pattern of jobs has changed since the 
onset of the recession, it suggests a growth in the numbers 
employed in personal service, sales and customer service 
and elementary occupations, and some decline in 
managerial, professional, and process, plant and machine 
operatives. This pattern would resonate with the trends in 
increasing numbers of part time employees, but raises some 
concerns as to the potential availability of sufficient skills to 
sustain a recovery. 
 
Table 6:  Trends in employment by standard occupational classification 
 
 
Apr 06 
Mar07 
Apr 07 
Mar08 
Apr08 
Mar09 
Apr09 
Mar10 
Apr10 
Mar11 
      
Managers and senior officials 566,500 578,700 586,500 577,900 575,300 
Professional occupations 596,900 617,000 625,600 599,400 616,900 
Associate Prof & Tech Occupations 646,900 687,100 697,500 695,000 688,900 
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations 560,400 531,500 521,800 513,300 496,900 
 Skilled Trades Occupations 366,300 380,000 392,700 372,400 376,800 
 Personal Service Occupations 444,400 454,700 441,600 457,700 469,700 
Sales and Customer Service Occupations 396,100 403,900 385,600 394,800 417,000 
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives 276,900 271,700 268,800 259,700 251,600 
Elementary occupations 558,400 532,900 517,500 535,600 526,400 
 
 
 
Table 7:  Total claimant count and computerised claims by age and duration (Numbers and percentage 
change over year to September 2011) 
 
 All computerised 
claims 
All computerised 
claims Up to 6 
months 
All computerised 
claims Over 6 and 
up to 12 months  
All computerised 
claims All over 12 
months 
     
All 16+ numbers 140,000 84,500 31,300 23,600 
All 16+ % change over year 7.7% 6.6 2.6 1.4 
All 18 – 24   41,600 30,600 8,700 2,300 
All 25- 49   75,900 41,900 17,900 16,000 
All 50 and above  21,000 11,200 4,600 5,300 
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Table 8:  Local Government employment by local authority (headcount) Q2 207 – Q2 2011 (not seasonally 
adjusted) 
 
  
 
 
 
 Annual 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 change 
Quarter Q2 Q2 Q2 Q2 Q2 headcount 
Local Authority / Joint Board 
            
Aberdeen City 11,700 11,600 9,500 9,400 8,900 -400 
Aberdeenshire 14,000 14,000 14,700 14,900 14,400 -500 
Angus 5,600 5,700 5,700 5,600 5,600 0 
Argyll & Bute 5,600 5,400 5,500 5,200 5,100 -100 
Clackmannanshire 2,800 2,900 2,900 2,800 2,600 -200 
Dumfries & Galloway 8,300 7,700 8,000 8,300 7,900 -400 
Dundee City 8,400 8,400 8,200 8,100 7,800 -300 
East Ayrshire 6,800 6,800 6,800 6,600 6,500 -100 
East Dunbartonshire 4,800 4,900 5,000 5,000 4,400 -500 
East Lothian 5,000 4,900 4,900 4,800 4,700 -100 
East Renfrewshire 4,600 4,700 4,800 4,500 4,500 -100 
Edinburgh, City of 20,800 20,200 19,300 18,800 18,100 -700 
Eilean Siar 2,500 2,600 2,500 2,500 2,500 0 
Falkirk 7,900 8,000 8,200 7,800 7,900 100 
Fife 23,900 23,000 23,300 23,100 21,900 -1,200 
Glasgow City 32,700 32,200 23,800 23,100 21,700 -1,400 
Highland 12,800 12,700 13,000 13,000 12,400 -600 
Inverclyde 5,200 4,900 4,900 4,700 4,500 -100 
Midlothian 4,500 4,800 4,700 4,800 4,600 -200 
Moray 5,100 5,100 5,300 5,100 5,000 -100 
North Ayrshire 7,400 7,400 7,300 7,200 6,700 -500 
North Lanarkshire 18,300 18,000 17,900 17,500 16,700 -800 
Orkney Islands 2,200 2,100 2,400 2,400 2,400 -100 
Perth & Kinross 6,000 6,100 6,300 6,100 5,900 -200 
Renfrewshire 9,200 8,900 8,900 8,400 7,600 -800 
Scottish Borders 5,800 5,800 5,800 5,700 5,700 0 
Shetland Islands 3,700 3,800 4,000 4,100 4,100 100 
South Ayrshire 5,900 5,800 5,600 5,600 5,700 200 
South Lanarkshire 16,500 15,700 15,900 15,800 14,700 -1,100 
Stirling 4,600 4,400 4,400 4,400 4,000 -400 
West Dunbartonshire 6,000 6,300 6,500 6,300 6,200 -100 
West Lothian 8,300 8,400 8,500 8,500 7,900 -600 
Total Fire Joint Boards 5,800 5,800 5,800 5,700 5,600 -200 
Total Police Joint Boards 24,100 23,300 24,700 24,800 24,000 -800 
Total Valuation Joint Boards 700 700 700 600 600 0 
Total Regional Transport Partnerships 
(SPT) 700 700 700 700 600 0 
SCOTLAND 318,100 313,700 306,300 301,800 289,400 -12,400 
 
 
Source:  Joint Staffing Watch Survey, Scottish Government 
Notes: 1.  Figures are rounded to nearest hundred. 
 2.  Totals may not add to the sum of the parts due to rounding. 
 3.  Figures for Fire Service staff exclude volunteer and retained fire-fighters. 
 4  .Police and Fire Service staffs in Dumfries and Galloway and Fife, who are not covered by Joint Boards, are included within the  
      figures for Joint Boards for consistency. 
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Tables 7 and 8 of the Labour Market statistics (first release) 
provide information of the trends in the claimant count. The 
figure for September indicates a total of 145.2 thousand 
claimants, up 10.3 thousand for the year. Of interest are the 
differing trends in the claimant count for men and women. 
The claimant count for men, 100.9 thousand was up 2.9 
thousand over the year, whereas the comparable figure for 
women, 44.3 thousand, was 7.4 thousand higher than a 
year ago. 
 
Table 7 provides some limited indications of the experience 
of unemployment in terms of claimant count by age and 
duration. The latest figures suggest that 23.6 thousand have 
been claiming benefit for more than a year, up 2,600 over 
the year and 5.8 thousand have been claiming for more than 
2 years, up 1.4 thousand over the year. 
 
Public sector employment in Scotland 
The pace of reform of the public sector is accelerating with 
the announcement of proposals for a single Scottish police 
force and similar national organisations for the emergency 
services. Within the university sector rationalisation of 
courses continues and the first mention of merger has been 
voiced. Elsewhere, cuts, reduction in services, possible 
contracting out of services have been announced and/or are 
under discussion, although proposals for shared services by 
local authorities seem to have faded. 
 
Table 8 indicates the changes in headcount by local 
authority and indicates both a decline in Local Authority 
employment of 12,400 over the year, and some evidence of 
acceleration in the rate of reduction in employment. The 
latest data for public sector employment (q2 2011) suggests 
a reduction of 22,700 (excluding public sector financial 
institutions) over the year with declines in all areas, 
including a decline in headcount employment  of 4,800 in 
the NHS, 1,100 in FE colleges, 9,400 in total central 
Government, and again some acceleration in the rate of 
decline. 
Outlook  
The short term trends in employment indicate a decrease in 
employment and a rise in unemployment.  Total 
employment is still some 79 thousand below the peak 
before the recession; the number of full time employees has 
declined by 120 thousand whilst the numbers of part time 
employees has risen by 40 thousand, growth in employment 
seems to be more concentrated in personal services and 
sales occupations, but as household incomes continue to be 
under pressure is uncertain how much longer this trend in 
employment can be sustained. Reductions in public sector 
expenditure have yet to impact on the public sector 
employment landscape. Yet, if the rate of decline in public 
sector employment continues, then the private sector will 
need to generate over 25,000 jobs in the next year to 
sustain current employment figures.  
 
Any recovery in employment is likely to be slow and limited. 
Reducing unemployment/increasing activity rates for areas 
with a history of higher levels of unemployment will be 
particularly difficult and harder than in the past given the 
changing landscape of local and central government 
services. 
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Abstract 
The Fraser of Allander Institute regularly forecasts the 
annual growth of the Scottish economy. This paper 
measures the accuracy of these forecasts. It contrasts 
official measures of the growth performance of the Scottish 
economy and FAI forecasts for growth. Specifically, official 
measures of growth for the calendar years 2001 to 2010 are 
compared to forecasts for growth in these years made 
between January 2000 and spring 2011. Results show that: 
FAI forecasts of the direction of economic growth from one 
year to the next was statistically better than chance; the 
accuracy of forecasts improve as we get closer to the 
publication of the first growth estimate; excluding the ‘Great 
Recession’, the mean absolute error of forecasts made up 
to eighteen months before publication of the first growth 
estimate for a year is approximately half a percentage point 
(i.e. 0.5%). There have often been significant revisions to 
Scottish GVA data, particularly at the start of the sample 
period. This emphasises the need for quality, and timely, 
indicators of economic performance for the Scottish 
economy as part of the information required for accurate 
forecasts in the future. 
 
“The only function of economic forecasting is to 
make astrology look respectable”, (John Kenneth 
Galbraith, quoted in US News and World Report, 
11th January 1988) 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
Whether aware of it or not, we all use forecasts, and the 
accuracy of these is important. Weather forecasters will 
state the pattern of weather likely for particular areas during 
certain hours of the day, with their accuracy (or an idea of 
the likely margin of error) being crucial for users reliant on 
such forecasts. Astrologers will suggest particular influences 
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or outcomes for people born between specific calendar 
dates. Economic forecasters will, typically, produce 
estimates of the likely growth of an economy in a future 
year. These forecasts may be considered a “barometer” of 
the potential strength of that economy in the future. All users 
of forecasts will be helped to understand the nature of 
uncertainty around this specific forecasts is the forecasts 
also provide the scale of margins of error on these 
forecasts. 
 
Since 1975, the Fraser of Allander Institute (FAI) has 
published forecasts of elements of the Scottish economy, 
including annual economic growth. The accuracy of these 
forecasts can be empirically quantified. To the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first academic assessment of the 
accuracy of the FAI forecasts1. We consider forecasts for 
the growth of the Scottish economy published between 
January 2000 and Spring 2011. These relate to annual 
growth between 2001 to 2010. While this is a relatively short 
time period, it allows us to evaluate how accurate the FAI’s 
forecasts of the Scottish economy have been over the last 
decade. Here we are not concerned with issues relating to 
the production of the forecasts, rather we are solely focusing 
on the accuracy of the published forecasts2. The availability 
of recent data produced by the Scottish Government on the 
growth of the Scottish economy begins in 1998, so analysis 
cannot go before this date on a comparable basis.  
 
Figures for economic growth in Scotland are published by 
the Scottish Government and produced on a less timely 
basis than for growth in the UK as a whole (produced by the 
Office for National Statistics). The first estimates of annual 
growth figures for Scotland for each year of the decade in 
question have typically been available around seventeen 
weeks after the end of the calendar year to which they 
relate.  
 
For example, the first estimate of growth in the final quarter 
of 2010 was published on the 20th of April 2011, sixteen 
weeks after the end of the year. This is three weeks longer 
than the time taken for the first three official estimates of UK 
growth as a whole to be published. Preliminary data for 
growth in the UK in the final three months of 2010 was 
published on the 25th of January 2011, a second estimate 
published on the 25th of February 2011, and the third 
estimate was reported in the UK national accounts 
publication produced on the 29th of March 2011. The longer 
delay in Scottish GVA series appears to be due to all of the 
information used to calculate this series not being available 
earlier. Some data is available reasonably quickly – for 
example, the most recent Retail Sales Index, for example, 
for the second quarter of 2011 was published less than five 
weeks after the end of that quarter. This is however a 
relatively small part of the data requirements for Scottish 
GVA series. Monthly surveys are typically more important 
for the GVA series, but are available at a much longer delay 
(around two months). 
 
In addition to the delay in the GVA data being published, the 
first estimates of Scottish GDP growth figures have also 
been subject to considerable revision. A recent assessment 
of the revisions to Scottish GDP figures (Scottish 
Government, 2010) looked at revisions over the last ten 
years. This used a “rolling” five-year average which would 
take account of changes in methodology over the last 
decade. This concluded that future revisions to quarterly 
data had not been always positive or negative (i.e. first 
estimates of growth were not systematically biased). Mean 
Absolute Errors however showed that first estimates of 
quarterly growth were likely to be revised by around 0.15 
percentage points by the same time the following year. This 
is broadly in line with absolute revisions to initial UK 
quarterly growth estimates.  
 
The implications of slower release of Scottish growth data 
and revisions increase the complexity of evaluating the 
accuracy of forecasts. For example, part of the information 
available when forecasts are produced relates to the past 
performance of the Scottish economy as represented in the 
data released up to that point in time. If that information had 
subsequently been revised, it is likely that our forecasts 
would have been different from those published. Revisions 
to the growth series have implications for the accuracy of 
FAI forecasts and we explore these by comparing forecasts 
for growth to estimates of growth published initially, after 
one year, and the latest estimates3.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
provision of figures on growth in the Scottish economy, 
including revisions between the first estimate of annual 
growth and later periods. This section also describes the 
forecasts for economic growth made by the FAI over the 
period, and how “errors” (i.e. differences between what was 
forecast and the actual growth figures) are calculated. 
Diagrams reveal the scale of these “errors”. Section 3 
introduces two statistical measures which use the errors to 
examine the accuracy of the FAI forecasts. Section 4 
presents and discuss the results, while Section 5 makes 
some conclusions. 
 
2.     Data 
2.1   Growth in the Scottish economy 
Gross Value Added (GVA) measures the amount of goods 
and services produced in an economy. Annual GVA growth 
figures reveal by how much economic activity has increased 
from one year to the next. GVA figures for the Scottish 
economy have been produced on a quarterly basis 
beginning in the first quarter of 1998. As mentioned in the 
introduction these are typically produced around seventeen 
weeks after the end of the quarter to which they refer, 
although it must be noted that this time period has reduced 
slightly over the last decade. The first estimate of annual 
GVA growth in a year is available with the publication of the 
GVA growth figures for the final quarter of that calendar 
year. The annual growth rate is constructed by “annualising” 
from the quarterly growth series. We refer to that figure of 
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GVA growth given initially for annual growth as the “first estimate”. 
 
Figure 1: Annual GVA growth in Scotland, the importance of revisions 
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As noted earlier there are revisions made to a given year’s 
GVA growth in subsequent periods as more data becomes 
available about the true state of the economy during each 
(previous) quarter. Such revisions can be quite sizeable, 
and can affect the annual growth figures. For example, the 
first estimate of annual GVA growth for 2002 was 0.0%. One 
year later, the estimated growth was 1.6%4. In fact this has 
been the largest revision in the first year after the first 
estimate of GVA growth for any year in the sample. Other 
sizeable revisions evolve more gradually throughout the 
sample. The first outturn figure for growth in 2004, for 
instance, was 1.9%; however data now suggest that GVA 
grew by 4.2%. A similar upward revision – albeit not as 
dramatic – occurred between the first estimate of GVA 
growth in 2006 (2.6%) and that suggested now5 (4.0%).  
 
For simplicity we focus on three measures for the “actual” 
growth rate of the Scottish economy: the first estimate, that 
is available one year later, and the latest data. The 
differences between these three estimates for annual 
growth rates can be striking, as Figure 1 shows. What we 
are interested in is the differences (the errors) between FAI 
forecasts and actual growth estimates. While it is the first 
published estimate of GVA growth that forecasts are more 
normally evaluated against in the media, the growth 
estimates available from the most recent data are likely to 
be the most accurate description of what growth was seen 
in an economy during that period. 
 
2.2  Forecasts of growth in the Scottish economy 
We analyse all the forecasts for annual GVA growth 
between 2001 and 2010 in Scotland published by the FAI 
between January 2000 and March 20116. In order to take 
appropriate account of the varying months in which the FAI 
produced forecasts, we group the months of the year into 
three periods. We compare the forecasts made in each of 
these periods to the outturn figures on a consistent basis 
across the sample.  
 
We consider forecasts for each year made at seven different 
forecast horizons, shown in Table 1. Each of the published 
forecasts included were made prior to the publication of the 
first estimate of annual growth for the year being forecast. 
We include therefore forecasts made in the year before that 
which the forecast relates to, the year itself and the spring of 
the subsequent year (i.e. before the first estimate of annual 
growth is published).  
 
To clarify with a specific example, we look at the separate 
FAI forecasts for annual GVA growth in the year 2005 that 
were published during the Spring, Summer and Winter of 
2004, as well as three further forecasts during 2005, and the 
final forecast made before the first release of official data  
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Table 1: Forecast horizons for each annual growth rate 
 
Forecast horizon Year Months 
Previous spring Year before the year forecast January to April 
Previous summer Year before the year forecast May to August 
Previous winter Year before the year forecast September to December 
Spring During the year being forecast January to April 
Summer During the year being forecast May to August 
Winter During the year being forecast September to December 
Following spring The year after that being forecast January to April 
 
 
which was published in March 2006. The first release of 
annual growth figures for 2005 was published on the 26th of 
April 2006.Data for longer forecast horizons are not 
available on a consistent basis over the sample, so we do 
not include any forecasts produced any earlier than the start 
of the year before that being forecast (e.g. we do not include 
any forecasts for 2005 published in 2003)7.  
 
evaluate the accuracy of the FAI’s forecasts of the Scottish 
economy over the sample. The first column lists the forecast 
horizon, while each subsequent column gives the forecast 
for Scottish GVA growth for a particular year for a given 
forecast horizon. Reading across the rows of this table 
shows the forecasts made at a specific forecast horizon. 
Reading down the columns shows how forecasts for specific 
years have changed as the forecast horizon has shortened. 
Table 2 below summarises all the information used to 
 
Table 2: Annual GVA growth forecasts published by FAI, by forecast horizon for each calendar year, and 
three official GVA estimates for annual GVA growth 
 
 
Forecast horizon 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Previous spring 3.3 2.3 1.5 1.8 2.7 1.5 2.1 2.1 - -1.2 
Previous summer 2.9 1.9 1.3 2.2 2.0 1.8 2.3 2.3 1.2 -0.9 
Previous winter - 1.3 1.4 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.3 - -1.1 0.1 
Spring 2.0 1.2 1.1 2.1 1.7 1.9 2.2 - -2.6 0.6 
Summer 1.6 0.9 1.3 2.2 1.8 2.1 2.5 1.4 -2.9 0.7 
Winter 0.9 0.7 1.3 2.1 1.8 2.2 - 0.7 -5.0 1.0 
Following spring 0.7 -0.2 - 2.0 1.7 2.3 - 0.6 -4.8 1.1 
 
GVA estimates 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
First release 0.6 0.0 1.7 1.9 1.8 2.6 2.2 0.5 -4.8 0.8 
One year later 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.6 1.9 0.4 -4.2 0.8 
Latest data 2.9 0.5 2.2 4.2 1.3 4.0 3.0 -0.3 -4.2 0.8 
ȱ
Note:  “-“ indicates that no forecast was published in this period. See footnote six. 
 
 
2.3 Analysis of “errors” between forecasts 
and GVA estimates 
The difference between the forecast and the estimate of 
GVA data is described as the “error” of the forecast. We can 
show the absolute size of these errors over time using 
histograms. Good forecasts will have small “errors”. 
Forecasts with larger errors will lie further away from the 
centre of the histograms below. The labels on the horizontal 
axis of each histogram shows the range in which each of the 
errors lies. The label (0,1), for example, records those 
forecasts with errors greater than zero but less than (plus) 
one percentage point. The height up the vertical axis shows 
the number of forecasts which had an error of this size and 
direction. In total, Table 2 shows that forecasts for a total of 
63 points in time are evaluated. 
 
Figure 2 shows the histograms for errors over the sample 
period, comparing the forecast against the value of growth. 
Figure 2a, for example shows that the majority of the errors 
between the forecast and the first estimate lie between -1 
and 1 percentage point. The shading in each column of 
Figure 2 identifies which period the forecast error was made 
in. The darker colours show forecasts made closer to the 
release of the first estimate of GVA. The same diagram is  
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Figure 2: Errors between forecasts and estimates of GVA data (a) First estimate, (b) One year later, and (c) 
Latest estimate 
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Figure 2a: Difference between forecasts and first estimate 
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Figure 2b: Difference between forecasts and estimate one year later 
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Figure 2c: Difference between forecasts and latest estimate 
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reproduced for the errors between forecasts and the values 
for growth published one year later and the latest data 
(Figures 2b and 2c).  
 
We can see from Figures 2a, 2b and 2c that in each of the 
three comparison cases, the most frequent forecast error is 
between the -1 and +1 range, i.e. are concentrated within 
one percentage point (above or below) the official estimate 
of growth. This is particularly evident in Figures 2a and 2b. 
Further, in each of these figures darker shading indicates 
the forecasts made closer to the publication of official 
growth figures. We can see the improvement in the 
forecasts as the horizon between the forecast publication 
and the first estimate of annual growth. In Figure 2a, for 
example, all forecasts made at the shortest forecast horizon 
are within one percentage point of the first estimate of 
growth. 
 
Table 3: Share of directions for growth correctly forecast and p-value result for significance 
 
 
 Percentage of forecasts correctly 
predicting direction of change in growth 
 
Significance (p-value) 
Summer of year forecasts 89% 0.02 
 
 
 
2.4 Directional analysis 
Aside from “eyeballing” the errors, a further simple test is to 
see how well FAI forecasts have predicted the direction of 
growth, i.e. did growth increase or decrease from the 
previous year’s figure, and was this direction for growth 
correctly predicted? We follow Ashiya (2006) in calculating 
the accuracy of the direction of forecasts against those from 
the first estimate of annual GVA growth in each year. 
Against these known directions for annual growth, we 
compare the directions as predicted in the summer of the 
year (i.e. the first forecasts after the growth in the previous 
year is known). By comparing the actual change in growth 
and that forecast, we can calculate the proportion of 
changes which are forecast correctly.  
 
On this measure, a result of 50% would mean that the 
forecasts are correctly identifying the direction of growth 
changes only half of the time. A figure less than 50% would 
suggest that a coin-toss would be a better predictor than the 
forecast. A figure above 50% would indicate that there is 
value in the forecast for its direction of growth from one year 
to the next. We can use a test statistic (p-value) to show if 
the number of forecast record is statistically better than 
chance would suggest. A p-value below 0.05 means that we 
can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the FAI 
forecasts are better than a “coin-toss” at predicting the 
direction of change in growth in the Scottish economy. The 
results from this analysis are shown in Table 3. FAI 
forecasts has correctly predicted the annual direction of 
growth on eight out of nine occasions. 
 
3.  Statistical measures of forecast accuracy 
We next use two statistical measures to calculate the 
accuracy of the FAI forecasts. These are the mean absolute 
error (MAE) and the mean absolute proportionate error 
(MAPE)8. These are defined as follows: 
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Where k is the period in which T forecasts are made, 
is the error between the forecasts made in period k 
( ) and the actual value for growth in year t (y).  
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The MAE measures the mean absolute error between the 
forecast and the actual annual growth figures, and so is 
probably the most easily understood measure of forecast 
accuracy. Unlike other measures, such as the mean error, it 
is not affected by errors which are positive or negative (i.e. if 
growth is above or below that forecast, then the mean 
average will be smaller than the mean absolute average) 
since it is the absolute size of each forecast error which 
matters. 
 
The MAPE shows the relationship between the mean 
absolute error and the growth outturn. Mills and Pepper 
(1999, p. 252) note that a value for MAPE of greater than 
one means than, on average, the forecast error is greater 
than the growth estimate. We will see that for particular 
years the very low (first release) figures for annual growth in 
Scotland has an impact upon the values of the MAPE 
statistic. 
 
4.  Results and discussion 
We evaluate the accuracy of FAI forecasts for economic 
growth in Scotland over two periods. Firstly, we report the 
values of each of the measures of forecast accuracy over 
the whole sample period, i.e. for forecasts made between 
Spring 2000 and Spring 2011 for annual growth between 
2001 and 2010. Secondly, we exclude forecasts for the year 
of the “great recession”, i.e. 2009 when Scottish GVA fell by 
4.2%.  
 
As is well documented, the vast majority of professional 
forecasters did not forecast the timing or scale of the “great 
recession”. For example, from the HM Treasury’s collection 
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of forecasting organisations published in May 2008, the 
average UK growth forecast for 2009 was 1.7%. The 
Treasury’s own range forecast for growth in 2009 (produced 
in March 2008) was between 2.25% and 2.75%. Only one of 
the thirty-seven forecasts available in May 2008 forecast a 
decline in GDP in 2009 for the UK economy as a whole9, 
while the latest data shows in fact UK GVA declined by 
4.3% during 2009. Since the failure to forecast this decline 
is likely to dominate the results on forecast accuracy over 
our sample, it seems appropriate to consider the accuracy 
of the FAI forecasts for Scottish GVA growth with and 
without the forecasts for 2009. 
 
Table 4: Precision of FAI forecasts made between Spring 2000 and Spring 2011, forecasts for 2001 to 2010 
 
Forecast horizon First estimate  One year later estimate  Latest estimate 
 MAE MAPE1  MAE MAPE  MAE MAPE 
Previous spring 1.216 1.357  1.011 1.150  1.622 0.134 
Previous summer 1.555 0.969  1.333 0.854  1.773 -0.279 
Previous winter 0.894 0.112  0.766 0.154  1.381 0.501 
Spring 0.733 0.359  0.611 0.220  1.107 0.428 
Summer 0.635 0.415  0.592 0.445  1.066 -0.266 
Winter 0.284 0.186  0.448 0.269  1.047 -0.060 
Following spring 0.135 0.110  0.510 0.328  1.101 0.070 
ȱ
Note:  1 = MAPE calculated excluding 2003 where annual growth was 0.01% in the first release. This was subsequently revised to 1.6% one 
year later. 
 
4.1   Whole sample 
What is not known when publishing forecasts is the extent to 
which (any or all) of the official quarterly growth figures will 
be revised in the future. As already noted, the fact that 
official data are revised highlights the importance of clarity in 
relation to which official figures the forecasts are to be 
evaluated against. As noted above, there have often been 
some quite significant revisions to Scottish GVA data over 
the last decade. We therefore show the accuracy of 
forecasts made at each of the second forecast horizons 
against three estimates of the growth rate: the first estimate, 
that available one year later, and the most recent estimates 
(available in Summer 2011). 
 
Smaller values of mean absolute errors (MAE) and mean 
absolute proportionate errors (MAPE) reflect better forecast 
accuracy. If we look at the columns relating to “first 
estimate” in Table 4, reading down the column we see that 
on both measures the accuracy of the forecasts improve as 
the forecast horizon shortens. That is, as the forecasts are 
made closer to the point at which the first estimate growth 
figures are produced.  
 
The same general pattern is evident when we compare the 
forecasts to the growth estimates known one year later. 
Note that the forecast will not have changed, but what was 
understood about growth in the Scottish economy during the 
year being forecast will have changed. The reduction in 
MAE and MAPE between the earliest and latest forecasts is 
much less pronounced than the pattern observed for the 
accuracy of forecasts compared to the first estimate. It 
would appear therefore that our forecasts have been 
reasonably successful in taking in economic information 
available throughout the year being forecast and producing 
an improved estimate of the first estimate of the annual 
growth rate. 
 
Turning to the accuracy of the forecasts compared to the 
latest estimates, we again see the same reducing MAE and 
MAPE over the forecast horizons. It is clear is that there is a 
larger error on each of these measures between the 
forecast of annual growth and the latest estimates of growth. 
Part of this difference will be due to changes in the 
methodology used to calculate growth in the Scottish 
economy over the sample period while we do not – in line 
with other forecasters - continue to publish forecasts after 
the release of the first estimate of growth.  
 
Of further interest is the extent to which these results – 
comparing forecasts and growth outturns over our whole 
sample – is affected by the decline in GVA seen in 2009 
(and not predicted by many forecasters).  We therefore 
calculate the same statistics for the sample but removing 
forecasts and growth estimates for 2009. 
 
4.2   Whole sample, excluding 2009 
The dominance of poor forecast performance in 2009 is 
clearly shown in the comparison between Table 4 and Table 
5 (where 2009 is omitted from the analysis). If we begin by 
comparing the accuracy of the forecasts against the first 
estimates, the MAE for the forecast produced around 
eighteen months in advance of the first official estimate 
(after summer of the previous year) is less than 0.55 points. 
So if the first estimate of growth is 2%, then in the winter of 
the previous year the FAI forecast would, on average, lie 
between 1.5% and 2.5%. The accuracy of the first official 
estimate improves as its publication nears, and the forecast 
produced in the winter of the year and spring of the following 
year have an mean absolute error of 0.296 and 0.153 
respectively.  
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Table 5: Precision of FAI forecasts made between Spring 2000 and Spring 2011, forecasts for 2001 to 2010, 
excluding forecasts for 2009 
 
Forecast horizon First estimate  One year later estimate  Latest estimate 
 MAE MAPE1  MAE MAPE  MAE MAPE 
Previous spring 1.216 1.357  1.011 1.239  1.622 0.134 
Previous summer 1.060 1.246  0.877 1.205  1.366 -0.168 
Previous winter 0.492 0.259  0.427 0.298  1.131 0.679 
Spring 0.548 0.476  0.484 0.302  1.042 0.530 
Summer 0.493 0.516  0.510 0.541  1.036 -0.261 
Winter 0.296 0.218  0.409 0.287  1.082 -0.044 
Following spring 0.153 0.129  0.501 0.272  1.178 0.099 
ȱ
Note:  1 = MAPE calculated excluding 2003 where annual growth was 0.01% in the first release. This was subsequently revised to 1.6% one 
year later. 
 
Looking at the MAPE results – and again focusing on the 
accuracy of the forecasts against the first release estimate – 
from the previous winter forecast these values are (typically) 
less than 0.5. For the longer forecast horizons, published in 
the spring and summer of the previous year MAPE is 
greater than one. This is explained by the presence of two 
years of relatively low initial growth estimates – i.e. 2001 
(0.6%) and 2008 (0.5%) – meaning that the errors for 
forecasts made in the spring and summer of the previous 
year were greater than the outturn growth (in the first 
release). Interestingly, if the revised figure of 1.2% growth 
for 2001 which was estimated one year on is used rather 
than that from the first release, then both these MAPE 
figures reduce significantly.  
 
Looking at the accuracy with regard to later estimates of the 
annual growth rates, we again see the importance of 
revisions. FAI forecasts for growth are not produced after 
the first official estimate is produced, but the estimates for 
annual growth will be revised. As we have seen, some of 
these revisions have been quite sizeable over the sample 
using in this paper. This suggests that perhaps a greater 
emphasis should be placed on comparing forecasted 
estimates of GVA growth to later estimates of growth. It 
might be several quarters before the annual growth rates 
are no longer affected by revisions. This however is a 
possible tension between placing forecasts in context with 
regular updates on the current state of the economy. 
Uncertainty in the history of economic performance serves 
to multiply the possible states of the future economy. 
 
With relation to the MAE between forecasts and the values 
one year on, we can see that the FAI forecasts have an 
absolute error of around 0.5 for all forecasts produced from 
a horizon of one year or less (that is, from the winter of the 
year before that being forecast onwards). If we look at the 
accuracy of the forecasts against the latest estimates, again 
we see the huge impact of revisions. FAI forecasts in each 
of the periods have an average absolute error of over 1 
percentage point. This result is particularly driven by the 
sizeable revisions to GVA figures for 2004 and 2006 more 
than one year after their first release (see Figure 1). Without 
comparison forecasts of the Scottish economy, we are 
unable to say if these errors are superior than those 
produced by other forecasting organisations. What they do 
suggest is the scale of uncertainty which should be attached 
to future forecasts made by the FAI. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
We have evaluated the accuracy of FAI forecasts of annual 
Scottish GVA growth between 2001 and 2010, and have 
examined the accuracy over a range of forecast horizons. 
We have compared growth forecasts to the first estimate 
and subsequent official figures published by the Scottish 
Government. We have noted that revisions to official data 
are a normal phenomenon of economic statistics and that 
the Scottish Government’s analysis has indicated that there 
is no systematic bias in the revisions made to the quarterly 
growth figures between their first and subsequent releases.  
Such revisions however mean that the accuracy of FAI 
forecasts appears better for the first estimate of GVA growth 
than for the subsequently revised data.  
 
Revisions to the GDP series are a natural part of production 
of official economic statistics, particularly for series compiled 
from components of evidence, e.g. partial surveys 
supplemented with fuller information that is necessarily 
accumulated over a period of time. In addition the initial 
publication of Scottish GDP data occurs after three separate 
releases of official UK GDP data for the same period. These 
combine to cloud our understanding of the position of the 
Scottish economy at a given instant. The forecasts are 
made with the set of information which is available at a 
given time. Where the information turns out to have been 
incorrect given subsequent revisions it is unsurprising that 
the forecast accuracy worsens.  
 
In this paper we find that: 
 
x Forecast errors are concentrated close to zero and 
which typically reduce in size as the forecast 
horizon is reduced (i.e. we get closer to the release 
of first estimate of growth). 
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x FAI forecasts perform significantly better than 
chance would suggest in predicting whether growth 
in one year will be greater or less than growth in 
the previous year. 
x If we exclude the “great recession” of 2009 – an 
event missed by economic forecasts at the UK 
level – the Mean Absolute Error between forecasts 
made in the winter of the year preceding the 
forecast year is approximately 0.5. This means that 
if the first estimate of annual growth is revealed to 
be 2%, the forecast made up to eighteen months 
previously would lie between 1.5% and 2.5%. 
x It is crucial whether the forecast is compared 
against the first release of GVA data or that 
available after one year, given the size of some 
revisions to GVA data for Scotland over the last 
decade.  
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Footnotes 
1The author is aware of an assessment of the accuracy of Scottish 
forecasters made in 2000 or 2001, published by Business AM, 
which reported that the FAI forecasts were the most accurate. 
 
2Granger (1996) argues that forecasts typically do not provide 
adequate information to allow others to replicate the forecast and so 
it is therefore “correct” to judge the forecasts on their accuracy, 
rather than the assumptions used. 
 
3A second important point may be to evaluate the accuracy of the 
forecasts by taking into account what was known at the time the 
forecasts were made. This is not explicitly addressed in this paper, 
but could be a line for future research. 
 
4The current estimate for annual growth in 2002 is 0.5%. 
 
5The latest data we use for growth in each year are those given 
from the publication of Q4 2010, published in April 2011. 
 
6 During the sample number of forecasts by the FAI varied from year 
to year. Forecasts were produced four times a year between 2000 
to 2003, and then three times in each year between 2004 and 2006. 
There were two forecasts (April and June) published in 2007 before 
there was a break in the production of the Fraser Commentary. This 
break meant that no forecasts were published from July 2007 until 
June 2008. The Fraser Economic Commentary was relaunched 
with the support of PWC in June 2008 and has been published 
three times a year, typically in February, June and November of 
each year. 
 
7Further, in a small number of instances where two forecasts of 
annual growth were published in the same period we have used a 
mean average of the two forecasts. 
 
8Other articles evaluating economic forecasts include Pain and 
Britton (1992) and Melliss and Whittaker (1998). The first article 
here examines if National Institute forecasts are “efficient” (i.e. 
unbiased either positively or negatively in relation to the outcome), 
and not whether the forecasts are accurate, while the second paper 
examines the accuracy of HM Treasury forecasts and applies some 
of the measures identified above for a different time period and for 
the UK as a whole. 
 
9This was Economic Perspectives, who, in May 2008, forecast UK 
GDP growth for 2009 of minus 1. 
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Abstract 
The main purpose of this paper is to consider how the 
Conservative Liberal-Democrats Coalition’s so-called 
“immigration cap” will impact on Scotland. The immigration 
cap is a set of not yet specified policies (working mainly 
through the points-based immigration system) aimed at 
lowering net-migration to the UK primarily by lowering 
immigration. While the UK Government wants to reduce net-
migration to the UK, the Scottish Government wants to 
maintain a historically high level of net-migration in Scotland 
in part to achieve its population growth target and to ensure 
labour force growth.  The two levels of government are 
pursuing policies that clearly conflict, since lowering net-
migration to the UK will also likely lower net-migration to 
Scotland. 
 
 
  
The UK “Immigration Cap”: implications for 
Scotland 
 
1.   Introduction 
The Conservative Liberal-Democrats Coalition, led by David 
Cameron, is committed to reducing net-migration in the UK 
from "the hundreds of thousands to the tens of thousands" 
by the end of their first parliament. Net-migration is the 
difference between the number of immigrants (those coming 
to the UK) and the number of emigrants (those leaving the 
UK). Consequently, lower immigration and/or higher 
emigration will decrease net-migration. Since it is unlikely 
that the current administration wants more people (at least 
British citizens) to leave the UK, the focus on delivering on 
this promise lies with putting policies in place that lead to a 
much lower level of immigration in coming years. As a 
group, these policies, which are still at the “consultation” 
stage have become known in the media and political circles 
as the so-called “immigration cap”. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to consider how the 
immigration cap will impact on Scotland. While the UK 
Government wants to reduce net-migration to the UK, the 
Scottish Government wants to maintain a historically high 
level of net-migration in part to achieve its population growth 
target and ensure labour force growth. For obvious reasons, 
one might expect net-migration at a UK-level to be positively 
correlated with net-migration at Scotland-level.  If this is the 
case, then the two levels of government are pursuing 
policies that clearly conflict, since lowering net-migration to 
the UK will also lower net-migration to Scotland. Immigration 
is a “reserved power” with the devolved administrations, 
such as the Scottish Government, only having a minor role 
in shaping immigration policy.  
 
In February 2005, the then Home Secretary Charles Clarke 
outlined a “five year plan” aimed at changing fundamentally 
the way immigration to the United Kingdom is managed (see 
Mosca and Wright, 2009). Central to this plan is the 
adoption of a “points-based system” (PBS), where 
applicants are allotted points or “scored” for possessing 
human capital characteristics that make them more 
employable, such as education, age and previous earnings. 
If some threshold level of points is achieved (which can be 
varied), then the individual is allowed to immigrate to the UK 
(conditional on satisfactory security checks). When fully 
operational, the PBS will eventually replace the system that 
includes over 80 ways to immigrate to the UK. It is 
acknowledged that manipulating the details of the PBS will 
be the main vehicle by which the UK government will 
attempt to reduce immigration levels. 
 
The effectiveness of the government’s approach to reducing 
immigration will depend on what fraction of the potential 
pool of immigrants the PBS applies to. As is documented 
below, a sizeable share of immigrants to the UK (and 
Scotland) come from member states of the European Union. 
There are no restrictions on movement from the other 
member states—citizens of these countries are free to live 
in the UK. In addition, with the exception of Bulgarian and 
Romanian citizens, they are free to work here too. Likewise, 
a non-trivial share of immigrants are in fact British citizens. 
These immigrants may be individuals who emigrated from 
the UK earlier in their lives but have decided to return. They 
may also be foreign-born individuals who have obtained 
citizenship via their parents and/or grandparents. The PBS 
also does not apply to refugees and family class immigrants 
(e.g. immigration tied to marriage). Given these exclusions, 
it is unclear what the scope of the PBS is to seriously lower 
immigration levels to the UK. 
 
2.   Net-migration, immigration and emigration 
As a starting point, it is not unreasonable to argue that over 
time net-migration in the UK is correlated with net-migration 
in Scotland. Figure 1 shows the trend in UK net-migration 
from 1964 to 2010. Note that migration statistics for the UK 
before 1964 are of notoriously low quality so are not 
included in our discussion (see Hatton, 2005). Figure 2 
shows net-migration to Scotland from 1951 to 2010. Note 
that for Scotland net-migration also includes migration flows 
to and from the other countries of the UK. It is clear that 
these two series are highly correlated in a statistical sense.  
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Figure 1:  Net-migration - United Kingdom, 1964-2010  
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Source:  Office of National Statistics (ONS) 
 
 
Figure 2:  Net-migration - Scotland, 1950-2010  
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Source:  General Register Office for Scotland (GROS) 
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Figure 3:  Net-migration rate (per 10,000 population) - Scotland and United Kingdom, 1951 (1964)-2010  
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Source:  GROS and ONS 
 
 
In fact, in the 1964-2010, period the zero-order correlation is 
+0.85. 
 
Figure 3 shows the “net-migration rate” for the UK and 
Scotland. This rate is the number of net-migrants per 
10,000. It is a useful measure since it controls for the scale 
effect generated by the fact that the UK population (c. 62 
million) is around twelve times larger than the Scottish 
population (c. 5.3 million). The figure suggests that in a 
relative sense, emigration exceeded immigration by a much 
greater extent in Scotland compared to the UK in most of 
this period. However, since around 2004, when ten Central 
and Eastern European countries joined the EU, the net-
migration rate in Scotland has been higher than for the UK 
as a whole. However, these two series are still highly 
correlated with the zero-order correlation being +0.79 in the 
1964-2010 period. 
 
 
Table 1:  Immigration, emigration and net-migration - United Kingdom, thousands, 2004-2010 
 
 (1) (2) (1)-(2) 
Period Immigration Emigration  Net-migration 
2004/2005 596 336 260 
2005/2006 565 388 177 
2006/2007 596 387 208 
2007/2008 571 375 196 
2008/2009 563 397 166 
2009/2010 572 346 226 
    
2004-2010 3463 2229 1,233 
Average 577 372 206 
 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics 
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Figure 4:  Immigration and emigration - United Kingdom, 1964-2010 
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Figure 5:  Immigration and emigration - Scotland, 1964-2010 
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Figure 4 shows immigration and emigration totals to the UK 
in the 1964-2010 period. Figures 5 gives the same 
estimates for Scotland. Immigration to the UK and 
immigration to Scotland are highly correlated, with the zero-
order correlation being +0.94. The statistical relationship 
between emigration from the UK and emigration from 
Scotland is not as strong. The relationship is clearly positive 
with a zero-order correlation of +0.68. 
 
This descriptive analysis indicates that net-migration, 
immigration and emigration at the UK-level and the 
Scotland-level are highly correlated in a statistical sense. In 
research not reported here, we have constructed a 
statistical model that explains current levels of net-migration 
in Scotland in terms of the past levels of immigration and 
emigration in Scotland and the UK. This model is quite 
accurate in terms of predicting past trends. More generally, 
it provides more rigorous evidence suggesting that UK and 
Scotland net-migration are related in a casual sense. 
 
Table 1 gives the net-migration, immigration and emigration 
totals for the UK for the period 2004-2010. An examination 
of this table confirms that it is incorrect to conclude (as is 
routinely done in the media) that net-migration is increasing 
because immigration is increasing. Net-migration increased 
between 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 because emigration 
decreased — immigration actually decreased during this 
period. The same is the case for the period 2008/09 to 
2010/11. 
 
Table 2 gives the net-migration, immigration and emigration 
totals in Scotland for the more recent period 2004-2010. As 
mentioned above, the situation is more complicated in 
Scotland compared to the UK since in addition to “overseas” 
immigrants and emigrants there are immigrants from and 
emigrants to the rest-of-the-UK. In addition, the way 
migration statistics are compiled, the migration of armed 
forces personal, prisoners and asylum seekers are 
considered as a separate adjustment. In the period 2004-
2010, about 44% of immigrants to Scotland came from 
overseas. In the same period, 38% of emigrants from 
Scotland moved overseas. In other words, based on the 
past, less than half of the immigrants to Scotland would fall 
under the PBS according to the current rules. 
 
 
Table 2:  Immigration, emigration and net-migration - Scotland, 2004-2010 
 
 Immigration Emigration Net-Migration 
Period UK Oversea
s 
Total UK Oversea
s 
Total Total Adjust-
ment(*) 
Total 
Adjusted 
2004/2005 57,342 35,400 92,742 44,835 28,100 72,935 19,807 -511 19,296 
2005/2006 53,335 42,200 95,535 44,413 29,500 73,913 21,622 -455 21,167 
2006/2007 51,546 37,800 89,346 42,697 21,000 63,697 25,649 1,162 26,811 
2007/2008 53,327 38,500 91,827 41,818 30,800 72,618 19,209 744 19,953 
2008/2009 45,407 42,700 88,107 41,285 25,200 66,485 21,622 49 21,671 
2009/2010 46,968 46,100 93,068 43,535 24,600 68,135 24,933 35 24,968 
          
2004-2010 307,925 242,700 550,625 258,583 159,200 417,783 132,842 1,024 133,866 
Average 51,321 40,450 91,771 43,097 26,533 69,631 22,140 171 22,311 
 
*This total includes movements to and from the armed forces, asylum seekers and prisoners. 
Source: General Register Office for Scotland 
 
3.  Citizenship mix of immigrants 
Figure 6 shows the “citizenship mix” of immigration to the 
UK in the period 1991-2009. In 2009 (the most recently 
available estimate), 18.6% of immigrants were British 
citizens; 28.4% were EU citizens; and 53% were non-EU 
citizens. As the figure shows the share of immigrants who 
are British citizens steadily declined while the share of 
immigrants who are EU-citizens increased sharply after the 
major enlargement of the EU in 2004. From 2004 onwards, 
there has been a slight decline in the share of immigrants 
who are non-EU citizens. However, non-EU citizens are the 
biggest group of immigrants to the UK. 
 
The PBS does not apply to immigrants who are British 
citizens or EU citizens. Therefore, at most, it currently 
applies to about half of immigrants. As a thought exercise, 
assume that the PBS was in place since 2004. Assume 
further that it was effective at reducing non-EU citizenship 
immigration to zero. Table 1 shows that in the period 2004-
2010 net-migration in the UK averaged +206,000 per year. 
Arithmetic suggests that a 50% reduction in immigration 
corresponds to a net-migration of around -80,000 per year. 
Likewise, a 25% reduction in immigration gives a net-
migration of around +60,000 per year. It is clear that the 
PBS has the potential to reduce net-migration to “tens of 
thousands” by severely curtailing the immigration of 
individuals with non-EU citizenship. 
 
Figure 7 shows the “citizenship mix” of overseas 
immigration to Scotland in the period 1991-2009. In 2009, 
the citizenship mix of overseas immigrants to Scotland was 
different to that of the UK as a whole. More specifically 25%
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Figure 6:  Citizenship of Immigrants (% of total) - United Kingdom, 1991-2009   
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Figure 7:  Citizenship of Overseas Immigrants (% of total) - Scotland, 1991-2009   
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igure 8:  Adjusted net-migration - Scotland, 2005-2010  F
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f immigrants were British citizens; 39% were EU citizens; 
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igure 8 shows the actual level of net-migration in Scotland 
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Reducing immigration from countries outside the EU would 
 
s in a 
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.   Concluding comments 
pulation momentum is 
and 
only 
ute 
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o
result in a considerable reduction in net-migration in each of
these periods. Between 2005 and 2010 the net-migration 
averaged +22,311 per year. Driving immigration from 
countries outside the EU to zero (not surprising) result
net-migration of +6,644 per year. Likewise, driving 
immigration to zero from overseas countries, results
net-migration of -18,139 per year. By any standards, both
represent sizeable reductions in net-migration. 
 
and 36% were non-EU citizens. The key difference is that 
36% of non-EU citizens is considerably lower than 53% for
the UK. As Figure 7, shows there is considerable year-to 
year volatility in the citizenship mix of immigration. Howev
when the period 2004-2009 is considered as a whole the 
difference persists. More specifically, 56.5% of immigrants
to the UK were non-EU citizens compared to 43.3% of 
overseas immigrants to Scotland.  
 
4F
for the period 2005-2010 taken from Table 2. As a further 
thought exercise, the figure also shows what the level of 
net-migration would be under two scenarios. In the first 
scenario, the government is successful are reducing 
immigration to the UK from “outside the EU” to zero. I
second scenario, they are successful at reducing 
immigration to the UK from “overseas” to zero. In t
calculations, it is assumed that migration flows to and fro
the rest-of-the-UK remain the same. It is clear from the 
discussion above that it would not be possible to achieve 
such reductions for several reasons. However, the 
scenarios do provide some indication of the range o
variation in net-migration that could be brought about 
through the PBS.  
It is well established that Scottish po
moving in the direction of rapid aging and decline (see 
Lisenkova and Wright, 2009). Population decline goes h
in hand with labour force decline. For most of the past 
decade, deaths have exceeded births, and it has been 
through positive net-migration that both the labour force and 
general population have grown (see Wright, 2008). 
Research carried out by the Fraser of Allander Instit
suggests that an annual net-migration of around 20,000 i
needed to counteract some the negative macroeconomic 
consequences (such as lower economic growth) generated
by a “shrinking” labour force decline, (Lisenkova et al, 
2010). This suggested level of net-migration is no too 
different to what has occurred in recent years (see Tab
It is clear from the simple analysis carried out in this paper, 
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that the UK Government’s desire to significantly lower net-
migration to the UK, through lower levels of immigration, ha
the potential to reduce net-migration in Scotland to levels 
well below +20,000. 
 
s 
his conclusion however is based on the assumption that 
ems 
tion 
f 
 
 
ill not be 
___________________ 
eferences 
), “Explaining Trends in UK Immigration”, 
isenkova, K., P. McGregor, RE. Wright and others, (2010), 
isenkova, K and R.E. Wright, (2009), “Scotland’s 
 and 
d 
osca, I. and R.E. Wright, (2009), “Devolved Immigration 
right, R.E., (2008), The Economics of New Immigration to 
T
the other flows of migrants would not change if the 
immigration of non-EU citizens was reduced. This se
unlikely. Even if the UK Government was successful at 
reducing the immigration of non-EU citizens, the immigra
of EU-citizens and British citizens could increase to make up 
the difference. This substitution is more likely if immigration 
is predominately a response to employment and economic 
opportunities. In the case of Scotland, this difference could 
also be made up by an increase in immigration from the 
rest-of-the-UK. Put simply, if the decrease in immigrants o
one type (i.e. non-EU citizens) results in an increase in 
immigrants of another type (i.e. EU-citizens and British 
citizens), then all that will be achieved is a change in the
citizenship mix of immigration with no decrease in net-
migration levels. If this is the case then trying to reduce
immigration solely through the making it “tougher” 
(impossible?) to immigrate to the UK via the PBS w
successful.   
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Introduction 
Strengthening leve
cornerstones of the Scottish Government’s Econ
Strategy1. Innovation is a key catalyst for productivity g
as new ideas drive enterprise, create new products and 
markets and improve efficiency, delivering benefits to firm
customers and society.  It is a crucial factor in determining 
competitiveness and national progress2. 
 
U
innovation has been the ratio of national expenditure on 
R&D to GDP3. Data shows that there has been a significant
gap in business research and development (R&D) 
expenditure between Scotland and the UK, EU and
averages in recent years.  Scottish Business Enterprise 
R&D (BERD) expenditure was 0.56% of Scottish GDP in 
2009, lower than the rate for the UK as a whole (1.11%) a
the EU (1.17%)4.  Compared to other UK Government 
regions, Scotland ranked in 10th place out of the 12 reg
 
H
based activities, it is increasingly recognised that this is o
one element of the broader concept of innovation and is 
frequently more relevant for manufacturing than for 
services5.  Evidence shows that firms introduce new 
products and services onto the market without necess
performing R&D.  A lot of innovation activity is based on (or 
embodied in) advanced machinery and computer systems 
purchased to implement new or improved processes and 
deliver new products and services. Innovation can also be
purchased through rights to use patents, licences, 
trademarks and software. Innovation can also enco
training and new design and marketing processes6.  
Evidence also shows that many firms adopt multiple, 
complementary innovation strategies, with the most 
innovative firms introducing both product and process
innovations as well as marketing or organisational 
innovations.  Therefore, productivity growth can be 
through advances in technology combined with new 
approaches to creating and delivering of goods and 
 
There is n
re
development7.  The evidence suggests that investmen
‘intangible assets’ that give rise to innovation (R&D, 
software, human capital and new organisational structures
now accounts for up to 12% of GDP in some countrie
contributes as much to labour productivity growth as 
investment in tangible assets such as machinery and 
equipment.  According to OECD estimates, investmen
intangible assets accounted for around a quarter of lab
productivity growth in the UK and other countries between 
1995 and 20068. 
 
The Community In
a
just R&D expenditure, across European Union coun
CIS collects a range of information from businesses on the 
types of innovation they are involved in, motivation for 
innovation, spending on a range of innovation activities 
beyond R&D, collaboration and linkages between 
businesses or with public research organisations, as wel
data on sales from product innovations9.  In light of
growing recognition that innovation encompasses a wider 
range of activities, and that broader metrics are required
reflect this, the Innovation Survey provides a key data set t
measure innovation within businesses10. 
 
UK innovation survey, Scottish 
a
This paper presents an initial analysis of the Scottish resul
of the 2009 U
third bi-annual survey, and this analysis focuses on Scottish 
trends over time and provides comparisons with the UK as 
whole. 
 
The UK
o
every two years by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
on behalf of the Department for Business, Innovation & 
Skills (BIS) and its predecessors since 2005.  Earlier 
surveys were undertaken every four years11.  The results
feed into the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), whic
allows Europe’s progress in the area of innovation to be 
monitored.  
 
Both across 
th
Scotland, 2,393 enterprises were surveyed and 1,184 
questionnaires were returned.  To compensate for the 
that did not respond to the survey and those not select
the sample, BIS developed weightings so that the results 
are representative of the population of firms as a whole.  On 
average each respondent represents 13 enterprises in the
population12. 
 
The analysis i
fr
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Figure 1: Proportion of innovation active firms in Scotland and the UK, 2005-2009 
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igure 2: Innovation active firms by government office region 2007 and 2009 
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innovation activity indicators and innovation ‘inputs’ and 
‘outputs’.  
 
x Innovation activity indicators 
 
‘Innovation active’ firms are defined as enterprises 
engaged in any of the following14: 
 
x Introduction of a new or significantly improved 
product (goods or service) or process; 
x Engagement in innovation projects not yet 
complete or abandoned; 
x Expenditure in areas such as internal research and 
development, training, acquisition of external 
knowledge or machinery and equipment linked to 
innovation activities. 
 
x Broader areas of innovation include the 
introduction of innovative business practices and 
organisational structures: 
 
x ‘Wider innovators’ are firms that have introduced 
new and significantly improved forms of 
organisation business structures or practices 
d at improving internal efficiency or 
f approaching markets and 
der innovators’ are firms that are either 
rs, or both. 
x 
ht-in machinery, 
for 
al 
n (outputs) 
yses, however, the 
h 
 e 2  Scotland and the UK, the proportion 
er 
ys. 
y 
the end of 2008 the Scottish and UK economies were in 
recession.  This is likely to have had an impact on the 
number of businesses starting innovation activities in 2008 
and affect the overall number of innovation active firms in 
the survey period16.  The fall in innovation activity levels 
between the 2007 and 2009 surveys was slightly greater in 
Scotland than the UK and, since 2005, Scotland has tended 
to lag the UK as a whole (figure 1). 
 
Scotland ranked in 11th place out of the 12 UK Government 
Office Regions in the 2009 survey, although since 2007 the 
gap in performance between the lowest and highest regions 
has narrowed.  It is also worth highlighting that smaller 
sample sizes for the regions leads a bigger standard error in 
the results than for the larger UK sample17.  Therefore, the 
differences between regions may not be significant. 
 
Figure 2 shows the proportion of innovative active firms 
ranged from 63 per cent in South East England to 55 per 
cent in Northern Ireland and Scotland in 2009.  The regional 
patterns and rankings can generally be explained by 
differences in industrial composition and business size, and 
variations in sectoral business cycles and product life 
cycles18.  This suggests levels of innovation activity differ 
depending on firm size and sector.  Table 1 summarises the
results for Scotland by size band and table 2 indexes these 
The 
to inc g 
the p  had 
a hig l 
and m
Scotl  
ov 07, the proportion of 
tage 
n large firms (-
ms 
st of 
ntly improved oroducts 
aime
effectiveness o
customers; 
 
x ‘Broa
innovation active or wider innovato
 
Innovation inputs and outputs 
There are several types of innovation expenditure that 
firms may undertake, such as boug
equipment, software, knowledge and expertise.  
Impact on turnover is a measure of the effects, or 
outputs, of innovation.  This is important since, 
businesses, the value of innovation is the financi
return.  This paper reviews: 
 
x Forms of innovation expenditure (inputs); 
x  
x Turnover from innovatio
 
Analysis of the main innovation and broader indicators in 
this paper are based on weighted data.  In line with the 
cottish CIS3, CIS4 and CIS5 analS
analysis of input and output indicators is based on un-
weighted data.  The rationale for using un-weighted data 
was outlined in the 2005 report published by the Scottis
Government in 200715 
 
Innovation active businesses in Scotland  
In th  0 9 survey, in0
of innovation active firms was 54.8 per cent and 58.2 p
cent respectively, lower than in the 2005 and 2007 surve
he 2009 survey covered the period 2006 to 2008, and bT
 
results relative to the UK = 100.   
 
above results show that innovation activity levels tend 
rease as the size of the business increases, reflectin
attern shown in previous surveys.  In 2009, the UK
her proportion of innovation active firms in the smal
edium size-bands than in Scotland.  However, 
and had a greater proportion of large firms that were
ation active.  Compared to 20inn
innovation active small and medium sized firms fell more in 
Scotlan  than the UK (falls of -4.7 and -13.8 percend
points compared to -1.4 and -10.3), but less i
ared to -14.8). 8.7comp
 
Table 2 highlights the effect of this on all firms with 10 or 
more employees in 2009.  Compared to the UK, large fir
in Scotland outperformed the rest of the UK against mo
the indicators, while the UK outperformed Scotland in 
product innovation in each size band. 
 
New or significa
The ONS report, “First findings of the UK 2009 Survey”, 
notes that the increased investment in innovation activity 
reported in the 2007 survey in many cases may have 
resulted in product and process innovations during the 
period 2006-2008.  Although still lagging the UK average of 
23.9 per cent, the proportion of firms introducing new or 
significantly improved products in Scotland increased by 
almost two percentage points to 21.3 per cent, with product 
innovation activity almost returning to 2005 survey levels19. 
Nevertheless, despite an overall improvement, Scotland
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Table 1:  Innovation indicators by firm size band, p
 
roportion of firms (%), Scotland 2009 
Activity 10 to 49 employees 50-249 employees 250+ employees All 10+ employ
58.2 67.1 54.8
25.2 28.7 2
14.2 22.9 12.5
9.9 
ees 
novation Active 53.8  
 1.3 
  
 20.2 7.8 
40.7 46.4 53.6 41.9 
 5.9 
.0  
9.4  
rganisational Structure 17.4 22.2 
13.5 15.6 
4.9 66.9 71.8 57.3 
nd, S
In
Product Innovator 20.4
Process Innovator 11.8
Ongoing/abandoned activities 7.0
Innovation Expenditure 
Wider Innovation: 23.5
Corporate Strategy 14
Management Techniques 
34.8 45.6 2
16.9 24.4 17.1
15.4 26.0 14.6
23.8 31.5 
15.1 21.3 
O
Marketing Concept 
Broader Innovation 5
 
 
Table 2:  Main innovation indicators by firm size ba
 
cotland relative to UK = 100 2009 
Activity 10 to 49 employees 50-249 employees 250+ employees All 10+ emplo
93 110 94
89 91 
92 121 
79 128 86
94 118 97
95 117 
yees 
  
9 89 
99 99 
ngoing/abandoned activities 84  
  
6 97 
 97 130 110 
103 96 142 111 
 109 
arketing Concept 89 78 120 92 
Innovation 
 Scotland relative to the UK is less than 100, then the proportion of ngaged in that innovation activity in Scotlan
ortion in the UK.  Conversely, if the figure ter than 100, then oportion of firms e  in that activity in 
. 
e out of 12 UK regions, only the North
eland had lower product innovation 
maller proportion of product innova
ery business size band over th
st three surveys, the only exception being in the 2005 
urvey, when there was a tendency for large firms in 
 Scotland and the UK or influenc
K Innovation Survey Report 2009 
hest proportions of product innovators 
-based manufacturing, other 
intensive services such as 
otland has a smaller proportion of 
ors in its business base than the UK as a
r cent compared to 42 per cent20), th
verall proportion of firms that a
eightings are applied to the 
 Similarly, the UK Innovation Survey 
a higher proportion large firms were 
Scotland has a smaller proportion of large firms than the UK 
as a whole ould be likely to reduce the proportion 
firms that are product innovators. ver, there is littl
difference i istribution of firm and betwe
Scotland an UK, with small b having the 
largest sha e business bas arge firms have
smallest sh each.  This sugg hat industry 
structure is the main influence on differences between the 
UK and Scotland in overall product innovation performance. 
s in ’s
relative to the UK is slightly better, the proportion of 
firms around the UK average over the last three surveys.  
The proportio  process innovators increased between 
2007 and 20  both Scotland a  UK, however, 
activity levels ower than those reported in the 
2005 survey.  In 2005, both Scotla d the UK had 16 p
cent of firms that were process inn rs compared to 1
per cent and  per cent respec in 2009.  The 
proportion of process innovators r
in the South East of England to 10.6 per cent in Northern 
Ireland in 20 t 12.5 per cent, nd was close to th
Both product and process innovators are more likely to be 
Innovation Active 94
Product Innovator 8
Process Innovator 
O
Innovation Expenditure 97
Wider Innovation 9
Corporate Strategy 109
Management Techniques 
Organisational Structure 109 101 120
M
Broader 93 100 110 95 
 
Note:  If the figure for firms e d 
was less than the prop  is grea  the pr ngaged
Scotland was higher than in the UK
 
ranked in 10th plac  
East and Northern Ir
levels. 
 
Scotland has had a s tors 
than the UK average in ev e 
la
s
Scotland to have slightly higher product innovation activity.   
This could be due to differences in the sector breakdowns New or significantly improved processes 
between ed by weightings.  
For example, the U
showed that the hig
were in engineering
manufacturing and knowledge-
financial services.  As Sc
firms in these sect  
whole (around 34 pe en 
this is likely to reduce the o re 
product innovators when w
sample distribution. 
2009 analysis21 that 
p
 this w of 
 Howe e 
n the d s by size b en 
d the usinesses 
re of th e and l  the 
are in ests t
In terms of proces novation, Scotland  performance 
with 
n of
09 in nd the
 were still l
nd an er 
ovato 2.5 
 12.6 tively 
anged from 14.2 per cent 
09.  A Scotla e 
roduct innovators than small or medium sized firms.  If UK average, and ranked in 7th place out of 12 regions.  
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larger firms.  In the last three surveys a higher proportion of 
large Scottish firms were process innovators than across the 
UK as a whole. 
downturn.  Once again, Scotland’s overall performance wa
broadly similar to the UK (42 per cent compared to 43 pe
 
Expenditure on innovation 
Most innovation active firms have expenditure associated
with inn
 
ovation activities.  In 2009, 55 per cent of firms were 
novation active in Scotland, 76 per cent of which had 
s 
vious 
s 
r 
cent across the UK).  For the third consecutive survey, 
Scotland remained in 8th place out of the 12 regions. 
 in 
vation 
nt in 
ness and 
d 
 
 and 
in
innovation expenditure.  Firms reported a range of 
investments, including, R&D, training and the acquisition of 
equipment and software.  Although the proportion of firm
reporting expenditure fell in 2009 compared to the pre
two surveys, this may partly have been due to the economic 
 
Wider innovation 
In addition to technological development and investme
innovation-related activities, strategic innovations are also 
important in terms of improving firms’ competitive
 
 
Figure 3: Wider and broader innovation in Scotland
 
 
Over the last three surveys, a higher proportion of firms
the largest size band have had innovation-related 
expenditure in Scotland than in the UK.  The effect of this, 
combined with the proportion of large firms with ongoing 
activities, could lead to an increase in large firms’ inno
activity levels in the next survey. 
 
growth opportunities.  Wider innovation indicators are use
to measure this.  Wider innovators are those firms that have
undergone strategic, organisational, managerial techniques 
and marketing changes to achieve efficiencies or 
the UK, 2005-2009 
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ource: ONS 
ider and broader innovation activity fell between 2007 and 
2009 in Scotland and the UK (figure 3).  
 
Firms were asked if they had made any major changes to 
their business structure or practices over the survey period.  
As in the rest of the UK, there was less engagement by 
Scottish firms in non-technological innovation than in the 
previous survey, continuing the decline from 2005.  Scotland 
ranked in 6th place out of the 12 UK regions.  The 
ovators in the largest size band fell to 
46.5 per cent in 2009 from 52.5 in 2007.  Smaller firms also 
recorded a fall and remain less likely than large firms to 
engage in wider innovation.    
 
Broader innovation 
Broader innovators are those firms that are either innovation 
active or wider innovators, or both.  Broader innovation 
gives an overall picture of the level of innovation, both 
S
 
improvements to service.  The proportion of firms reporting proportion of wider inn
w
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Figure 4a: Scottish Expenditure in 2009 Figure 4b: UK Expenditure in 2009 
Proportion of Innovation Expenditure
Scotland 2009
38%
30%
21%
3%
3% 3%
2%
Buy-in Technology
Internal R&D
Training
External know how
Design
External R&D
Marketing
Proportion of Innovation Expenditure
UK 2009
24%
40%
3%
3%
5%
19%
6%
Buy-in Technology
Internal R&D
Training
External know how
Design
External R&D
Marketing
Source: ONS 
 
 
technological and non-technological.  Broader innovation 
levels in Scotland rose between 2005 and 2007 before 
falling back in 2009 by almost nine percentage points to 
57.3 per cent, increasing the gap with the UK.  Ranked in 
t of the twelve UK regions, this mirrors 
erall innovation activity performance.  Only 
ader innovators 
at 
or can be used to 
illustrate the extent to which firms engage in wider 
(strategic) innovation only.  This is calculated by subtracting 
the proportion of innovation active firms from the proportion 
of broader innovators.  Across all the UK regions the 
proportion of firms engaging only in strategic innovation 
activity is very low at around 2.3 per cent.  The figure for 
Scotland sits at around 2.5 per cent.  This suggests that 
firms in Scotland tend not to change behaviours or business 
strategies as an independent means of improving 
competitiveness.  Rather, they tend to introduce strategic, 
organisational, marketing or management changes in 
conjunction with other technological innovations. 
 
The results outlined so far have shown that, generally, any 
differences between the results for Scotland and the UK are 
ll, particularly when considering the narrow 
mance across the UK regions for many 
dicators.  However, there are differences in performance 
22
 
 
do better, and, for Scotland (and for the UK as a whole), 
innovation activity increases with firm size. 
 
 
Innovation inputs and outputs 
The 2005 and 2007 surveys highlighted that R&D acco ts 
for only a small proportion of total innovation spend and total 
 
 well compared to the UK as a 
ation expenditure per 
ore, 
n of Scottish companies 
more than the 
UK average.  Measuring innovation in this way, Scotland 
performs better relative to the UK than when measured 
using Business Enterprise R&D (BERD) figures. BERD data 
for 2009 shows that Scotland ranks in 10th place among UK 
regions for expenditure per employee, with average 
expenditure of £592 compared to a UK average of £1,03723. 
 
The Innovation Survey 2009 results showed that across 
Scotland and the UK, bought-in technology was the most 
frequently cited type of innovation expenditure across most 
business size bands; although there were differences in the 
distribution of firms’ actual expenditure (figures 4a and 4b).   
Firms in Scotland had invested a higher proportion of their 
total innovation expenditure in bought-in technology and 
training than the UK overall.  Other notable differences 
include marketing and external R&D, where UK firms as a 
whole invested a higher proportion of innovation expenditure 
h as 
11th place ou
cotland’s ovS
Northern Ireland had lower proportions of ‘broader’ and 
‘innovation active’ firms. 
 
cotland did have a higher proportion of broS
in the largest firm size band than the UK in 2009.  Given th
the broader innovation indicator includes firms that are 
innovation active, the high proportion of large innovation 
active firms in Scotland is likely to explain the high 
proportion of large firms that are broader innovators. 
 
nd broader 
innovation outcomes, and that low levels of formal R&D may 
not necessarily result in low levels of innovation.  In terms of 
how well Scotland performs using innovation expenditure as
a measure instead of Business R&D as a percentage of 
DP, Scotland performs fairly
Based on the above definitions of wider a
innovation, the broader innovation indicat
relatively sma
nge of perforra
in
at firm size band level .  Small and medium sized firms in
Scotland underperform relative to the UK while large firms
Scottish firms. 
 
Compared to the UK, large firms in Scotland had a greater 
proportion of expenditure on bought-in technology suc
un
G
whole.  Calculating total innov
employee for all innovation active firms with 10 or more 
employees, Scotland ranks in 4th place out of 12 UK 
regions.  Scotland had average expenditure of £3,268 
compared to £3,018 across the UK as a whole.  Theref
although a slightly lower proportio
invested in innovation they tended to invest 
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machinery, equipment and software and firms in each siz
band had a greater proportion of expenditure on training
 
e 
.   
his indicates a greater tendency in Scotland for firms to 
end 
d 
eting 
and in 
mall firms buying in external know-how and training were 
so 
 
he 2005 and 2007 surveys noted that the biggest 
 
s 
Fi
T
introduce new products on the market or new processes 
without necessarily performing R&D.  Considering trends by 
size band, large firms in Scotland were more likely to sp
on in-house R&D, external R&D, bought-in technology an
marketing.  In medium sized firms, design and mark
accounted for the greatest proportions of expenditure 
s
important.  It is likely that the sector breakdown will al
influence these results.  For example, the UK Innovation 
Survey 2009 statistical annex shows that financial and 
business services had the highest proportion of expenditure 
 
Figure 5a: Turnover in Scotland 2007 
in internal R&D while manufacturing had the highest 
proportion on external R&D and transport and logistics had
a high proportion of expenditure in training.  This area 
requires further research and analysis to understand the 
implications for Scotland. 
 
Affect on turnover of product innovations 
T
proportion of firms’ turnover was generated from products
that were wholly unchanged during the survey period.  Les
than 40 per cent of turnover was attributed to new or 
improved products.  However, between 2007 and 2009 the 
proportion increased by almost 9 percentage points in 
gure 5b: Turnover in Scotland 2009 
Percentage of Turnover from Innovation
(Product Innovators), Scotland 2007
9%
15%
15%61%
New to the market
New to the
Enterprise
Improved
Unchanged
Percentage of Turnover from Innovation
(Product Innovators), Scotland 2009
16%
15%
17%
52%
New to the market
New to the
Enterprise
Improved
Unchanged
Source: ONS 
 
Scotland and by 2009 almost half of turnover was attributed 
tive firms with 
ase was due to 
 
 band 
enerated for every £1 of innovation expenditure.  Clearly, 
gy and in-
house R&D has produced a higher return on investment in 
Scotland. 
 
Potentially, some of the difference between Scotland and 
the UK may be explained by the extent to which products 
are new to the market, or any differences in the sector 
 
 
firms 
also be due to the increased 
t 
size 
otland 
 
x Innovation activity among businesses in Scotland 
han in 2007, 
probably due to the onset of the economic 
downturn 
 
x Scotland’s business innovation performance lags 
the UK as a whole for most innovation indicators 
to new or improved products in innovation ac
10 or more employees. The biggest incre
‘new to the market products’, although the percentage of 
turnover from improved products also increased by two 
percentage points.  This is illustrated in figures 5a and 5b.   
 
Small firms in particular had a higher proportion of turnover 
from ‘new to market’ and ‘new to business’ products than
medium and large sized companies (table 3), and a higher 
proportion of firms in Scotland in every business size
had a greater proportion of their turnover from new and 
improved products than in the UK (table 4). 
 
Calculating the returns from innovation expenditure in 
turnover terms, table 5 estimates how much turnover (£) is 
g
large firms’ expenditure on bought-in technolo
breakdowns between the Scottish and UK samples.  
Previous reports have shown that some sectors are more 
innovation active than others.  For example, the 2007
results showed that Scottish manufacturing firms were more
innovation active while financial and business services 
were less innovation active than the UK average.  Some 
increase in turnover could 
investment in the previous survey period since, over the las
three surveys, a higher proportion of firms in the largest 
band have had innovation-related expenditure in Sc
than in the UK.   
 
Conclusions 
The analysis of the 2009 Innovation Survey results 
highlights a number of interesting findings: 
(and the UK) by 2009 was lower t
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Table 3: Percentage of turnover by product/service yype and by firm size band, 2009 
 
 
 Product/service 10-49 employees 50-249 employees 250+ employees All 10+ 
New to market 18.5 13.4 11.2 15.7 
New to business 16.7 13.1 14.6 15.3 
Significantly improved 16.1 16.2 17.8 16.5 
Unchanged/modified 48.7 57.2 56.5 52.6 
 
 
Table 4: Percentage of turnover by Product/Service Type and by Firm Size Band relative to UK = 100, 2009 
 
 
  Product/service 10-49 employees 50-249 employees 250+ employees All 10+ 
New to market 112 113 132 117 
New to business 112 109 118 113 
Significantly improved 105 113 113 109 
Unchanged/modified 91 93 89 91 
 
 
Table 5: Estimated £s of turnover relative to £1 o
 
 
f expend
10-49 employees 50
iture, 2009 
-249 employees 250+ employees All 10+   
Scotland £3 £13 £35 £23 
UK £3 £9 £12 £12 
 
 
x Innovation activity rises as firm size increases –
and large firms in Scotland outperfo
 
rm those in the 
UK as a whole across most innovation indicators 
t 
 
 innovation activity. 
 
n 
 
compared to UK firms 
h firms that do invest in innovation  
 employee than the UK average
novation investment’ in Scotl  
cotland and the UK are relatively small.  However, there 
l differences betw  
y levels in Scotland and the UK as a 
ncy for smaller firms to be less in tion 
than the rest of the UK will have an 
n 
small firms have 
e largest share of the business base. 
 
to be 
and more likely to be strategic 
innovators than for UK as a whole.  However, while the 
s 
llen, reducing Scotland’s overall performance. 
 
nces in 
of different sizes, and 
examine in more detail factors such as motivation and 
ion.  Fu y s
may also pr ome insight into the  to which t
performance ferent sectors affects Scotland’s overa
and product ator performance. 
 
 
1
 
x Lower levels of product innovation in Scotland 
compared to the UK may be due to industry 
structure. Differences in industry structure migh
also contribute to Scotland’s relatively lower levels
of
x Scottish businesses invest more of their innovatio
expenditure in ‘non-technological’ innovation than
UK firms 
 
x Scottish firms are more likely ‘buy in’ technology, 
To better understand the reasons for differe
performance between businesses 
and less likely to invest in their own R&D, between Scottish and UK performance, a future analysis will 
 
x Scottis  spend
more per  
 
x ‘Return on in and is
higher than for the UK as a whole. ____________________ 
 
There has bee
av
n a tendency for Scotland to lag the UK Endnotes 
erage over time, although differences in the results for The Government Economic Strategy, The Scottish Government, 
S
are fairly substantia een small and large
firms’ innovation activit
whole.  The tende nova
active in Scotland 
impact on Scotland’s overall results, particularly whe
weightings are applied to the sample, since 
th
 
Large firms in Scotland are more innovation active, have
more innovation related expenditure, are more likely 
process innovators 
proportion of innovation active large firms has grown in 
Scotland relative to the UK, the proportion of small firms ha
fa
barriers to innovat rther analysis by industr ector 
ovide s  extent he 
 in dif ll 
 innov
2011 
wth: Rational
 
2Innovation and Gro e for an Innovation Strategy, 
OECD, 2007 
NOVEMBER 2011 PAGE 69 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
 
3European Commission Staff Working Document: A Rationale for 
Action, European Commission 2010. 
 
4Innovation and Research & Development - R&D Business 
Expenditure, The Scottish Government, 2010 
 
5Measuring Innovation: A New Perspective, OECD, 2010 
Commission Staff Working Document: A Rationale for 
 
6European 
Action, European Commission, 2010 
n Commission Staff Working Document: A Rationale for 
 
7Europea
Action, European Commission, 2010 
o uMinisterial Report on the OECD Innovation Strategy: Innovation t
strengthen growth and address global and social challenges, 
OECD, 2010 
 
9Measuring Innovation: A New Perspective, OECD, 2010 
10Annual Innovation Report, BIS, 2010 
 
11UK Innovation Surveys were carried out in 1993 for the period 
1990-1992, in 1997 for the period 1994 to 1996, and in 2001 for the 
period 1998-2000. 
 
12UK Innovation Survey 2009 Statistical Annex, BIS, 2010 
 
13This contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown copyright 
and reproduced with the permission of the controller of HMSO and 
u e 's Printer f
ses 
actly reproduce National 
Statistics aggregates. 
Q e n or Scotland. The use of the ONS statistical data 
does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the 
interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This work u
research datasets which may not ex
 
14First findings from the UK Innovation Survey 2009, Stephanie 
Robson and Martin Kenchatt, Economic & Labour Market Review, 
Vo Nl 4 , o ,  March 2010 3  
 
15The Community Innovation Survey 4: Profiling Scotland's 
Innovation Performance, Dr. Mark Freel and Prof. Richard Harrison, 
The Scottish Government, 2007, Weights which are incorporat
the data can only be correctly scaled where information is given b
all respondents, however, some respondents may only partially 
complete a questionnaire.  In addition, the survey contains filter 
questions, inviting only enterprises fulfilling certain criteria to answe
parts of the questionnaire and the relevant population for weighting 
purposes would not be all firms in the IDBR 
 
16
 
ed in 
y 
r 
e First findings from the UK Innovation Survey 2009, Stephani
Robson and Martin Kenchatt, Economic & Labour Market Review, 
Vol 4 , No 3,  March 2010 
 
17The standard error is used to calculate the confidence interval for 
the range of values in which the population mean is expected to lie
Given the larger range of values for Scotland the Scottish 
population mean might not be very different from the UK p
mean. 
 
18
.  
opulation 
UK Innovation Survey 2009: Science and Innovation Analysis, 
BIS, 2010 
 
19The OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms defines product 
innovations as the introduction of a good or service that is 
significantly improved with respect to its characteristics or intend
uses. This includes significant improvements in technical 
new or 
ed 
specifications, onents and materials, incorporated softwar
user friendliness or other functional characteristics. 
20Innovation Surv  weighted and non-weighte
provided by BIS 
 Survey 2009 Statistical Annex, BIS, 2010
 comp e, 
ey d sector data 
 
22UK Innovation  
 
23Although, as noted earlier, margins of error are an issue. 
Innovation a earch & Development - Business 
 
24 nd Res  R&D 
Expenditure, T ottish Government, 2010he Sc  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAGE 70 VOLUME 35  NUMBER 2 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
How the civil service 
responded to ou
proposal for changing
r 
 
r 
cottish Water 
 
 
ntroduction 
gest 
for the 
n 
 when 
 Water Industry Commissioner for Scotland 
1 hods 
at 
or 
xample our previous articles in the Fraser of Allander 
 In 2008, the Cabinet Secretary for Finance raised 
th us the problem of capital charges on the water industry: 
as expected that changes in Treasury policy would make
water capital charges an increasing real burden to the 
Scottish government budget. As a result of both this concern
and our 2007 Commentary paper, (which had set out the 
problems with the current method of setting water charges),
we proposed a new charging system for Scottish Water, 
details of which we published in the Fraser of Allander 
Commentary in February 2009. Under our proposed 
charging system, net new capital formation financed from 
customer charges would be regarded as being paid for by a 
notional loan from the customer base as a whole to Scottish 
Water. We suggested that the body of customers as a whole
would then earn a return: this would be in the form of a 
rebate, equal to historic cost interest and depreciation on 
the notional loan. In our paper, we showed how this 
approach would be fully sustainable, and would lead to 
significantly lower charges for customers than the present 
regulatory capital value pricing system. The approach would 
                           
the pricing system fo
S
 
 
Jim Cuthbert, Margaret Cuthbert, January 2011 
 
1. I
1.1 Water is one of Scotland’s most vital and lar
industries. It is an input into all other forms of economic 
activity as well as being part of every family’s expenditure. It 
is therefore important, both for living standards and 
economy, that the pricing of water in Scotland is taken 
extremely seriously and that efforts are made to have a
appropriate, sustainable charging system. Since 2002,
the office of the
was established , we have analysed the various met
sed to determine water charges, and have shown thu
each of the various methods have major faults. See f
e
Commentary, (Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2007, 2009).  
 
1.2
wi
it w  
 
 
 
 
1
 The Commissioner was replaced by the Water Industry 
Commission for Scotland in 2006, which body regulates Scottish 
Water and determines the caps to be placed on water revenues: in 
effect determining water charges. 
also have had significant benefits as regards the capital 
charge which, (when the paper was written), the Treasury 
levied from departments on the capital assets of public 
corporations.  
 
1.3 Although we received no response from the Water 
Industry Commission for Scotland, (WICS), or the Scottish 
government civil service with responsibility for water to this 
or our earlier paper, it transpires that the civil service did 
provide a briefing on our paper to Ministers. In the summer 
of 2010 we were given a copy of the brief which had been 
put to Ministers by the civil service, commenting on our 
proposal. This brief was originally prepared for Ministers in 
2009, and a slightly revised version was put to Ministers 
again in mid 2010. It is the later version of the brief which 
has now been given to us. A copy is attached as an annex 
to this paper.  
 
1.4 This paper represents our critique of the civil 
service comments on our proposal. We will demonstrate 
that the advice put to Ministers was seriously flawed: in 
several respects the advice was factually wrong – and we 
believ
which
Minis
it impossible to
relative proper
th
se
 
1.5
exa
exp
the opportunity to con
charging system of th
subsequently announced in the operation of capital charges.
vice brief 
hich commented on our original proposals 
2.1 The civil service brief commenting on our 
proposals set out in our Fraser of Allander paper of 
he annex to this paper.  
 
y 
 
hen 
rolled forward by a process of annual updating. This process 
involves: 
e that there were major omissions relating to matters 
 should have been covered in advice given to 
ters. Our conclusion is that Ministers would have found 
 make a properly informed decision about the 
ties of different charging methods, or about 
e merits of our specific proposal, on the basis of the civil 
rvice brief. 
 Section 2 is the main part of this paper, where we 
mine what the civil service said about our proposals, and 
lain why their analysis is flawed. In section 3, we take 
sider the implications for our proposed 
e change that the Treasury has 
  
 
2. Our critique of the civil ser
w
February 2009 is reproduced in t
 
2.2 Before considering the civil service argument in
detail, it is necessary to give some background on the RCV 
method of setting utility prices, (as used by the WICS and b
OFWAT in England and Wales.)  
 
According to the definition given by the WICS, the RCV of a 
utility like Scottish Water is “The capital base used in setting
charge limits. The value of the regulated assets on which 
Scottish Water can earn a return.” (WICS, 2005, p38) 
Starting from some initially estimated value, the RCV is t
 
a) uprating the previous year’s RCV figure for 
inflation;  
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b) adding in the nominal value of investment 
undertaken during the year; 
  
c) subtracting off depreciation, assessed in current 
cost terms. 
 
How this RCV fits in to the determination of charges is a
follows. The basis for setting charge limits in any given year 
is: 
 
i) an appropriate allowance for the operating costs
the undertaking; 
 
ii) plus an allowance for the cost of capital, worked 
out as an appropriate interest rate applied to the RCV; 
 
iii) plus an allowance for current cost depreciation and 
infrastructure renewal expenditure. 
 
Details of the application of this process can be found in 
(WICs, 2005, p294, and WICS 2009, sheet P4). (Note th
when the WICS first introduced the RCV approach in the 
2006 Strategic Review of charges, their initial estimate of 
RCV was for the year 2009/10, and this was then rolled 
back to 2006/07 by reversing the above procedure: this 
does not affect our comments below, on the general 
properties of th
s 
 of 
at, 
e RCV approach.)  
s 
 
re 
  
etails 
 was 
ome from these sources with the loan 
harges it would have to pay on its borrowing. We also 
med
ubstantial part of the RCV was being generated through 
tion,
tant d 
a 30 
enerated by inflation, rather than directly relating to 
tme  
 rapidly came to exceed 
hat it had to pay out by way of loan charges. In other 
ted in Scotland, under which the interest charge is 
alculated by applying a nominal rate of interest to the RCV. 
rsion of 
 capital value pricing, under which a real interest 
terest 
T variant still implies that the 
arge to customers significantly exceeds the funding cost 
 is important to note that these effects stem from the way 
al RCV estimate is calculated.  
 brief claims that there are two key errors 
 our analysis of the regulatory model being applied by the 
CS. T
agrap
V) used in the water 
dustry (both in England & Wales and in Scotland) are an 
 
er 
is of 
oint, however, is that in 
e modelling developed in that paper, we considered the 
dy s , 
as 
is, 
 
2.3 For present purposes, the important thing about 
the version of the RCV method as used in the water 
industries in Scotland, and England and Wales, is that it is 
applied in current cost terms: specifically, when the RCV i
uprated each year, the previous year’s RCV is uprated for 
inflation: and when depreciation enters the process, what is
used is an estimate of current cost depreciation. (There a
versions of the RCV approach applied elsewhere in the 
world where the process is done in historic cost terms.)  It 
was this current cost aspect of the RCV approach as 
applied in the UK which was the basis of our Commentary 
paper of 2007. 
 
2.4 We refer the reader to that article for the full d
of our critique of the current cost version of the RCV 
method. In that paper, we developed the financial model of 
an idealised utility, which undertakes a constant amount of 
real investment each year, and which finances this 
investment by borrowing. We assumed that the utility
funded as if it were charging customers RCV prices: that is, 
as if it were charging customers an interest charge based 
upon current cost RCV, and also charging customers to 
cover current cost depreciation. We then compared the 
company’s inc
c
assu  that the company started off with an initial RCV of 
zero.  
 
What the model showed was that, if inflation was positive, 
then the company’s RCV rapidly came to exceed the 
company’s outstanding financial debts: in effect, a 
s
infla  rather than as a direct result of the capital the 
company had borrowed and invested. The effects were 
subs ial: for example, if inflation was at 2.5%, an
assuming the company was investing in assets with 
year life, then in the long run, 20% of the RCV would be 
g
inves nt. If inflation was at 5%, then 34% of the RCV in
the long run would be generated by the effects of inflation. 
In terms of customer charges, what the company received 
by way of charges from customers
w
words, the company was making a substantial profit over 
and above what was needed to fully fund its capital 
investment.  
 
The detailed modelling in our 2007 paper related to the 
version of regulatory capital value pricing originally 
implemen
c
As noted in that paper, OFWAT applies a different ve
regulatory
rate is applied to RC V. Note, however, that if real in
rates are positive, the OFWA
ch
of the capital invested. 
 
It
that current cost RCV pricing uprates the RCV each year: 
and that the long term effects are independent of how the 
initi
 
2.5 Let us now consider the argument in the civil 
service brief. The
in
WI he first of these claimed errors is outlined in 
paragraphs 4 to 6 of the brief.  
 
Par h 4 first of all states that “…the Cuthberts assume 
that the regulatory capital values (RC
in
estimate of the value of the assets employed, derived from
how much it would cost to create those assets. This is 
incorrect.”  
 
This claim is, however, in itself incorrect. In our 2007 paper 
we made it clear, (paragraph 2.2), that in practice a numb
of different approaches were possible towards the bas
calculation of RCV. The important p
th
stea tate, (that is, long run), position of a notional utility
with an initial RCV which started at zero, and which w
then rolled on from year to year using exactly the same 
approach as employed by WICS/OFWAT. The long run 
RCV in our model is on exactly the same basis as implied 
by the WICS/OFWAT approach.  
 
The civil service’s first claim that we have made an error 
therefore, wrong.  
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2.6   As seen in the previous paragraph, there is n
difference in the basis of the RCV with which we are 
working. The que
o 
stion then boils down to the issue of how 
at RCV should be remunerated: that is, what return needs 
o be 
 
e 
s 
s, 
 in 
ng 
cism of the current cost RCV pricing method 
mounts to no more than an unsubstantiated claim that we 
he brief 
 that 
like 
s 
e 
 
 
t 
 
h returns earned on the equity capital actually 
vested: the high prices paid for water and sewage 
 
ortion of 
ique that “The cash basis is driven 
y financial ratios, such as gearing and free cash flow, that 
 sets 
n assumed annual rate of return on a ‘regulatory capital 
he detail of the financial model, published with 
e final determination, shows the calculation of rolling the 
 
me 
.8 The civil service brief is therefore wrong in its claim 
 
also in what it omits to say. As we will 
rgu
re 
ef. 
ready noted above (para 2.6), that paragraph 5 
f the brief amounts to making a particular assertion about 
g 
 
 
 our 
CV for an idealised utility. We are not claiming 
fallibility for our approach: but the important point is that 
 but 
major weakness of the brief that, in 
dvising Ministers on a subject where an appreciation of 
pt 
at 
r 
th
to be earned on that RCV to adequately compensate 
investors.  
 
The only reasonable interpretation of what the civil service 
are saying in their paragraph 5 is that the RCV has t
remunerated in line with the charges implied by the current
cost RCV pricing method, or else investors would not fund 
any further investment. However, no evidence is given in th
brief to justify this implicit assertion that what is required i
remuneration in line with current cost RCV. In other word
once we have removed the incorrect civil service claim
paragraph 4 of the brief that we are dealing with the wro
definition of RCV, the civil service’s first attempt at rebutting 
our criti
a
are wrong.  
 
2.7 We now consider the second error which t
claims we have made. This is described as follows: “The 
second error the Cuthbert’s analysis appears to make is
the RCV, together with the cost of capital, are the sole 
determinants of customer charges. In practice, WICS (
OFWAT) has used the RCV as a guide but has set charge
on a cash basis.” 
 
Our 2007 critique of the current cost RCV approach is 
based on the published descriptions of how OFWAT and th
WICS use RCV in setting prices. As regards OFWAT, our 
paper not merely describes the way they say they use RCV
in setting prices: it also then draws inferences about the
likely results of this approach, which are entirely consisten
with the outcomes observed in practice – such as the
extremely hig
in
companies in England in post-privatisation trading (often
described by commentators as “irrational”): and dist
the English companies capital programmes. Given all this, it 
is disingenuous to say that, in effect, OFWAT do not really 
rely on RCV, but are primarily setting prices on some other 
basis.  
 
Exactly the same comment applies when we consider the 
potential impact of RCV pricing on Scottish Water prices. 
The statement in the crit
b
investors see as critical indicators of a company’s financial 
health”, does not reflect what the published Final 
Determination for 2010 actually says and does. We quote 
from Final Determination papers:  
 
“Staff Paper 3 
The Commission signalled in the last review that it would 
move towards the method of charge setting that is widely 
used by other utility regulators in the UK. This method
a
value’ (RCV).  
 
Staff Paper 9 
The level of revenue is calculated using the RCV approach.” 
 
In addition, t
th
RCV forward, and calculating a capital charge by applying 
an interest rate to this RCV. 
 
It is perfectly true that the process of setting prices in the 
final determination cross checks the results against key 
financial ratios: we have never sought to deny this. But to 
imply, as the brief does, that the RCV approach is almost
irrelevant, and that prices are actually being driven by so
quite different approach, simply runs counter to the 
published final determination of charges. 
 
2
that we made two “key errors”. But the brief is not just wrong
in what it says, but 
now a e, the advice given to Ministers should have 
included discussion of certain important topics which a
just not featured in the brief at all.  
 
2.9 Consider, for example, paragraph 5 of the bri
We have al
o
the answer to the following question: namely, what return 
needs to be generated on the RCV in order that the fundin
cost of the capital invested in the company can be fully 
reimbursed? Now the RCV of the company, and the funding
cost of the investment capital, are related to one another in 
a straightforward, but nevertheless fairly complex manner, 
depending on parameters like the inflation rate, interest rate,
and asset life. Sensible statements about the relationship 
can therefore only be made in terms of some form of 
mathematical model, which takes these parameters into 
account. This is precisely the approach we adopted in
2007 paper, where we developed one specific model of the 
evolution of R
in
criticism of our approach has to be along the lines either of 
pointing out a specific error in the calculations within our 
model, or in the assumptions underlying that model. The 
civil service brief, however, does not attempt to do this –
instead, relies on a loose and unsubstantiated assertion.  
 
In our view, it is a 
a
modelling issues is paramount, the brief makes no attem
to use the tools which are essential for discussing and 
appreciating the relevant issues.  
 
2.10 There is another grave omission in relation to wh
the brief claims is the second error in our approach. We 
have already discussed the civil service claim that wate
prices in Scotland are set, not using the RCV method, but 
NOVEMBER 2011 PAGE 73 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
actually on the basis of certain financial ratios, which
“investors see as critical indicators of a company’s financi
health.” Surely, however, if it was indeed true that water 
prices were set like this, then the brief should go into detail 
about what method is actually used – and what the 
implications are. How are the key ratios actually applied: 
why is it
 
al 
 appropriate for pricing for a publicly owned utility 
ke Scottish Water, which can borrow at significantly lower 
harging 
inisters are in no position to make a rational decision 
ve methods of different charging 
y 
ve dealt so far with the two main criticisms 
hich the brief attempts to make of our approach. Before 
worth remarking on certain other 
 
ction of government 
epartments would be. However, we would say that: 
fy 
ce the 
re taken out of 
customer charges before they are even set, they would 
ot fe
ine 
h 
 
r 
n 
cost 
f 
t 
ritique is not merely factually wrong in key respects: what is 
sis 
ms 
rent cost RCV method, 
or does it undertake modelling of its own. Moreover, 
e i
her 
t 
oposal 
 
 
ns like Scottish Water. (Indeed, the reason we 
ddressed the issue was because of the concerns 
 
mption from 
 large part of the capital charge on Scottish Water’s assets.  
 
of the capital 
harge: (Treasury, 2010, page 20). This change opens up 
po
r 
a body 
f the size of Scottish Water, which has a large and stable 
investme
wo
arr e to go 
into the full detail of this modelling work: but, to summarise, 
this work does indicate that: 
li
costs than market rates, to be driven by financial ratios 
which would satisfy private investors: what are the 
implications of the approach which the WICS actually uses 
for the future trajectory of customer charges: and crucially, 
how does this trajectory compare with the trajectory which 
would result from the application of our proposed c
scheme. 
 
M
about the comparati
schemes unless they are provided with the sort of detail 
implicit in these questions – and yet this detail is completel
lacking in the civil service advice to Ministers.  
 
2.11 We ha
w
concluding, however, it is 
aspects of the brief which are surprising.  
 
2.12 In paragraph 11, the brief in effect second guesses
what the likely reaction of HMT and HMRC would be to our 
customer loan proposal. It is not our business to second or 
third guess what the likely rea
d
 
a. If Treasury did oppose, they would have to justi
going against World Bank advice that it is desirable to 
reward customers for customer financed capital. 
 
b. As regards the imputed HMRC position, sin
notional interest and debt repayment a
n ature at all in the accounts of SW, and hence are 
unlikely to be of any concern to HMRC. 
 
(See, however, section 3 of this paper, where we exam
the implications of the Treasury’s recent decision to abolis
the capital charge).  
 
2.13 The civil service brief claims in paragraph 6 that 
the WICS initial estimate of the RCV of Scottish Water is 
likely “to approximate the value investors would pay to own 
Scottish Water”. The initial RCV estimated by the WICS fo
2009-10, when the WICS introduced the RCV method in 
Scotland, was £5.4 billion: and the WICS rolled this 
backwards, (as noted in paragraph 2.2 above), to give a 
value of £4.1 billion in 2006-07. The strategic review of 
charges for 2010-2015, however, recorded the outcome of 
an exercise undertaken by Scottish Water to assess the 
modern equivalent asset value of its assets. This resulted i
an estimate of £42.7 billion in 2009-10 for the current 
net book value of Scottish water’s assets, (rising to almost 
£50 billion in 2014-15.). It seems extraordinary that the brie
did not alert Ministers to the huge discrepancy between the 
WICS estimate of the sale value of Scottish Water, and the 
value of the assets over which control would be lost in the 
event of a sale.  
 
2.14 Overall, therefore, we see no merit, and much tha
is surprising, in the civil service critique of our findings on 
the RCV method and of our proposed replacement.   The 
c
really surprising are the omissions from the civil service 
brief. In particular, it attempts to deal in a purely verbal ba
with issues that are fundamentally matters of modelling: and 
it undertakes no serious analysis of the model which for
the basis for our critique of the cur
n
despit ts surprising and implausible claim that prices are 
actually set on the basis of certain key financial ratios, rat
than the RCV method, it then fails to specify what the 
resulting long term trajectory of charges would be on the 
basis of applying these ratios. Our conclusion is that 
Ministers would have found it impossible to make a properly 
informed decision about the relative properties of differen
charging methods, or about the merits of our specific 
proposal, on the basis of the civil service brief. 
 
3. Postscript: the implications of the 
Treasury decision to abolish the capital 
charge 
3.1 A primary reason why we structured our pr
for a revised charging system for Scottish Water specifically
in terms of a notional customer loan was because of the 
capital charge which the Treasury levied on departments in
respect of capital assets – including the assets of public 
corporatio
a
addressed to us personally by the Cabinet Secretary for 
Finance about the cost of the capital charge relating to
Scottish Water). As we explain in our 2009 paper, our 
approach would have given the Scottish government a 
strong case to pursue with HM Treasury for exe
a
 
3.2 Since publishing our earlier paper, however, there
has been an important development – in that, in 2010, the 
Treasury effectively announced the abolition 
c
the op rtunity for an even simpler, and ultimately even 
cheaper, approach to charging for water in Scotland – 
namely, moving to a position where all Scottish Water’s 
capital expenditure is funded directly from custome
charges. This approach would be entirely feasible for 
o
nt programme. We have undertaken some further 
rk in modelling both the long term and transitional 
angements of this approach. It is not the place her
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a) the transition to funding capital directly from 
revenue could be achieved at the price of a relatively 
small extra cost burden on customers in the short term. 
 
b) the long term implications of this policy would be a 
very significant cost reduction for customers.  
annual saving to the Scottish 
government would build up to the full £140 million annual 
ly 
 a 
ure 
 
uthbert, J.R., Cuthbert, M.: "A Recommendation on How 
o 
l 
 to 
icing. The 
assages in italics were not in the original brief, but were 
ded
e of the Cuthbert’s analysis on the 
 
c 
ative 
ent 
fficiency on Scottish Water’s part to the overall benefit of 
WICS. 
r industry (both in England & 
Wa an  the 
ass
cre
val nies in England & Wales was originally 
set e
on ated 
each year to reflect new (efficient) investment (over and 
abo an
sta
 
5. T
the ave put into those 
ompanies, which is why it is appropriate that this 
ies in E&W. SW’s RCV 
 not therefore a reflection of the value of the assets 
uch it would cost to create them. 
ather it is an estimate of the regulatory value of SW, based 
from E&W, which is likely to approximate 
 the cost of capital, are 
e sole determinants of customer charges. In practice, 
onclude that “under the present charging model a 
significant financial surplus is likely to build up”, and that the 
 
c) And since Scottish Water would no longer need to 
borrow at all, the 
provision for Scottish Water borrowing which is current
in the Scottish government DEL.  
 
3.3 What we would now propose, therefore, given the 
recent change in capital charge rules, would be moving to
system where all of Scottish Water’s capital expendit
was funded direct from customer charges, rather than the
proposal set out in our 2009 paper of treating customer 
financed capital as a notional loan. 
 
____________________ 
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Annex 
The following is the civil service critique which was put
Ministers in reaction to our proposal on water pr
p
inclu  in the version put to Ministers in mid 2010:- 
 
A critiqu
pricing mechanism currently used for  
Scottish Water 
 
Background 
1. The Cuthberts contend that the regulatory model being
applied by the WICS (and as it happens all other economi
regulators across the UK) imposes too high charges on 
customers and as a corollary over high returns for the 
regulated utilities. Their (or conceivably another) altern
might rectify that undesirable position. They further cont
that an alternative regulatory model such as they one they 
advocate  would act as a greater incentive to capital 
e
the Scottish economy. 
 
2. As part of an alternative regulatory model the Cuthberts 
have argued that the concept of customer loans could 
reduce the need for lending to Scottish Water (SW) from 
government, thus freeing resources for other priorities. 
 
Critique of the Cuthbert’s analysis of the 
regulatory model applied by WICS 
 
3. There appear to be two key errors in the Cuthberts’ 
analysis of the regulatory model being applied by the 
 
4. Firstly the Cuthberts assume that the regulatory capital 
values (RCV) used in the wate
les d in Scotland) are an estimate of the value of
ets employed, derived from how much it would cost to 
ate those assets. This is incorrect. The regulatory capital 
ue for the compa
 in th  early 1990s and reflected the value paid for them 
privatisation. Since then the RCV has been upd
ve y investment to maintain the assets in the current 
te), which is funded by investors.  
he RCVs of the companies in England and Wales 
refore reflects the funds investors h
c
investment is remunerated. If it wasn’t, investors would not 
fund any further investment.  
 
6. An absence of information on what investors would pay 
for SW results in the RCV being set by the WICS based on 
the RCV of equivalent sized compan
is
employed, based on how m
R
on comparators 
the value investors would pay to own SW. 
 
7. The second error the Cuthbert’s analysis appears to 
make is that the RCV, together with
th
WICS (like OFWAT) has used the RCV as a guide but has 
set charges on a cash basis. The cash basis is driven by 
financial ratios, such as gearing and free cash flow, that 
investors see as critical indicators of a company’s financial 
health.  
 
8. These two erroneous positions lead the Cuthberts to 
c
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utilisation of this surplus would allow customer charges to
fall without borrowing from Government increasing.   
 
 
. In fact the cash basis that WICS uses is designed to 
on, 
0. The exception is that in the Final Determination for the 
od WICS explicitly funds Scottish Water to be 
s 
 
oted that that the financial surplus does not occur as a 
ficient 
ould borrow commercially. 
 Cuthberts’ proposals for 
t 
 
m 
 its present structure private sector 
funding scores exactly the same as if the SG had 
ng 
to SW without increasing the finance that is 
o The Cuthberts’ suggestion assumes that Scottish 
o be 
that this was not a tax dodge as it is possible that 
ustomer loans are a 
roductive option to pursue. 
alysis of 
the regulatory model being applied by the WICS have lead 
them to a false conclusion. The bottom line is that SW’s 
nt. If one declines, the other 
ust increase to compensate. The Cuthberts’ proposal on 
o 9
ensure a tight budget constraint on SW. With one excepti
a financial surplus builds up only if SW outperforms the 
regulatory settlement.   
 
1
2010-15 peri
able to pay commercial borrowing rates – that is the 
borrowing rates that would be incurred if Scottish Water wa
raising finance independently of Government. Further 
advice is provided on this in the annex but it should be
n
result of the RCV methodology. Rather the surplus arises 
due to an explicit decision by WICS to providing suf
finance so that SW c
 
Critique of the
customer loans 
 
11. With regards to the idea of a customer loan, we do no
think that this proposal offers the possibility of replacing
Government lending to Scottish Water. Further investigation 
has revealed that: 
 
o HM Treasury is highly likely to view loans fro
customers to SW as analogous to private sector 
funding. Under
lent SW the funds – i.e. as SG expenditure. 
Converting part of the existing charge on 
customers to a loan is therefore highly dis-
advantageous – it increases Government lendi
available to SW. 
 
Water could simply deem some of its income t
classed as loans. HMRC would require convincing 
there would be a tax advantage to SW. They are 
likely to seek evidence of credit agreements at the 
individual customer level. This would effectively 
require SW to account for loans to every 
household, which would be disproportionate to any 
tax gain that might accrue and would pose 
challenging questions of how to gain consumer 
consent for making loans and what to do if that 
consent were not forthcoming.    
 
12. It therefore does not appear that c
p
 
Summary 
13. To summarise, the Cuthbert’s errors in their an
financing only comes from two sources – customer charges 
and borrowing from Governme
m
customer loans does not appear to be a productive option t
pursue. 
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